Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment, CSA
By Paul Robert Scott

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Arlington in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts in History

The University of Texas at Arlington
July 1977

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Table of Contents

Preface
Abstract
List of Illustrations
Chapter I. Raising the Regiment
Chapter II. Winter 1861
Chapter III. To Shiloh
Chapter IV. Return to Kentucky
Chapter V. Fighting in Tennessee
Chapter VI. The Chattanooga and KnoxvilleCampaigns
Chapter VII. The Long Retreat
Endnotes
Appendix. Roster of the Rangers
Bibliography

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Preface

I wish to take this opportunity to thank the many individuals who aided me in the preparation of this paper. First, I acknowledge my indebtedness to the three members of my committee, Dr. Martin H. Hall, Dr. C. George Wolfskill, and Dr. Homer L. Kerr who performed yeoman service throughout the development of this paper. Their patience and perseverance account for whatever scholarly merit it may have.

Two other persons deserving special mention are Judge Lester N. Fitzhugh and Mrs. Benjamin McPherson Hines. Judge Fitzhugh, a distinguished jurist, soldier, and historian, greatly facilitated my early research through suggesting an initial line of study, sharing the result of his own work, and by loaning me a rare and valuable book. Mrs. Hines, at great inconvenience to herself, made available family materials relating to the Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment.

I also wish to acknowledge, collectively, the many others who rendered aid. Numerous historians, librarians, archivists, and researchers went to great pains to see that I received the materials necessary for this project. My failure to cite them individually is not due to a lack of appreciation but to the dictates of time and space.

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Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment, CSA

Paul Robert Scott, M.A.
The University of Texas at Arlington, 1977

Supervising Professor: Martin H. Hall

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In 1861 the Confederate States of America was faced with the problem of raising an army to protect its newly declared independence. It resorted to the time honored expediency of commissioning individuals to raise the necessary units. One of the most renowned organizations thus recruited was the Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment, more familiarly called Terry's Texas Rangers.

While they were representatives to the Texas Secession Convention, Benjamin Franklin Terry, John Austin Wharton, and Thomas Saltus Lubbock conceived the idea of raising a regiment of Texas cavalry for service in Virginia. Terry and Lubbock personally petitioned the Confederate government for permission to do so but were initially refused. President Jefferson Davis relented, however, after Terry and Lubbock gained glory during the First Battle of Bull Run, July 1861. Terry obtained the colonel's commission and Lubbock the lieutenant colonel's.

Back in Texas, Terry and Lubbock authorized ten captains (including Wharton) to raise companies for their units. Throughout August and September the companies individually recruited troops, organized, and mustered in Houston. In the excitement of the first days of the war, the ranks were quickly filled by the most qualified men available.

Terry's Regiment was not destined for Virginia service. As the first companies passed through New Orleans, Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Army of Tennessee, secured their transfer to his command in Kentucky. The Regiment assembled at Bowling Green, Kentucky, completed its organization and began operations against the enemy. Patrolling and skirmishing during the first few months were more important as training than for the influence on the overall military situation. In contrast, disease was rampant, killing Lubbock and incapacitating three-quarters of the command.

On December 16, 1861, near Woodsonville, Kentucky, the Regiment engaged the Thirty-Second Indiana Infantry Regiment in its first pitched battle. The Texans charged, carried the field, and inflicted more casualties than they sustained, but unfortunately Terry was killed. Technology had made sweeping changes in warfare and nowhere was this more apparent than in the cavalry. Increased firepower made sabers and traditional cavalry charges virtually obsolete. Terry's Rangers were admirably suited for this new form of warfare as it was consistent with their experiences at home where revolvers were more effective against Indians and Mexicans than were swords. They also enjoyed an initial advantage over their blue-coated counterparts as they were experienced in horsemanship from childhood.

Under their new commander, Wharton, the Rangers shared the Army's reverses throughout the first part of 1862 and suffered a marked decline in morale. Nevertheless they performed well in numerous small unit actions as well as in the Battle of Shiloh. In the summer they joined Nathan Bedford Forrest to raid behind enemy lines in Tennessee. Under his successful and inspirational leadership morale soared and remained high for the rest of the war despite the worsening military situation and numerous changes in commanders. They fought with the Army of Tennessee in the battles of Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and Bentonville and participated in several hundred other engagements in ever decreasing numbers but with the same determination with which they left Texas.

While the Federal cavalry consistently improved its efficiency, it never surpassed that of the Texans. Even in the final campaigns, Sherman's marches through Georgia and the Carolinas, the Rangers repeatedly engaged the enemy with favorable results. The regiment, though numerically a shadow of its former self, continued the fight until it was surrendered by Joseph Johnston in April 1865.

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List of Illusrations

Undated Photograph of Benjamin Franklin Terry, co-organizer and first commander of Terry's Texas Rangers

Undated (probably 1862) Photograph of Private Achille Ferris, Company H .

Privates John Walker Foster Hill and Robert Edward Hill, Company D. Summer or Fall 1861

Captain Louis M. Strobel, Company F. Probably about August 1861

The Army of Tennessee's area of operations, Winter 1861

Undated Photograph of John A. Wharton, Organizer and First Captain of Company B and Regimental Commander December 1861-September 1862

Undated Photograph of five Rangers

Shiloh Battlefield, April 6 and 7, 1862

Stones River (or Murphreesboro) Battlefield

Wheeler's Raid on Rosecrans, September 29-October 9, 1863

The Eighth Texas' Area of Operations, November-December 1863

The approaches to Atlanta

Area of operations, July 1864

The Rangers' second battle flag

The Terry's Texas Ranger Association's statue

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Chapter I
Raising the Regiment

When, in 1860, the tension between the North and the South reached the point that many Southerners believed that their only recourses were secession or submission, Benjamin Franklin Terry, Thomas Saltus Lubbock, and John Austin Wharton were three of Texas' most ardent advocates of the former. These three men, in addition to campaigning for the dissolution of the Union in the political arena, were equally willing to campaign on the battlefield to maintain it. Together they raised one of the most famous Texas units, the Eighth Regiment Texas Cavalry, C. S. A., or Terry's Texas Rangers.

Each was a prominent figure, and each was from a distinguished family. Ben Terry was born in Kentucky, February 18, 1821, the eldest of the four sons of Joseph R. and Sarah Smith Terry. His brother, David, born in 1823, was to have a distinguished and tumultuous career as a lawyer and judge in California before and after the War Between the States. With the outbreak of the conflict he left California and raised the unnumbered D. S. Terry Texas Cavalry Regiment for the Confederacy. Aurelius had the distinction of being the only one of the four brothers to die a natural death, but he did enjoy a prosperous life. 1 Clinton, the youngest, was Wharton's law partner and was mortally wounded at Shiloh. 2

The family moved from Kentucky to Mississippi at an undetermined date where Joseph and Sarah separated. Sarah traveled on to Texas with her sons and joined her mother, Obedience Fort Smith, in 1833 or early 1834. 3

There is no record of Ben's serving in either the Texas Revolution or in the War with Mexico in 1846. 4 It is possible, however, that he was in one or both of these wars. In February 1858, he received 320 acres in Jack County by a special act of the legislature; the service entitling him to the grant was unspecified. 5 His brother, David, claimed to have participated in the Texas Revolution (although he would have been only thirteen at the time of the Battle of San Jacinto); in the War with Mexico he served in the First Regiment Texas Mounted Volunteer Rifles. 6

[PHOTO]
Undated Photograph of Benjamin Franklin Terry,
co-organizer and first commander of Terry's Texas Rangers.
Courtesy of Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin.

Ben Terry always enjoyed a prosperous position in life. In 1840, his property included eighteen slaves, twenty-six horses, thirty-five head of cattle, and 2,000 acres of land. 7 In 1850 he owned twenty-eight slaves, 8 and in 1860 he had $68,000 in real property, $105,000 in personal property, and 118 slaves. Of Terry's 118 slaves, 105 were held jointly with William J. Kyle, his partner, on a sugar plantation located in Fort Bend County. They had purchased the enterprise in 1853. 9

Terry was a natural leader. He was over six feet tall with broad shoulders and blonde whiskers. His photograph implies that he was a powerful man with a dignified bearing. He is credited with being an aggressive individual, a "tireless rider," and a good shot. 10 As the eldest son of a fatherless family he had a chance to develop his leadership from an early age. His mother also died about 1836. More than likely the boys were reared by their grandmother or their uncle, Ben Fort Smith, a planter. There is, however, an indication in A. Russell Buchanan's David S. Terry of California that Ben was in fact the head of the family of boys in that it was he who allowed David to terminate his formal education. 11 Even though he allowed David to quit school he evidently had a great deal of respect for education because he maintained a school on his plantation, Oakland, for his own children and those of the neighborhood. 12

Thomas Saltus Lubbock was born in Charlotte, South Carolina, in 1817, to Henry T. and Susan Ann Saltus Lubbock. 13 In 1835 he moved to New Orleans to be with his brother, Francis R. Lubbock, and to work as a cotton factor. After staying a short period of time he joined the New Orleans Greys, a unit being raised to aid Texas in her revolt against Mexico, and arrived in Texas in time to participate in the Siege of Bexar, December, 1835. In January, 1836 he was employed on the Yellowstone, a Brazos River steamboat. Sam Houston, during his retreat, pressed the Yellowstone to ferry his army across the river. Later the ship had a brush with the Mexican army; but otherwise it played a relatively minor part in the campaign. In 1841, Lubbock was a member of the Texan-Santa Fe expedition as a lieutenant and was captured with it and sent to Mexico City as a prisoner. 14 He managed to escape by leaping from a balcony and was able to return to Texas in time to join the Somervell Expedition. 15

Lubbock was a staunch supporter of the South and its institutions. In November, 1860, David C. Jones, an organizer living in Owensville, Robertson County, Texas, named him a member of the Knights of the Golden Circle, a militant group founded on the dream of establishing a slave-holding empire in the southern section of the United States, Mexico, and Central America; the inclusion of the northern United States was optional. With the imminent threat of an abolitionist government in Washington, the organization changed its program to that of advocating secession. 16 In the meantime, Tom's brother, Francis, had been active in Texas politics. He was lieutenant governor from 1857 to 1859 in the Hardin R. Runnels administration and later served as governor from November 1861 to November 1863. At the beginning of the war Tom Lubbock was a Houston businessman. 17

