Report to Gen. Hardee from P. R. Cleburne

ORs: Series I, Volume 4, Page 531

 

HDQRS. ADVANCE GUARD, HARDEE'S DIVISION,
Tompkinsville, Ky.,
November 13, 1861.

Major-General HARDEE, Commanding Division, &c.:

GENERAL:
We arrived at this place on yesterday evening about 5 o'clock. We did not find a friend along the whole road from Jamestown here; the houses were closed, the country apparently deserted. We saw a few women and children, but in almost every instance they were surprised and tried to run and conceal themselves at our approach; they have been told, and evidently believed, that we were burning, killing, and destroying as we advanced. One old woman met us with an open Bible in her hand, said she was prepared and ready to die, and could not be convinced that we meant her no harm. As we entered this town, having sent a party in advance to prepare for our encampment, I ordered the advance guard to fall back, you bands to the front, our colors opened, bayonets fixed, and the march at attention resumed, for the purpose of making the strongest display we could. In this order we got nearly to the center of this town, when I was so astonished at the utter silence and desertion, not having seen a human being but two, who both fled, and not having heard seen a human being but two, who both fled, and not having heard from the party sent in advance, that I halted, under the belief the enemy must be at hand, sent our music away, loaded a strong advance guard, and sent our skirmishers, and advanced in this way until we met the party sent our under Major Glenn to select a camp. I merely mention this as an illustration of the feeling existing among the people here. To-day most of the women and children have return, but all the men (a dozen, perhaps, excepted) are absent in Grider's camp at Columbia.

There is a rumor here that a detachment of Rouseau's force, 10,000 or 15,000 strong, is advancing, and but a few miles from here. This I regard as too false to base any calculation whatever upon it. I am satisfied of one thing, there is of once on any of the roads leading to Gallatin, Tenn., and no very immediate danger to the railroad in that quarter from any section of the country through which I have passed. The people here are under the impression that the Federals have possession of the railroad south of Bowling Green, and that we are only waiting a favorable opportunity to get away from there. This is the nearest camp to us. There are tow regiments of Kentucky volunteers there, and hundreds have fled there in front of our advance. I am informed, however, they are dissatisfied with their officers, dispirited, badly armed, and many down with measles. I am reliable informed that there are few, if any, slave-owners among them, and the majority are fighting for the $13 a month and other pecuniary inducements. Did my instructions permit an advance on their camp, I would not hesitate to make it. I believe they would leave, and even if they fought, unless strongly re-enforced, I believe we could destroy them. The alacrity with which they fled from this strongly defensible country, leaving their wives, daughters, and children to the tender mercies of supposed ravishers, murderers, and barbarians, shows they are not yet very formidable as soldiers.

I made it my special business and used every effort to convince the people we were friends to all but soldiers in arms against us and those giving them aid and information. I think on the whole we have succeeded. No insult or injury to the person of any on has come to my notice. I am sorry to state that on yesterday, for the first time, the same respect was not paid to property. Our teamsters, rear guard, and guard with the teams, and individuals who fell back under the pretence of being sick, stole some poultry and other things along the road. I think this conduct was confined to very few; but it was witnessed by officers, who never exercised their authority to put in down, and it only comes to my knowledge now when it is too late to repair it.

On reaching the residence of Colonel Frame, a bitter enemy, in open arms against us, the chief circulator of all the slanders against us, a man who was ordered the plundering of all the southern-rights men he could find, I ordered his house, late headquarters of his camp at someplace, to be searched for arms and ammunition. We found immense quantities of empty gun boxes, receipts for Lincoln guns sent through the country, and all other indications of a recruiting camp. I ordered one quartermaster to seize sheep enough on the place to do us for who or three days; also to take some tallow, sweet oil, and turpentine, which we were in great need of. I then ordered the house to be closed up and nothing else taken. Some unprincipled men took advantage of this circumstance to commence stealing on their own account.

In view of this state of affairs I immediately issued and caused to be read to the men the inclosed special order (marked A).

FRIDAY, November 15, 1861.