John Austin Wharton was the youngest of the three, and he was the only one who lived long enough to establish a name for himself as a result of his Civil War service. He was born near Nashville, Tennessee, July 3, 1828, to William Harris Wharton and Sarah Ann Groce Wharton. As a child he was brought to Galveston but returned east to attend South Carolina College (present-day University of South Carolina). In 1848, he married Penelope Johnson, the daughter of South Carolina's governor, David Johnson. Electing to enter the legal profession, Wharton studied under Elisha Marshall Pease, who was elected governor of Texas in 1853 and 1855. In 1859, Wharton became district attorney of the First Judicial District, and in 1860 he was a presidential elector. 18 At the outbreak of the war he was practicing law in Brazoria with Ben Terry's brother, Clinton. 19

Each of these three men were members of the delegations their districts sent to the Secession Convention held in Austin in January 1861. Terry represented the district which included Matagorda, Wharton, and Fort Bend Counties; Lubbock represented Harris County; and Wharton, Galveston and Brazoria Counties. During the convention they did little to distinguish themselves from other members who were as ardently prosecession and perhaps even more vocal than they. The convention adjourned on February 5, and on February 23, the people of Texas voted for secession with the exception of E1 Paso County (which had cast its votes a week earlier). 20

While returning home together by stagecoach, Terry, Lubbock, and Wharton determined to raise a regiment of cavalry for the Confederate service to protect the new nation they were helping to establish. 21 Lubbock immediately left with George Goldthwaite for the Confederate capital in Montgomery to obtain permission to raise the proposed unit. Secretary of War Leroy P. Walker, however, refused their request on the grounds that it would be inefficient to raise forces in Texas when troops were available nearer to the scene of action in the east. It was expected that the war would be of brief duration; therefore, the government did not want to go to the expense of transporting troops from Texas. Lubbock returned to Texas "chagrined and indignant." Shortly after arriving home he determined to return East to personally participate, at least, in the struggle for Southern independence. 22

While Lubbock was in Alabama, Terry was dealing with problems closer to home. At this time there were some 2,800 United States troops stationed in the State of Texas, and Texans were determined to effect their removal and to appropriate their stores. At some points the transfer was carried out with almost ludicrous ease. At Brazos Santiago the material was receipted from Ordnance Sergeant John L. Greer, United States Army, and then turned over to Ordnance Sergeant John L. Greer, Texas Army. Captain Bennett H. Hill of Fort Brown (near Brownsville) was not so tractable. He not only refused to accede to the demands of Ebenezar B. Nichols, the commissioner of the state, but refused to acknowledge Nichol's authority. Nichols thereupon went to Galveston for reinforcements. He left Colonel John Salmon "Rip" Ford in charge of negotiations and Lieutenant Colonel Hugh McLeod with the forces at Brazos Santiago.

Arriving at Galveston on February 26, Nichols wired Colonel Terry, who had been selected by the Convention to command the battalion of reinforcements consisting of three companies of seventy-five men each from Brazoria, Liberty and Houston and the Galveston Rifles. At 6:00 p.m. on the twenty-eighth, Terry arrived at Houston with the Brazoria Company, consolidated two understrengthed companies found in Houston, took passage on a special train, disembarked at Galveston, and boarded the General Rusk where he found the Galveston Rifles waiting.

On March 2, he joined forces with Lieutenant Colonel McLeod at Brazos Santiago to form a regiment. Terry yielded his colonelcy, but became the unit's major. The two opposing forces faced one another for some two weeks, the Texans at Brazos Santiago and the Federals at Fort Brown. During this time Terry was active in communicating between Colonel Ford in Brownsville and the command at Brazos Santiago. On or about March 7, Captain Hill called on Nichols in Brownsville to announce that he had received marching orders and would evacuate the Rio Grande Valley without bloodshed. The Texans returned to Galveston on the fifteenth and Terry accompanied the companies from Harris and Fort Bend Counties to Houston. 23

In early June, Lubbock again left Texas for the East. This time it appears that he was accompanied by perhaps as many as fifty others, including Terry and Thomas J. Goree. 24 Wharton planned to join them but rather than traveling overland he sailed to New Orleans. Along the way he was allegedly temporarily detained by the Federals. 25 After his release he returned home to raise a company. 26 Oran M. Roberts, however, stated that it was illness that prevented him from being with his companions when on July 21, 1861, they participated in the First Battle of Manassas. 27

Upon arriving in Virginia in July, Goree was appointed an aide to General James Longstreet while Lubbock and Terry were attached to his staff as volunteer aides. 28 Early on the morning of the battle they made their most significant contribution to the Confederate victory when, as Longstreet wrote:

About an hour after my position was taken it was discovered by a reconnaissance made by Colonels Terry and Lubbock that the enemy was moving in heavy columns towards our left, the position that the general [Beauregard] had always supposed he would take. This information was at once sent to headquarters, and I soon received orders to fall back upon my original position, the right bank of the run. Colonels Terry and Lubbock then volunteered to make a reconnaissance of the position of the enemy's batteries. They made a very gallant and complete one, and a hasty sketch of his entire left. 29

By their early detection of the enemy's movements they allowed Longstreet and Beauregard to frustrate the Federal scheme of maneuver. As is so often the case, it was not these significant accomplishments which captured the imagination of both the public and of the leaders alike, but a more spectacular, less telling exploit the next day which General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the southern commander, recorded in his report:

[they] accompanied Captain Whitehead's troop to take possession of Fairfax Court-House. Colonel Terry, with his unerring rifle, severed the halliard, and thus lowered the Federal flag found still floating from the cupola of the Court-House there. 30

Terry's exploit in shooting down the flag has been recorded by almost everyone who has written about the Eighth Texas Cavalry, and even General Beauregard mentioned it in an article he wrote on Manassas after the war. 31 Even though shooting down a flag flying over a captured courthouse may seem redundant, it is of such things that legends are made.

Shortly after Manassas, Terry and Lubbock received commissions to raise a cavalry regiment for service in Virginia, reportedly in recognition of their battlefield exploits. 32 While sources dealing with circumstances surrounding their negotiations with officials in Richmond are sketchy, it is evident that there was a misunderstanding in the very basic matter as to who would mount the regiment. Terry and Lubbock apparently believed that the Confederate government would provide the necessary horses. While they required prospective recruits to bring their own weapons and equestrian equipment, they did not require them to have horses. 33 On the other hand, three months later, Acting Secretary of War Judah Philip Benjamin wrote that, "When Terry went to Texas to collect his regiment he was informed by the President in the most explicit manner that no cavalry could be accepted without their furnishing their own horses." 34 This misunderstanding would have serious, but not fatal, consequences later when the command reported for duty.

In early August Terry and Lubbock were back in Texas and on the twelfth they commissioned ten captains and directed each to raise a company consisting of:

. . . one captain, one first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, [four sergeants,] four corporals, one blacksmith, two musicians, and from sixty-four to one hundred privates, and to report the same to us on or before the ist day of September next. Each man will be required to furnish equipments for his horse and to arm himself. The company will be transported free. The term of service will be during the war unless sooner discharged. 35

The ten captains selected to raise the companies which were to comprise the regiment were: Thomas Harrison, John A. Wharton, Marcus L. Evans, Stephen C. Ferrill, L. M. Rayburn, Louis M. Strobel, William Y. Houston, Isham G. Jones, John Holt, and John G. Walkero Terry also offered a commission to John D. Rogers, but he declined because he was recruiting a company of infantry for service in Virginia. 36 While it is not known why these particular captains were selected to raise their respective companies, it is probable that each was personally known to either Terry or Lubbock. At least one company had been formed before its captain received Terry's commission. On August 14 the Weekly Telegraph reported that Terry had accepted Captain John G. Walker's company from Harris County. The same issue stated, however, that the company had not yet achieved full strength and that applications were still being accepted. 37 Three weeks later the newspaper announced that Walker's company had been enrolled with an election held the first of September. 38 This probably indicated that it had to be reorganized after receiving new recruits and perhaps losing some former members who had declined service in Virginia.

The call to arms stipulated that each man should furnish his own gear which was to include a rifle or shotgun, one or more revolvers, a saddle, bridle, etc. The regiment as a whole was very well equipped. When Captain Ferrill's company passed through New Orleans--a city which had become accustomed to seeing Texas troops en route to the war, as well as the many military organizations that flourished in and around the city--it evoked special comment from the Picayune. The newspaper calculated that the average cost of each man's saddle and rigging alone amounted to $100.00. 39 Confederate authorities, however, disagreed, for their evaluation was approximately a third that of the journalist's. 40

As might be expected, the soldiers brought a wide variety of ordnance. Terry, in reports to headquarters relating to the nature of the arms of his regiment, asserted that there were twenty-one different varieties. There were 597 double-barrel shotguns, ninety-one common rifles, twenty-nine Mississippi rifles, fourteen Sharps rifles, thirteen Sharps "6-shooting rifles," twelve Minié rifles, ten Sharps Carbines, six shotgun rifles, five Minié muskets, five Harper's Ferry rifles, five carbines, three Colt's "6-shooting rifles," three Morse rifles, three double rifles, three musketoons, two muskets, 584 Navy Colt revolvers, ninety-two Army Colt revolvers, sixty-four Colt "5-shooter" revolvers, twenty-two holster pistols, eleven Starr pistols. 41 Supplementing this motley assortment were numerous hunting knives. While the Weekly Telegraph's statement that each member of Strobel's company carried a two-foot, three-pound knife may have been an exaggeration, this is certainly an indication that there were a considerable number of large knives in this company. 42 Conspicuous for not being mentioned were swords, for with the exception of Terry's, there were none mentioned among the myriad weapons at the time of organization. 43

[PHOTO]
Undated (probably 1862) photograph of Private Achille Ferris, Company H.
Courtesy of Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin.

[PHOTO]
Privates John Walker Foster Hill and Robert Edward Hill, Company D. Summer or Fall 1861.
From Goldman, "Letters From Three Members of Terry's Texas Rangers."

[PHOTO]
Captain Louis M. Stroble, Company F. Probably about August, 1861.
Courtesy of the Confederate Museum, United Daughters of the Confederacy, Austin, Texas.

Some troopers brought their body servants to ease the straing of campaigning. It is not known how many slaves were with the regiment, but in December 1862, a Ranger wrote that there were sixty blacks who had been with the unit from the beginning. 44 This, of course, was only an estimate and Rangers were seldome guilty of underestimating the numbers of anything that they felt would reflect upon the honor of their regiment. This figure excluded, however, those slaves who had been with the regiment for only part of the time.

A recurring theme of those who were acquainted with the regiment during its recruitment was the high caliber and high spirits of those who were allowed to enlist. Leonidas B. Giles observed that:

The personnel was of the very highest. Sons of leading families, many of them college graduates, professional men, merchants, stockmen, and farmers, served in the ranks as privates, all young, in their teens and early twenties. Rank was scarcely considered. The supreme desire was to get into the war in a crack cavalry regiment. 45

Generally Giles was correct in his estimate of the personnel of the Regiment. As the appended roster shows they were not all in their "teens and early twenties," but the large majority were well within their prime years. The information available on the individuals confirms Giles' statement of their background. Not all were from prominent families, but many were. Their subsequent record indicates that they were well motivated and had faith in their cause. 46

The regiment's quality was high because each man was selected. At this point of the war the unit could pick and choose its members. If a man did not meet the expectations of the recruiter he was simply refused the privilege of enlistment. In late August it was already reported that hundreds had been turned down; 47 in late September the reported figure had risen to 3,000. 48 While these statistics were doubtlessly exaggerations, they do illustrate the attitude of the leaders towards recruitment. It was reported, albeit by a relatively unreliable source, that some individuals attempted to influence the decisions of the recruiters by offering $75 to $100 for being allowed to enlist. 49

There were several reasons for the capability to select recruits rather than simply accepting them. This was one of the earliest units to be raised in Texas for duty in Virginia and the first cavalry regiment for such service. Stephen B. Oates, a prominent Texas historian, in "Recruiting Confederate Cavalry in Texas," listed twenty-two cavalry units from company to regimental strength that were raised in Texas in 1861: five regiments were for service in New Mexico; five regiments and a battalion were for Texas; one regiment for Indian Territory; and four regiments, two battalions, and three companies were for Arkansas. The remaining unit, the Eighth Texas, alone was destined for service in the East. 50

Texans preferring to serve in the cavalry and who wanted to participate in the Eastern Theater, where it seemed that the outcome of the war would be decided, favored the unit Terry was raising. Texans, with a long tradition of mounted warfare including the Mexican-American War, Indian campaigns, and border skirmishes, always gravitated towards the cavalry. During the Civil War the state of Texas raised some ninety regiments, fifty-four battalions, and twenty-eight batteries for the Confederacy. Of this number there were sixty-one cavalry regiments and thirty-nine cavalry battalions. 51 This clearly indicates an overwhelming preference on the part of Texans to serve in the cavalry rather than in the infantry.

The spectacular victory at First Manassas less than a month previously also doubtlessly did much to bolster the spirit of Texans and whetted their desire to participate in such a "glorious" war. There was also a certain amount of snob appeal to be found in the recruiting methods. An announcement in a Houston newspaper for Walker's company stated that "None but men fitted for such service will be received. It is designed to make this the best regiment of the army, and every man will be picked with that view." 52 Terry's regiment had a multiplicity of attractions: a monopoly, status, popular support, and already a great deal of self-confidence. With these advantages it was relatively easy to recruit the most capable men into its ranks.

By the end of August, the enrolling being nearly completed, the respective men and companies began marching to Houston. On August 31, Terry took leave of his plantation in a manner befitting an aristocrat. He was on a fine horse, wearing a new uniform and an old sword, one that his uncle, Ben Fort Smith, had carried in the War of 1812 and at San Jacinto. He made the rounds of his property and visited some of his slaves who were too feeble to come to him. He then bade his farewells to the remaining servants and instructed them to render obedience to their overseers and to take care of his family. He also informed them that he would be home by Christmas. He then said goodbyes to his family and rode off with his son, David, who had joined John Holt's company. 53

The men of Stephen C. Ferrill's command, later designated as Company "D," met in Bastrop on a sunny morning in August, bade their friends goodbye, and rode sixty miles to Alleyton where they boarded the train for Houston and sent their horses back. Instead of being carried directly to Houston they were left at Pierce Junction to await another train. That night they were plagued by swarms of mosquitoes. The next day, the train not having arrived, they pushed by hand the freight car with their equipment and walked some nine miles to Houston where they bivouaced in a warehouse. 54 Company "G" left San Antonio on September seventh and marched 235 miles to Houston arriving on the thirteenth. 55 The others reported in at varying intervals throughout late August and September. 56

The main item of business once each company reached Houston was to be mustered into the Confederate service. Second Lieutenant Jesse W. Sparks, an officer on Henry E. McCulloch's staff, commander of the Department of Texas, administered the oath. Sparks was formerly of the United States Infantry. The event made an impression on at least one man, for long after the war he recalled:

A little incident happened at the time which showed the feelings and determination of the men. They were lined up on three sides of hollow square (as I now remember). The enrolling officer in the center asked this question, "Do you men wish to be sworn into service for twelve months or for three years or for during the war?" With a unanimity never surpassed, a shout unheard of before, that whole body of men shouted, "For the war," "For the war!" not one expecting or caring to return until the war was over, long or short, and the invaders had been driven from our borders. 57

It is not surprising that the response was "for the war," because that was the period for which the regiment was recruited. Doubtlessly the recruits did have a great deal of enthusiasm, but at the time no one thought that three and a half years of war lay before him. One trooper believed that it would be over in three months, while another expected to be home within twelve months. 58

The companies also had to complete their organization. All had probably chosen their officers and noncommissioned officers by the time they had arrived at Houston. There was, however, some last minute recruiting to fill out the ranks of units which did not yet have their full complement and to replace those who for some reason had enrolled but failed to muster with their unit. Even though the newspapers reported that the first companies numbered 116 men each, Harrison's company, the last to be enrolled, numbered only four officers and eighty-seven enlisted men. On September Ii, Rayburn and Jones each called for more volunteers to fill out their ranks, and on September 18 a local newspaper ran an announcement that there was room for 100 more recruits in the established companies. 59

Though there were last minute details for some individuals to attend to, the majority had very little to do except to visit town and to have a good time. At this early stage of their development the Rangers began demonstrating the flair that was to make them famous. As might be expected it was their horsemanship that attracted the greatest amount of attention. Individuals used the streets of Houston to practice such skills as dismounting and remounting at full gallop and to pick up objects on the run. Walker, acknowledged as perhaps the best horseman of the Regiment, at one point on Main Street jumped his horse over a brace of oxen. From their subsequent behavior in Nashville it would appear that their stunts were inspired as much by a love of public attention as a love for equestrianship. 60

The regiment itself was not organized at this time. While no reason was given for postponing formal organization, there are several possible explanations. The most obvious one was that at no time were all companies simultaneously present in Houston. Terry probably believed that it would be bad for the morale of the troops to retain them at Houston any longer than necessary; therefore after each company was ready it was sent towards its destination. The men were also newcomers to military life, and their understanding of martial matters was restricted solely to preconceptions and first impressions in an abnormal environment. They knew little more of their leaders. The regiment at this time could hardly be considered a unit; it was more like ten separate entities under a common leader. The men, being from scattered points, knew very little of the men and officers of other companies. They would, therefore, tend to be relatively provincial in their attitudes. Later common experiences would cause them to consider themselves as Rangers first and as members of their individual companies second. Since Terry planned to have all regimental officers, not just company grade officers, stand for election, he may have wished to give the men more experience with which to make an intelligent decision. As the time was not yet propitious, organization was postponed.

At this time the companies were known by the names of their captains and by self-assumed designations, such as "Prarie Rovers" or "The Bastrop Rangers." As each company arrived during the month of September, it conducted its business, and then left Houston for New Orleans on its way to Virginia. While it appears that each was largely on its own in making the journey, Francis Lubbock reported that the regiment was divided into two divisions. The first was led by Terry and had the honor of escorting the newly-elected governor of Texas, Francis R. Lubbock, on the first part of has journey to Richmond. The second division left a few days later and was led by Tom Lubbock. 61 The first companies departed Houston about September 18 and arrived at the Crescent City around the twenty-fifth. Companies were to straggle into New Orleans for over a month. 62

Strobel's company was the first to leave Houston just as it had been the first to arrive. The men boarded a train and rode to New Iberia where there was a gap in the line of some 100 miles which they were to march across. Wagons were hired to carry the baggage and eight to ten men were able to engage horses for the trip. The remainder had to travel on foot. By that afternoon the troops were suffering from blisters and sore feet due to the numerous puddles in the road. Seeing large herds of horses running loose, the commanding officer decided to press some for his men to ride. The mounted men succeeded in penning a herd of over a hundred head in various stages of training--some had never been handled, others were broken. The remainder of the afternoon was spent breaking horses. The next morning the company rode on towards Brashear City (now Morgan City). There they left their steeds and boarded trains. There apparently is no record as to what was done with the horses. The day after it reached New Orleans, Strobel's command again boarded a train and continued on its journey towards Virginia. At Grand Junction, Tennessee the captain received a telegram from Terry instructing him to halt and await further orders. 63

Ferrill's company left Houston by rail to Beaumont about the same time as Strobel's. Here it boarded a steamboat and sailed down the Neches and up the to Niblett's Bluff. The men then walked about a hundred miles and subsequently rode forty miles in ox-carts to New Iberia. Here they boarded boats which took them to Brashear City where they apparently caught the train for New Orleans. 64