I found it unsafe to send a dispatch back, unless with such a force as I could not spare. I am camped here, 7 miles west of Tompkinsville, and expect to be at Jamestown or beyond by night. On the 13th, 12 m., I advanced on the Columbia road, with the intention of taking the Burkesville and Glasgow road home. My guides represented it to me as the best road, and as my orders were silent as to route returning, I thought it best to take the easiest and that which would most advance the object in view, which as I understood, was to make a strong impression (on the people of these hostile counties) as to our strength and readiness to exert it. I feared a return by same route might be construed into a retreat, especially as the enemy were reported on this road, within a few miles of our camp. For these and other good reasons, which I will give when I get back, I determined to take this route. We started at 12 m., intending to make McRea's Cross-Roads (9 miles distant, as I was informed by everybody at Tompkinsville, but which I found utterly untrue). I managed it so as to make the impression on everybody I would take a different road, and then suddenly turned off on this road. Two miles from town, my advanced guard jumped the enemy's pickets. The Texas Rangers, 10 in front, gave chase, followed 4 miles, when they suddenly found themselves in presence of 40 U. S. cavalry. Our men fell back and sent for re-enforcements. I sent on 20 more cavalry to join them, and ordered 60 more to keep well in advance of our infantry and to keep up communication with the party in chase. By the time we had advanced 7 miles night was coming on, I found the Cross-Roads were 16 instead of 9 miles distance, and the enemy's scouts were seen on our flanks and evening our rear.

In this state of affairs I halted the main body, taking up a strong position on Skaggs' Creek. I could not tell whether we were approaching an army or a mere scouting party; I was completely in the dark. I knew nothing of the general movements of the enemy, not having heard from Bowling Green since I left. I knew, however, they were in great force in front and might get in our rear. In this emergency I determined to have our train loaded for any movement. A hotly pressed retreat through 50 miles of hostile country would, I feared, prove very disastrous, and I determined not to be caught in such a trap. I had false camp fires lighted on every surrounding hill, and a wide line of outlying pickets. In the mean time our cavalry pressed the enemy in the direction of the Cross-Roads so closely that they got confused and dispersed in the woods at McRea's Cross-Roads. Our cavalry fell on the main body of the enemy's cavalry, about 100 strong, and after a little skirmish, in which the enemy broke and left and got 2 of their men killed, other men and horses wounded, without damage to us, our cavalry fell back 5 miles to camp for the night.

During the evening and night we captured a number of U. S. dragoon horses, fully accoutered, a number of muskets, pistols, and sabers. a great deal of credit is due Major Harrison, of the Rangers, also Captain Philips, volunteer, for the way they managed to disorganize and disperse this large body of the enemy's cavalry in an unknown country in the night,and without one friend among the country people. My infantry pickets captured several U. S. horses, fully accoutered in the most approved style, within our lines. The truth is, the rush of the rangers so dispersed and confused the enemy that they got lost and were wandering about in every direction, and this accounts for their appearance on our flanks and rear.

I sent Lieutenant Cage, of my regiment, with a dispatch to Major Harrison at midnight, ordering him to fall back on me. Cage and his escort lost their way, got almost into the enemy's lines, and in returning were fired on by our cavalry picket, and returned the fire before the sad mistake was found out. Cage was shot in the leg, his horse was twice shot, and Bankhead, of the Rangers, was shot badly in the leg and arm. Yesterday morning, finding the road clear beyond the Cross-Roads, the enemy all fled, and thinking [it] imprudent to advance, blindfold as I was, I commenced returning by the same route I came,and am here this morning. The Rangers advanced to and beyond the Cross-Roads and up the Glasgow; they heard artillery in the direction of Columbia, and believe a force is advancing along that road. They left Cross-Roads at 1 o'clock yesterday and reached here, a distance of 23 miles, last night.

I doubt whether any force is advancing, and do not think the enemy's cavalry will visit this section soon again. If energetic, the enemy may advance along the Columbia and Jamestown road an attempt to cut us off. I have sent a strong cavalry force ahead to guard against this. The road mentioned is a good one, and Jamestown is as close to Columbia as Tompkinsville. Our advance has been fired at twice from the woods. No damage done. My seven days' provisions are almost out. I think some ought to be sent to meet me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. R. CLEBURNE.

P. S.-I will have a detailed report of captured property of the enemy made out and sent in.

 

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