A simple recitation of the route does very little to describe the journey. One man reported that the roads were muddy and from time to time they were rained upon. The baggage wagons often became mired and had to be dragged or pried free. 65 This naturally inspired a certain amount of grumbling among the troops, but generally they seemed to have accepted their situation as part of the profession. There was some sickness on the trip but it was not severe and appears to have been at least partially attributable to the men's tendency to overindulge in the sugar cane which grew abundantly along the route. 66

Wharton's company left Houston with Ferrill's and rode on horseback as far as Beaumont where it dismounted and returned its horses. From Beaumont the men sailed to Lake Charles, Louisiana, and then walked to New Iberia where other boats took them to New Orleans. 67 Wharton's company does not appear to have been particularly restrained in its actions. A private in Ferrill's unit reported that when a poor civilian, owning only about four head of cattle, refused to part with one, a member of Wharton's command killed the beef anyway. On the whole, however, it appears that the regiment got along reasonably well with the citizens of the area who presented them with. food and bouquets. 68

The Texans made a favorable impression upon the people of New Orleans, especially by their unusual dress. Throughout their history the Rangers were never particularly concerned about uniformity, and for the most part they wore what they deemed appropriate. New Orleans was the home of numerous volunteer organizations which quite often wore their uniforms. Several other Texas companies had passed through before the Rangers, all of which caused comparably little comment from the press. The arrival of Wharton's company only evoked an acknowledgement and the comment that "They . . . are a most formidable looking body of men." 69 Walker's company, however, attracted a great deal of attention. The Picayune observed that they were:

. . . dressed fantastically in hunting shirts of different material, with large boots worn outside and coming over the knees, with Mexican spurs attached. Some wore fancy Mexican pants trimmed down the sides with little round buttons, and silk sashes around their waists. Others had the Confederate flag, worked in different colored feathers to represent it, on the legs of their boots.

Their commander was the subject of especial comment:

Capt. Walker, who is about six feet four inches in height, and who has served nearly his whole life on the frontier as a Ranger, was dressed in a buckskin hunting shirt and pants, which latter fitted close to his well rounded form, with an immense pair of boots, large Mexican spurs, a real Mexican sombrero, or hat, and wore across his shoulders a beautifully worked Mexican blanket. 70

Though they were not yet fully organized, had seen only a month of Confederate service, and had yet to see combat, Terry's Rangers had already acquired a reputation. The people at home had sent them off with enthusiasm and at New Orleans they had been received with admiration. They were armed to the teeth and were commanded by men who were already veterans of campaigns and pitched battles. They were picked men who were expected to accomplish great things.

Company Organization and Activities 71
Houston to New Orleans

[TABLE]

Company Organization and Activities; Houston to New Orleans (continued)

*Although Bunting consistently spelled the name "Javellins" it appears from the
fact that they originally carried the skin of a javelina as a standard that
"Javelinas" is the correct spelling

---

Chapter II
Winter 1861

While Terry's regiment was being recruited, organized, and transported, events were in progress which redirected its destination from Virginia to Tennessee and Kentucky.  In mid-September, Albert Sidney Johnston had assumed command of the Western Department and found his situation to be serious.  He had an insufficient force to hold this important and highly vulnerable area which included a substantial portion of southern industry and mining.  The troops which he did have were poorly deployed and ill-equipped. 1  In order to bolster his force, on September 17 he telegraphed Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper:

I can mount and use Terry's regiment of Texas Rangers immediately if put under my orders. Please not to order any more armed companies from this department at present and order any such organized within the department to me here.

The next day the Adjutant and Inspector General replied:

Terry's regiment is understood to have been raised with special view to service on the Potomac.  If they prefer to remain in your department, stop and employ them as you propose.3

There is some contradiction as to how Johnston induced Terry's regiment to come to the Western Department.  Strong evidence indicates that Johnston and authorities in Richmond simply ordered the unit to Kentucky.  Francis Lubbock stated that while at Chattanooga, Terry received a dispatch from Johnston "ordering" him to Kentucky.  Some credibility is added to his version by the statement that he (Lubbock) said farewell to the regiment there.4  Others, however, maintained that Johnston requested the Texans to join his command and that they did so at their own volition, as the Adjutant and Inspector General's message indicated would be the proper procedure.  Writing after the war, Henry W. Graber, of Wharton's Company, reported that Johnston contacted Terry and requested that he persuade the troops to accede to join his command.  As inducements he authorized Terry to say that he would provide them with the best horses in Kentucky and that they would never be brigaded while he lived.5  (This last promise is probably erroneous, for in January, 1862, the command was part of William J. Hardee's division.6 The Eighth Texas, however, was not joined with another cavalry command until after the Battle of Shiloh where Johnston was killed.)  Upon obtaining the men's acquiescence, Terry supposedly agreed to service in Kentucky.7

Contemporary evidence, however, indicates that the rank and file were not consulted and, perhaps, even that Terry was not certain as to their status.  On September 28, William Nicholson of Ferrill's company wrote home that “Colonel Terry is in this place [New Orleans]--he is not certain where we will go but believes he will receive orders to go to Kentucky.”8  On September 29 the uncertainty was alleviated when a message was received from Richmond ordering them to report to Johnston.9  The unit received the change of destination with mixed, but predominantly negative, emotions.

Some were pleased (at least after the war) at the opportunity to serve under a fellow Texan who was personally known to Terry and other men of the command. 10 At the time, however, most of the soldiers were displeased with the change of destination and several voiced their displeasure in their letters home. ll

Shortly after the determination was made to deploy Terry's Regiment in the west, the companies began assembling at Nashville to drill and await further orders.  Terry reached the Nashville fairgrounds on October 3 with four companies, one had preceded him by two days.  Immediately upon arriving, the unit drew supplies.  The troopers also encountered a problem that would plague them throughout the war, a shortage of horses.  Terry soon learned that only 100 mounts had been gathered, and he expressed to Johnston his well-founded fear that horses in the vicinity were scarce and had been picked over. 12

The time spent at Nashville appears to have been a period of relative idleness.  The principal item of business was that of securing horses.  Five days after his arrival, Terry again reported to Johnston that procurement of mounts was going slowly. 13  With what animals they did have, however, the Rangers put on a spectacle for the citizens, just as they had in Houston.  The Gazette reported that the Rangers' repertoire of stunts included picking up objects while in a gallop, dismounting and remounting at full speed, riding horses on their flank, thus using them as portable bulwarks, and, perhaps most impressive of all, breaking horses heretofore considered unbreakable.14  J. K. Polk Blackburn noted that the Tennesseans scattered silver dollars to be picked up by mounted Rangers riding at full speed. Eventually half-dollars and quarters replaced dollars and were in turn succeeded by bouquets.  Notwithstanding the absence of financial remuneration, the Rangers avidly competed solely for the laurels.15

While at Nashville the Rangers suffered their first fatality, not from a bullet but from a hazard more dangerous in 19th century warfare, disease.  The first man to die was Thomas Hart of Ferrill's company who succumbed in early October.  His sickness and death spanned less than a day, and William Nicholson attributed it to an overdose of opium administered by physicians.16 During ensuing bivouacs more men sickened.  General Johnston had unfortunately occupied a portion of Kentucky unhealthful to his troops from the warmer climates of Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.  His entire command was plagued by measles, pneumonia, diarrhea, mumps, and other maladies.  In December, three-quarters of Terry's men were unable to stand roll call.17  These diseases permanently deprived the Confederacy of the services of large numbers of men.  Many Rangers died in the period from early winter 1861 to spring 1862; many others had their health shattered and were discharged.  A number of those medically discharged later reenlisted in either the Eighth Texas or in other units, but most had their taste for campaigning permanently satiated.18

The officers probably tried to keep a tight rein on their high spirited troopers to prevent trouble.  A private in Ferrill's company wrote that only six or eight of that company were allowed to go to town simultaneously and that they were only permitted to stay four hours.  He also stated that there was some circumvention of the rules. 19  Strobel's company, in particular, was in need of strict disciplining:

From the beginning, military discipline was a severe tax on the wild, independent youths of Strobel's Company.  They heaped censure on their officers and had fights among themselves in which several soldiers were wounded.  Another company was forced to assume the responsibility of restoring order in the turbulent Company F.20

Although Nashville was not mentioned as the scene of the disorder, this indicates the problems faced by those responsible for the unit's conduct.  Blackburn believed that it was a lack of discipline that led to the removal of the Rangers from Nashville.  He recorded that even though Terry posted guards about the camp at night, some individuals left undetected.  Many habitually overimbibed and vigorously took exception to being jailed by the city police.  One night three or four drunken Rangers attended a performance at the theater.  One scene depicted Pocahontas intervening to save the life of John Smith.  As Pocahontas placed herself in the path of the executioner's club, one of the Texans:

. . . whipped out a six-shooter and fired upon the supposed executioner with the remark that "his mother had taught him to always protect a lady when in danger."  This shot missed its mark, but created consternation and stopped the play.21

The local police foolishly attempted to thwart this trooper's

chivalrous attempt to "save the princess."  The Rangers escaped by killing two policemen and wounding a third.  Blackburn stated that the governor of Tennessee notified Johnston of the incident and that same night Terry's regiment was ordered to Bowling Green, Kentucky, on the first train. It was not reported what happened to the men responsible for this crime.22

While Blackburn tells a good tale that may have some factual basis (inasmuch as a contemporary newspaper advertised the play),23 more was involved in Johnston’s order of October 12 than he related.  The message reflected the urgency of the situation:

The enemy are advancing on Bowling Green.  Take all your men to that place by rail, if possible.  If there are no cars, march.  If Colonel [Lloyd] Tilghman’s armed Kentucky troops have not left Nashville, give them this as General Johnstons order to go at once, by rail or afoot.  Assume command of any other armed troops, except city guards, at Nashville, the commanders of which you may rank, and order them to follow you.  If you ranked by the commander, you exhibit this as General Johnston's order for their movement.24

The Confederates believed that 13,000-14,000 Federal troops

were advancing upon their force of 6,000 at Bowling Green.25 Terry received his movement orders around 2:00 a.m., October 13 and ordered the companies that were in Nashville to prepare rations for three days.26  Lubbock and his companies had not yet arrived.27  It was rumored that there might be an engagement the next morning, but upon arriving at Bowling Green it was discovered that the enemy was not as near as was thought.  The force of Rangers therefore settled into the routine business of soldiering, such as making bullets and caring for their weapons.28

A continuing problem during this period was supplying the regiment with the material it needed to insure the fulfillment of its mission.  The importance of securing horses for Terry's cavalry was so pressing that Johnston thought fit to mention it in his correspondence with Acting Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin.  In a situation report he wrote of his pressing need for money to purchase transportation:

I have been also particularly anxious to mount Terry's Texas regiment, the services of which are much needed, but for want of ready money cannot procure the horses.  On_ about 350 have been bought for this regiment.29

Benjamin, himself harassed by demands which he could not meet, replied:

I hope you have not bought the horses you speak of for Terry's regiment with the public money. There is no act of Congress allowing it, and the accounts cannot be passed without a special law for that purpose.  When Terry went to Texas to collect his regiment he was informed by the President in the most explicit manner that no cavalry could be accepted without their furnishing their own horses .... When Terry's regiment received leave to go to you instead of coming to Virginia, it was because we were led to believe that horses would be furnished them by subscriptions in Tennessee; but the expression of your letter makes me fear that you have ordered the purchase with public funds, and this would be very unfortunate.30

In addition to the problem of procuring horses was Terry's desire to improve further the quality of his regiment's weaponry.  In his initial report to Johnston, Terry requested that he be issued cartridge boxes for his shotguns. He also informed the general that he had been promised 250 Harpers Ferry rifles before he left Richmond.  He indicated that he could have these rifles modified to be loaded from the breech which would leave his entire regiment armed with shotguns and breech loaders, both of which were highly suited for cavalry.31 On November 2, in conjunction with reports Terry submitted enumerating by company the types and quantities of his regiment's firearms, he reported a deficiency of 214 guns (meaning shoulder weapons) and estimated that thirty-six others were inadequate, making a total of 250.  He also reported a deficiency of 186 pistols and wished to replace the eleven Starr pistols and sixty-four Colt 5-shooters (Pocket Pistols) to make a total of 261 revolvers he wished to acquire.  For some unexplained reason he made no mention of the twenty-two single-shot holster pistols.32

There is no indication that Terry’s requests were honored.  In view of the fact that the regiment was undoubtedly one of the best armed in Johnston’s army, and the problem Johnston was having procuring weapons for unites whose men were either unarmed or equipped only with flintlocks, it is unlikely that at this point the Rangers received any arms from the Confederacy, except for a few revolvers which were sold to individual officers.33 There are numerous receipts for supplies in the Compiled Military Service Records which enumerate all types of material received by the command throughout the war, but it was only in July, 1864 that weapons appeared on the lists.  Those in that issue were identified simply as Austrian rifles.34  Terry personally exemplified his philosophy of massive firepower.  One of his men recorded that he carried four Tranter pistols, an English double-action revolver.35  In addition, he also purchased a Navy revolver from the Confederate government.36

Though the Rangers failed to find a battle at Bowling Green, they were finally within striking distance of the enemy and were subsequently issued their horses.  The animals were assigned in a most cavalier, but equitable manner.  Each man drew a number by lot which indicated in which order he would choose his mount.  Those drawing low numbers had their pick of the herd; those with high numbers got what was left. 37

The regiment was soon ordered to Oakland, Kentucky, where it completed its organization at Camp Johnston.  In the Confederate service, company officers had to be elected by their men, but field grade officers were appointed.  Terry and Lubbock, however, set the precedent of standing for election in what amounted to a vote of confidence.38 This was largely perfunctory, although some changes were made at the company level.  The only important change was Thomas Harrison's election to the rank of major.  The companies also drew lots for their letter designations.  The regiment then reported its organization to the War Office in Richmond so that it could receive its official designation and commissions for its officers.  The War Department assigned it the official title of Eighth Regiment Texas Cavalry, signifying, of course, that this was the eighth regiment of cavalry from Texas that had been organized and mustered into the Confederate Army. Because of the month's delay in organization between Houston and Camp Johnston this number was somewhat higher than was expected.39

In spite of now having an official designation, the unit and its friends clung to the unofficial title of "Texas Rangers" which had been used in conjunction with the prefixes "Terry's" and the “First Regiment of.”40 It is not readily apparent when and how they acquired the title Texas Rangers. The title "Ranger" was popular with cavalry units in the Confederate service, especially those from Texas.  As early as August 7 journalists referred to the proposed regiment as a “Ranging Regiment.”41 Although never officially assigned, the title "Ranger" came naturally and passed into standard usage.

[Map]
The Army of Tennessee's area of operations, Winter, 1861.
From Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p. 65.

As soon as the Eighth Texas was deployed at its base at Oakland and was organized, Johnston utilized it in limited offensive operations.  These were primarily reconnaissance patrols and raids to ascertain the location and strength of enemy forces and, whenever possible, to inflict casualties upon the enemy.42  The principal reason for these activities was to conceal Johnston's weakness.  A modern historian has deduced that by December Johnston was facing a well-armed Union army of 57,000 with only 22,253 effectives who were poorly armed and generally unhealthy.43 By sheer aggressiveness he foiled the Federal attempts to ascertain his strength.  In fact, in mid-October, General William T. Sherman reported to Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron that Johnston could march into Louisville whenever he desired.44

The Rangers were active particularly in the area around their base at Oakland, and had several successful engagements in which they managed to kill and capture some enemy soldiers and civilian spies.45 While the main result of these pin-pricks was to reenforce the illusion Johnston was creating of a powerful and aggressive Confederate Army, it was also important in enhancing the confidence of the Rangers and giving them combat experience without taking any serious chances.

Houston's company was the first to draw blood.  On November 5, the advance guard of an eighty man scout from Houston's and Evans' companies encountered enemy pickets and managed to kill one or two, wound at least one other, and to capture two or three more.  One of the wounded prisoners was a terrified young boy.  With perhaps more magnanimity than good judgment, he was released upon the promise that he would return home, rather than being formally paroled. 46

Most patrols had no contact and brought back forage rather than prisoners.  In spite of some Union sentiment in the area, their contacts with the civilians were normally friendly, and in some regions they were freely provided with apples, buttermilk, potatoes, cider, etc.47 The opposition of the Union elements was passive.  Graber recalled that at Edmonton, Kentucky, the ladies at a hotel unsuccessfully attempted to conceal a spy during a raid.  On the same patrol civilians also reported large numbers of Federal cavalry threatening to cut the Rangers off from their base.  Because there was no contact, Graber believed that these accounts were to induce the Rangers to free their prisoners and flee the area.  The Rangers did leave, but not without their prisoners.48

One engagement caused the command to lose its respect for Major Harrison and to give him a nickname to commemorate the incident.  Johnston had ordered Brigadier General William J. Hardee to send a force of infantry and artillery, reenforced by a squadron of Terry's Regiment, to Jamestown and Tompkinsville, Kentucky, with the instructions that "if the enemy are there [Jamestown] and not in too great force, attack and destroy them.  Proceed to Tompkinsville and do the same thing."49 He also instructed Hardee to “create the impression that this force is only an advance guard.”50 Colonel Patrick Cleburne commanded and Harrison, with two companies of Rangers, formed the cavalry escort.  A popular myth perpetuated by writers who did not consult the official records, has it that Harrison, with his two companies, ran into a force of 5,000 Federal troops, causing him promptly to order a retreat.51 Cleburne's report mentions the same incident, except that Harrison is not mentioned specifically:

Two miles from town, my advanced guard jumped the enemy's pickets.  The Texas Rangers, 10 in front, gave chase, followed 4 miles, when they suddenly found themselves in presence of 40 U. S. Cavalry. Our men fell back and sent for reenforcements.52

Harrison's action in withdrawing in the presence of superior forces displeased many of the men who had more courage than good judgment, and they accorded him the nickname “Jimtown Major.”53 That evening they had a more successful engagement.  Cleburne wrote:

. . . our cavalry pressed the enemy in the direction of the Cross-Roads so closely that they got confused and dispersed in the woods at McRea's Cross-Roads.  Our cavalry fell on the main body of the enemy's cavalry, about 100 strong, and after a little skirmish, in which the enemy broke and left and got 2 of their men killed, other men and horses wounded, without damage to us, our cavalry fell back 5 miles to camp for the night.54

A number of fully accoutered horses, as well as muskets, pistols, and sabers were captured in this engagement.  The Federal cavalry was so shattered and dispersed that even the infantry managed to catch a number of their horses.  Harrison was specifically mentioned in the report:

. . . for the way they [Harrison and a volunteer identified as Captain Phillips] managed to disorganize and disperse this large body of the enemy's cavalry in an unknown country in the night, and without one friend among the country people. 55

The only Ranger casualty was J. T. Bankhead of Company I who was mortally wounded when he and an officer of Cleburne's command blundered into their own pickets at night after having delivered a message.56

Captain Walker, with a force of about twenty-five men, also scored a success on the night of December 15.  He led the contingent toward Columbia with the intention of breaking up a quartermaster depot there.  About eight miles from town he learned of a picket at the fork of the Glasgow and Edmonton roads.  Some eight Texans advanced upon the enemy from the direction of Columbia and identified themselves as Federals.  When they had come within ten feet, they opened fire. The Texans claimed that they killed and wounded eight Yankees and captured twelve horses, fourteen mules, and a quartermaster identified as Colonel Fraime.  The raiders then returned to their camp without loss.57 The Northerners acknowledged the death of one soldier and the capture of a Captain Frain, formerly connected with the Ninth Kentucky Infantry (Union) quartermaster department and a citizen of Monroe County.58

In mid-December, these raids and skirmishes culminated in a general engagement with the Thirty-Second Regiment Indiana Infantry near Woodsonville, Kentucky.  General Alexander M. McCooks's Division of Don Carlos Buell's army was slowly but steadily applying pressure along this section of the Green River, and was repairing a bridge near Woodsonville.59  Brigadier General Thomas C. Hindman was at Cave City, Kentucky, confronting the Federal force with a command of some 1,200 infantry and artillery and Terry's Regiment. His command was not sufficient to repel the Yankees, but it was strong enough to contest their advance.  On the morning of December 17, two days after the bridge was completed, Hindman moved towards Woodsonville to destroy the railroad. Terry led the vanguard, a force of some 250 Rangers drawn from eight companies.  Hindman managed to get his command to the railroad within a mile of the river undetected, except for a company of Rangers which established an observation post on Rowlett's Knob and had a minor skirmish with the enemy's pickets.60

Colonel August Willich's Thirty-Second Regiment Indiana    Infantry was a German-American unit.  It was noted as one of the best drilled outfits in the United States Army, as might be expected of a regiment whose commander was a veteran officer of the Prussian army.61

Federal Captain Jacob Glass advanced towards the Confederates until he ascertained the presence of infantry in force, and then retired.  Another company proceeded down the road until attacked by the Rangers some time later.62 Exactly how this combat came about is not clear.  Hindman reported that thirty minutes after the initial firing ceased he left Terry in command with instructions to decoy the Yankees up the hill so that he could employ his infantry and artillery while out of range of Federal cannon.63 The plan of action was sensible, but his statement that he left the field to find a suitable place to camp was illogical. There was a battle pending and it was still early afternoon. Graber's statement that Terry said, "General Hindman, this is no place for you; go back to your infantry,"64 may have some basis in fact.

In the meantime, three Union companies joined Captain Glass's unit on the right flank, two others went to the support of the company advancing down the road on the left, and three others formed a reserve.65 The enemy took advantage of trees, fences, and whatever cover the terrain afforded to strengthen their position.  Terry sent for the Confederate infantry, but before it arrived the enemy opened fire and he ordered the cavalry to attack.  The battle was divided into two distinct engagements because of a railroad cut.  Terry led the assault on Glass's company in a cornfield, and Ferrill attacked the force on the enemy's left.66 Willich described the charge:

With lightning speed, under infernal yelling, great numbers of Texas Rangers rushed upon our whole force.  They advanced as near as 15 or 20 yards to our lines, some of them even between them, and then opened fire with rifles and revolvers.  Our skirmishers took the thing very coolly and permitted them to approach very close, when they opened a destructive fire on them. They were repulsed under severe loss, but only after Lieutenants [Henry] Sachs, who left his covered position with one platoon, was surrounded by about 50 Rangers, several of them demanding of him three times to give up his sword and let his men lay down their arms.  He firmly refused, and defended himself till he fell, with 3 of his men, before the attack was repulsed.

Frank Batchelor described it in more personal terms:

. . . raising in his stirrups Terry shouted in a clear loud voice "Charge them boys! Charge!" then bending low with drawn revolver he dashed forward toward the enemy; his words were hardly uttered before a wild shout broke from our ranks & with spurs closely pressed the column made the charge.... Our charge was not made in front, but on a line; our column running closely outside the fence, which served the enemy as a sort of breastwork & rest for their guns--Nothing could exceed the brilliancy & daring of that impetuous charge.  Our Shot Guns threw up a blaze of fire & shot almost into their faces--the distance between our lines did not exceed ten or fifteen feet....68

It was a contest between steady infantry, armed with slow firing single-shot rifles and bayonets; taking advantage of cover and concealment and fast moving cavalry armed with shotguns and pistols delivering a heavy volume of fire. Early in the battle Colonel Terry was struck in the head by a bullet and instantly killed.  The forces soon became intermixed with the Germans withdrawing upon their supporting elements with the Rangers pursuing.69

The accounts of Terry's death appear to have been influenced by emotion.  He was credited with charging a group of infantrymen, killing two but being killed in turn by a third.  Terry, his horse, his two victims, and a third Federal, perhaps the one who shot him, all fell together.70 The Tri-Weekly Telegraph reported that the Federal trooper who shot Terry was killed by a volunteer named Anderson.71 Robert F. Bunting, writing to the San Antonio Herald, however, reported that it was uncertain who fired the fatal shot.72  Clarence R. Wharton stated that some years afterwards Clem Basset averred that the man who allegedly killed Terry was captured, and Terry's son, David, was allowed to murder him.73

Ferrill had less luck.  He succeeded in driving the skirmishers in, but the enemy was formed into a compact body and was able to repel his three charges.  The Federals withdrew upon the arrival of Hindman's infantry.  When Willich saw Confederate infantry being committed, he withdrew his forces a short distance and the battle ended.74

Hindman reported that his casualties (including two wounded infantrymen) totaled four dead and ten wounded.  He also stated that some fifteen to twenty horses were lost.  Hindman had seven prisoners, but three others were too badly wounded to be moved and were left with private citizens after being given medical treatment.  The day after the battle Willich reported that he had eleven dead, twenty-two wounded, and five missing.  Probably the two extra captives held by Hindman were assumed by Willich to be dead.76 While the Federals suffered more casualties than the Confederates, Terry's Rangers lost their commander, a man in whom they had the greatest confidence and would remember with profound respect.

Shortly after Terry's death, Thomas Lubbock died of typhoid fever in Nashville.  On January 8, 1862, the day before the latter's demise, he was officially promoted colonel although he never served in that capacity due to his eleven week illness.  Lubbock's body followed Terry's to Texas and both were buried with military honors in Houston.77

Following the battle of Woodsonville, Johnston ordered the Eighth Texas from the line to rest and reorganize at Camp Terry, near Woodburn, Kentucky.  He reported that sickness and death had reduced the unit's strength to half its original number, and that its horses were also jaded.78 An election was held at this time which advanced Lubbock to colonel and promoted Walker from captain to lieutenant colonel.  Several company officers and noncommissioned officers were also elected to replace those lost through death, discharge, and resignation.  Upon Lubbock's death, John Wharton was elected colonel.  It was technically illegal for officers to be promoted over the heads of their seniors, e.g., Walker over Harrison, and Wharton over Walker and Harrison.  The previous November Benjamin had written Johnston concerning a proposal to appoint a colonel to the Third Kentucky Infantry, "The lieutenant-colonel has a right to promotion under law, unless incompetent, and in that event the major must be promoted over him. . . ."79 Johnston favored the regular system of promotion (the automatic advancement of Harrison), but a delegation of captains persuaded him to honor the wishes of the Regiment, and by inference, the precedent set by Terry.80

The Rangers' actions at a dress parade at Camp Terry reflected their attitude toward military formalities.  Frank Batchelor wrote to his wife:

This morning we were called out for General Inspection & dress parade. . . & having no field officers a brass buttoned Colonel of the regular Army was sent to Superintend it; if there is anything that a Texian Ranger hates particularly it is a man in Uniform and the Colonel's appearance on the field was a signal for all sorts of squibs at his expense; he had not gone far with the inspection, when a man let his thumb slip from the hammer of his gun

[Photo]
Undated Photograph of John A. Wharton, Organizer and First Captain of Company B and Regimental Commander December 1861-September 1862.
Courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

and sent a bullet whizzing close to his ears, another spurred his horse who sprang forward and nearly unseated him, another wanted to bet a brass button, "as big as the Colonel's," that he could rope his Plume &c.  These pleasantries made the inspection quite brief and the officers disgust was profound when upon the announcement of "Dismissal" the battalion set up a hideous "Yell" and pell mell, helter skelter for Camps they charged leaping logs fences and ditches on the way; in less than three minutes "brass buttons" was the only horseman on the ground.81

As Batchelor's letter indicated, the Rangers held the external trappings of rank in disdain.  One officer wrote afterward that he was unaware of any of the command's officers applying for a commission from the Secretary of War and that insignias representing rank were seldom seen except on the parade ground.  There was actually little need for insignias for the men knew their officers and their obligations to them.82

Rangers also had a casual attitude toward uniforms in general, for photographs of members of the Regiment show little regularity.  Throughout the war they were compelled to wear whatever came to hand.  Whether the apparel was originally intended for use by civilians or by members of the Federal Army was immaterial.  There was, however, an insignia that was worn proudly by the Rangers--the Texas Star.  The first Eighth Texas reference to it came in February 1862 when correspondent Robert F. Bunting wrote of new recruits and noted that “. . . the 'star' indicates that they are Texas Rangers.”83  This star was probably no different from that worn by other Texans in the Confederate service.  A year later Bunting reported that a new device to be worn on the hat had been adopted to distinguish the members of the Eighth Texas from those of the Eleventh Texas with whom they had been brigaded.  This was a five-pointed star with the letters T-E-X-A-S between the points with the name TERRY over the star and the letter R in the center.84 In a contemporary (but undated) photograph of five Rangers the stars of four are visible.  While details are not discernible, it is apparent that there are no letters between the points and nothing over the star.

After a relatively short period of combat the Rangers had established a reputation.  One trooper wrote home from Camp Terry that General Hindman had twice requested that General Hardee (their mutual division commander) return the Rangers to his command.85 Bunting expressed the same thought more expansively:  “General Hindman himself acknowledged that he could not sleep soundly at night since the Rangers were gone.”86

[photo]
Undated photograph of five Rangers.  These six names Furnished with Photograph:  left to right, Peter Kenwell, Dick Oliver (unidentified individuals), Felix G. Kennedy, William A. Lynch, George W. Archer, and Thomas S. Burney of Company C and subsequently Shannon's Scouts.
Courtesy of Mrs. Benjamin McF. Hines.

Sometime during late 1861 or early 1862 the Rangers established a close relationship with another famous Confederate cavalry command, John Hunt Morgan's squadron. The Rangers appreciated Morgan for his personal courage, bold tactics, and excursions behind enemy lines.  From time to time individuals would accompany him on his raids and patrols, both from their own volition and upon orders from their commanders.  In addition, there was a mutual understanding among the men that, while standing camp guard, neither unit would interfere with the activities of the other.87

During the Winter of 1861-1862 the regiment suffered more from the elements than from the enemy.  The unit was subjected to rain, sleet, and snow.  As the Rangers had left home in late summer, it is doubtful if more than a handful had brought winter clothes.  The wholly inadequate Confederate commissary was unable to meet the needs of the army, and the suffering of the soldiers would have been greater had it not been for shipments of winter clothing from home.  These items were eagerly awaited, not only for the material goods they provided, but also because they were a link with home.88

After a short period of rest, the Rangers returned to the line to establish a base at Bell's Tavern, some twelve miles from the Federals.  Because of illness, however, many were missing from the ranks.  Among these were Lieutenant Colonel Walker, who was still recovering from wounds received at Woodsonville, and Major Harrison who was ill and who was expected by some to resign.  Despite the proximity of the enemy and constant patrolling, there was very little contact, and that which did occur was insignificant. 89

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Chapter III
To Shiloh

On January 19, 1862 Johnston's inadequate defenses began to disintegrate when General George S. Crittenden lost both a battle and the life of his second-in-command, Felix Zollicoffer, at Mill Springs, Kentucky. Zollicoffer's body was returned to the Confederates by the victorious Federals by the end of the month. The Confederate honor guard was composed of General Hindman, his staff and the officers and several privates of the Eighth Texas. The Texans were conspicuous in their buffalo robes and Mexican-style clothing. The transfer was amicable, perhaps because of the liquor the Federals distributed. There was a general exchange of witticisms during which Captain Marcus L. Evans expressed the desire that they might soon return the kindness which brought the two sides together. It may be assumed that the Federals were less than enthusiastic as to this wish.1

The next blow to Johnston's army fell on its left flank when Fort Henry fell on February 6 and Fort Donelson capitulated on the sixteenth. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson gave the Federals control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, smashed Johnston's left flank and necessitated his withdrawal to a more viable position.2 There is some indication in the Official Records that a contingent of the Eighth Texas made up part of the force at Fort Henry. Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, the commandant, mentioned a detachment of "Rangers" under an acting-Captain Milton, and the index indicates that this was the Eighth Texas.3 There is, however, no other supporting documentation for that conclusion, and there is no indication that P. Milton of Company K, the only Milton associated with the command, ever served in any position other than private.4

On February 9, a week before Fort Donelson fell, the Rangers were ordered to pull back from their station on the Green River towards Bowling Green in response to pressure upon the forts. Harrison and half the command remained in the vicinity of the Green River scouting, while Wharton and the remainder proceeded towards Bowling Green which was being evacuated. On the morning of the fourteenth Federal artillery took a position commanding the town and commenced shelling it.5 While largely ineffectual, it was annoying and did cause the last locomotive to uncouple and pull away from its cars leaving a number of convalescent soldiers.6

Late that afternoon the Rangers, forming the rear guard, withdrew from the town after firing the depot and abandoned stores.7 Bunting stated that they formed the vanguard of the retiring force as well as the rear guard. While he did not state which element they were the van of, he probably meant of the rear guard which consisted of Hindman's Division and the cavalry. The retreat towards Nashville was without incident and without interference from the Federals. Hardships along the route were in the nature of shortages of rations, inclement weather, and the natural congestion of a retreating army.

On the night of the sixteenth and seventeenth the column arrived at Nashville. While en route, Fort Donelson fell, forcing Johnston to continue his retreat southward. On the twentieth, Wharton received orders to take a force and retrace his steps through Nashville to Charlotte, Tennessee. His mission was to cover the retreat of those who had refused to be surrendered at Fort Donelson, and also to collect Confederate livestock in the vicinity. The next day the Rangers that could be spared left with rations for two days; six days later this force rejoined the main army at Murfreesboro. Again the Federals failed to exploit their advantage and press the Confederates. The Rangers were thus enabled to accomplish their mission hampered only by cold and rainy weather.8 The citizens in the area were generous in providing them with food and fodder.9

On February 28 the army withdrew from Murfreesboro to Corinth, Mississippi, where Johnston determined to concentrate his force.I0 Several days later the cavalry, which was covering Johnston's rear, also left Murfreesboro. About March 3 the command arrived at Shelbyville, Tennessee, where it spent approximately five days.11 Here Harrison attempted to instill some discipline, but failing to do so, he acquired another nickname. The Rangers were encamped within a mile and a half of the town, but the men were not allowed to enter without permission. Wharton, being absent ill, left Harrison in command. The major, however, discovered two men in town without permission. He ordered them to return to camp, but they refused.

When he returned to camp he ordered these men arrested by the camp guards and placed on the pike, marking time. A Mr. Sam Ash of Company B . . went to these men and led them back to camp, telling them that no such disgraceful punishment should be inaugurated in the regiment. The infantry were passing frequently and we considered it a disgrace to the Texas Rangers to submit to such punishment.12 Afterwards Harrison became known as the "Mark-time Major," as well as the "Jimtown Major. "13

By March 8 Terry's Rangers were near Wartrace, Tennessee, after serving as pickets. There had been some relatively unimportant skirmishing between the pickets of the opposing forces in which the Eighth Texas probably participated. 14 After leaving the Shelbyville-Wartrace area the regiment slowly moved to Huntsville, arriving on the sixteenth or seventeenth. After a two day stay it continued its march by way of Decatur and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and Iuka, Mississippi, arriving at Corinth at an undisclosed date. Along the route bridges were burned to delay the enemy's advance. Although there is no direct evidence that it was the Rangers who burned these bridges, Graber gives that impression.15

At Corinth, the end of the retreat, the regiment pitched camp within two miles of the city. Health and morale improved and many who had been absent sick returned.16 The Rangers were also transferred from General Hardee's command, by whom they felt slighted, to that of General Pierre G. T. Beauregard. Judge James Love of Galveston stated that he had requested Johnston to assign the Rangers to his command.17 Beauregard visited Wharton in camp and captivated the men by his charming manner.18 While there, the regiment sent out several scouting parties.19 The only one of note was led by Wharton and Harrison and consisted of some 200 picked men.20 A Federal force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was sent to capture them, but was foiled by Wharton's timely withdrawal. Although these forays fatigued both men and horses, they at least kept the regiment occupied.21 While Johnston was massing his forces of some 40,000 men at Corinth, General Ulysses S. Grant was concentrating his at Pittsburg Landing about twenty miles to the north on the Tennessee River in Tennessee. Grant had approximately 42,000 troops under his immediate command while another 20,000 of Don Carlos Buell's army would join him later. Johnston determined that his best course of action was to attack Grant at Pittsburg Landing, destroy that force, and then turn on Buell before their juncture left him hopelessly outnumbered. Accordingly, on April 3 the Confederates began their advance with the intention of attacking on the fifth.22 The march order of April 3 specifically mentioned Wharton's command.

Wharton's regiment of Texas cavalry will be ordered forward at once to scout on the road from Monterey to Savannah between Mickey's and its intersection with the Pittsburg-Purdy road. It will annoy and harass any force of the enemy moving by the latter way to assail Cheatham's division at Purdy.23

The Rangers claimed that they were the first to leave Corinth and this order indicates that they were correct. The regiment of some 450 men guarded the left front and flank of Johnston's army. During the night of the fourth and fifth 100 were placed on picket and the remnant were within supporting distance.24 The weather was miserable. The men who were required to remain mounted were subjected to a heavy rain which drenched them and their equipment.25 The next morning Wharton committed a tactical error which endangered the entire operation. When day broke and the command was reassembled, the men requested permission to fire their arms, rather than risk battle with damp charges which could misfire. The Colonel consented and the weapons were discharged. The firing would have disclosed the presence of the Confederates if the Union army had been vigilant. Wharton was immediately summoned by his superiors and was undoubtedly reprimanded. Upon returning to his command he made a speech in which he acknowledged his error and exalted his men to atone for it in battle.26

The rain had more serious consequences for the Confederate army than causing the Eighth Texas a night's discomfort and the near disclosure of their positions. It hampered the march of Johnston's army and resulted in the attack being postponed twenty-four hours. Thus Saturday, the day the attack was originally scheduled, was spent reconnoitering the enemy's position.27

At sunrise April 6, 1862 the Confederates attacked and caught the Federal army by surprise, despite the day's delay, Wharton's blunder, and a brigade-sized engagement the previous day. The battlefield was roughly in the form of a box. Owl Creek on the Confederate left and Lick Creek on the right formed the sides and the Tennessee River the bottom. The creeks and river simultaneously contained the Federals and secured their flanks, but as Johnston was depending upon surprise and momentum to drive Grant's army into the Tennessee, it favored the Confederates more than the Federals. The terrain within the box, consisting of dense underbrush, ravines, and woods, made the cavalry practically useless.28 As a result, the Rangers were ineffectual the first day. They entered the battle on the extreme left flank at about 11:00 a.m.29 Shortly after their arrival ten men were detached to capture a cannon which they found abandoned with its horses disabled. The remainder of the regiment spent the morning following the infantry.30 About noon General Hardee directed the Texans to dismount and support a battery firing upon the enemy. The Federals soon retired and the General ordered Wharton to press them, apparently in conjunction with Morgan's squadron.31 In pursuing the enemy, the regiment was forced to cross a boggy ravine single-file which resulted in its becoming extended. Wharton, at the head of the column, crossed the ravine and

[Map of Shiloh]
Shiloh battlefield, April 6 and 7, 1862.
From Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, p. 757.

crested a summit some 300 yards from the starting point. The enemy, approximately forty yards away, then opened fire from their position in the woods behind a fence.32 Wharton was hit in the leg; Clinton Terry, Frank's brother who was serving as a volunteer aide, was mortally wounded; and thirty-one other men were killed or wounded.33 Wharton reported that he ordered the command to retreat 200 yards, to dismount, and fight on foot.34 Giles, however, stated that although some men had started throwing down the fence, most of the Regiment broke and fell back while Wharton and others attempted to prevent their flight.35 Before the cavalrymen could return to the engagement, infantry units came up and dislodged the enemy.36

The Rangers pressed forward and discovered an unsupported battery being harassed by enemy fire. Wharton dismounted five companies, threw them forward as skirmishers, and drove off the Federal troops.37 This ended the first day's fighting, although more casualties were suffered because of enemy artillery.38 Their performance was perhaps adequate, but certainly not spectacular. Bunting listed forty-one killed, wounded, or missing. Their only concrete accomplishment was the maintenance of pressure upon the already hard-pressed Yankees.

The Confederate army as a whole had more success. It forced Grant's forces steadily back from one line to another, almost driving them into the river. Some Federals, in fact, attempted to escape across the river and many more believed their situation to be hopeless. By afternoon, however, two events occurred which deprived the Confederates of their victory. General Johnston was shot in the leg and bled to death and, more important, the vanguard of Buell's column arrived.39 The Confederates in the meantime had become disorganized with many men absenting themselves from the battle to loot the Federal camps.40 When the last maximum effort was required to clear the enemy from the battleground, the Federals were too numerous and the available Confederates were too few.41

There was no combat during the night, although Federal gunboats shelled Confederate positions. Wharton posted a heavy picket 42 and the command slept on the field in the rain.43 With the arrival of part of Buell's forces and the break of day, Grant took the offensive. For the Rangers Monday was largely a repeat of Sunday. At about 10:00 a.m. Beauregard, now in command, ordered the Texans to counter-attack on the left. Wharton determined to charge the enemy from the rear. Again woods and a ravine forced the men into a column. When Wharton reached the site where he planned to form for the charge, his command was strung out some 400 yards. He found the field to be occupied by the enemy's reserve, thought to consist of two infantry regiments. The Federals opened fire and, though the Rangers at the head of the column tried to resist, they were forced back. The command fought the enemy on foot and notified Beauregard of the development.44 While thus engaged, Beauregard fell back, with the Rangers retiring with the infantry. Beauregard then ordered Wharton to move to the right to protect the retreat. The Colonel did as directed after detaching a company for scouting and two more to protect William H. Ketchum's Alabama battery.45 Ketchum had remained behind to cover his brigade's retreat when the withdrawal exposed it to a potentially fatal Union attack. With the support of the Rangers, however, it was able to keep the enemy at bay until Colonel Preston Pond, Jr.'s brigade was safe and then retire itself.46

The Texans camped that night in the rear of their retreating comrades and threw out pickets in cooperation with the other cavalry. Again it rained throughout the night. The next morning, Wharton, thinking that the fight had ended and suffering from his wound, turned the command over to Major Harrison.47

On Tuesday the cavalry, consisting of Nathan Bedford Forrest's and Wirt Adams' regiments and Morgan's squadron, as well as the Eighth Texas, covered Beauregard's retreat from the victorious but sluggish Federals. The operations during the morning and early afternoon were routine, restricted largely to the destruction of abandoned stores and equipment. During the late afternoon or early evening, however, Harrison learned that the Yankees were developing their position.48 General Sherman commanded this force consisting of his Third Brigade and the Fourth Illinois Cavalry.49 Major Harrison reported this to General Breckinridge, commander of the rear, who ordered the Texan to hold off the enemy as he was not yet ready to move. A company of some forty men, of Forrest's command, joined the 200-220 Rangers. The Major estimated that the enemy's cavalry numbered 300 men, and seeing that it was supported by infantry, fell back. The Federals attempted to outflank him, so Harrison withdrew again. He was then joined by a company of forty men from Colonel Adams' Regiment and learned that the remnant of Adams' command was prepared to block the enemy's flanking maneuver. Harrison thereupon returned to his original position to find that Forrest had joined his company. Together they decided to assault.50 Harrison rode up and down the line to instruct and to encourage his men. They were to ride to within twenty steps of the Yankee line, stop, and cut loose with their shotguns. Part of the encouragement consisted of urging the Rangers to follow their "Jimtown--Marktime Major.''51 Forrest, as senior officer, ordered the charge when the enemy infantry ineffectually discharged its pieces. The Confederates rushed forward at full speed and brushed the skirmishers aside. They halted just short of the Seventy-seventh Regiment Ohio Infantry which was waiting to receive the horsemen with bayonets. The Rebels thereupon fired their shotguns which, loaded with buckshot, proved effective at close range. Under this galling fire the Yankee infantry broke and ran, disrupting the Fourth Regiment Illinois Cavalry in their rear. The Confederates pursued with revolvers until stopped by the brigade's reserve formed in line of battle. The Federals, however, were firing too high, evidently to avoid hitting their own men who were intermixed with the Rebels. The Confederates, having expended their ammunition and seeing that this second line could not be broken, withdrew while still relatively unscathed.52 The intrepid Forrest, however, rode into the enemy line and although both he and his horse were wounded managed to escape.53 Harrison reported that this charge had cost his command two dead, seven wounded, and one missing. He was unaware of the losses of the other elements.54 Sherman reported that when the area was reoccupied he found that fifteen of his men had been killed and about twenty-five wounded.55 In addition the Texans had taken forty-three of his troops prisoner.56 More important than attrition, perhaps, were the tactical benefits of this charge. Sherman stated:

The check sustained by us at the fallen timbers delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were provided for and dead buried, and our troops being fagged out by three days' hard fighting, exposure and privation, I ordered them back to camp, where all now are.57

The Confederate army was thus able to retire to Corinth unmolested.

This engagement also resulted in most of the regiment's members revising their opinion of Major Harrison. Whereas the incident at Jamestown reportedly caused them to question his courage and the episode near Shelbyville represented him as a martinet, the charge on Tuesday showed him to be a capable and resourceful combat officer. As one man wrote, ". . . one 'gritty' little Major, Tom Harrison of Waco[,] showed himself to be a soldier from his 'boot soles up.'''58

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Chapter IV
Return to Kentucky

After the Battle of Shiloh the Eighth Texas helped cover the withdrawal of Beauregard's Army to Corinth.  Failing in an attempt to draw Sherman's force into an ambush following the charge on April 8, 1862, General John C. Breckinridge ordered the regiment to defend the Hamburg road where it was expected that the enemy would attack.  There was no attack, but there was rain. 1  Also on April 8 the regiment drove forty mules from the battle area. 2  The next morning the unit rode to Monterey and from there to Beauregard's headquarters where it stood picket that evening.  On Thursday the Rangers were ordered to escort invalids, both Northerners and Southerners, from the hospital to a more secure location. The cavalrymen walked while the casualties rode.  The date of the regiment's return to Corinth went unrecorded, but it was probably around the twelfth. 3

The exposure and hardship of the Shiloh campaign took a higher toll on the Texans than simply the sixty-six men Wharton reported as battle casualties. 4  Numerous soldiers were furloughed or discharged during the succeeding weeks because of poor health. 5  The officers, in particular, were not loathe to absent themselves.  A second lieutenant wrote in disgust:

Our Regiment has suffered sadly for want of field officers ever since the fall of Terry & this is the reason we have made so little progress-- Wharton is not strong enough to endure the exposure & has been a good deal absent on account of sickness--Lt. Col. Walker it seems is never going to return; he has been absent over 4 months & many in the Regt are so disgusted by his conduct in absenting himself that they call him a humbug; our Major has been sick & absent three fourths of this time; our Adjutant ditto--out of ten captains we have only 4 present and ready for the field--I would to God we had Col. J. H. Morgan to fill the place of Terry. 6

This officer was not alone in his opinions.  Nicholson, even before the battle, stated that since Terry's death he would have preferred to be in Morgan's squadron. 7  In June a "veteran" of nearly three months stated that the command was disgusted with its “commanding officers.” 8

A relatively large number of recruits arrived at this time, helping to replace some of the losses.  One group came organized as a company, apparently led by a Captain Johnson (given name not ascertained), 9 while others reported individually.  Some joined the existing companies for the war, whereas others formed a new company sworn in for three months duty and lettered "L." 10  A substantial number of the new recruits had arrived before Shiloh and had fought with the established companies and had suffered some casualties. 11 One youth, at least, was not particularly well equipped.  He arrived with neither horse nor pistol, but he did have the forethought to bring a servant. 12  On April 28 the regiment numbered 813, of which 485 were effectives. 13

The absence of details concerning the activities of the command during this period suggests that it was relatively idle and engaged more in "licking its wounds" than in conducting operations.  There were persistent rumors of orders to return to Tennessee which were based upon actual intentions of the commanders. 14 At least partially because of the poor condition of the horses, the command remained stationary until the twenty-third when it marched some fifteen miles to Rienzi in hopes of finding more plentiful forage. 15  Horses, besides being difficult to maintain, were also in short supply.  In mid-May the Tri-Weekly Telegraph reported that at least 125 men were without mounts. 16

On the night of the twenty-fourth a report that Federals had launched an attack caused the command to prepare to march.  It began to rain, but the regiment was held in readiness from midnight until nightfall of the next day when word came that there would be no movement.  By the twenty-seventh the unit was ordered to Russellville, Alabama to procure fodder and to protect the area from Federal raiders. 17 It was reported at the time that this was the beginning of the long awaited return to Tennessee.  It does not appear, however, that this march was conducted with any great urgency as the men found plenty of time to write letters and at least one found time to go fishing. 18

The movement to Tennessee seems to have been more or less coordinated with the actions of other cavalry units, notably Morgan's, and intended as a diversion. 19 One trooper wrote home that on May 6 the force consisted of some 3,500 men and three pieces of artillery and that they were to cross the Tennessee River the next day. 20  Bunting reported that General William N. R. Beall was in charge of the combined regiments of Scott, Morgan, and Wharton. 21 Probably at this time Captain William Y. Houston commanded the Rangers.  On April 22 he was mentioned as the ranking officer because of the absence of the field officers. 22  On May 11 Bunting reported that Wharton had returned and was on his way to join the regiment which was either in Tennessee or en route. Harrison had recovered but was in Corinth to participate in the expected battle between Beauregard and Halleck.  There was no mention of Walker. 23

In early May the regiment entered Tennessee after crossing the Tennessee River at Lambs Ferry near Courtland, Alabama. 24  On the eighth a detachment of about eighty men under Captain Houston joined Lieutenant Colonel T. G. Woodward and a force of 350-400 men of the First Regiment Kentucky Cavalry South for a raid against the enemy at the town of Bethel on the Elm River, some thirty-two miles from Lambs Ferry. 25  It was discovered, upon arrival, that the Federals were not at Bethel but there was a small detachment guarding a trestle nearby. 26 Woodward's force was to attack while Houston was to cut off retreat. 27 The plans were disrupted when the Confederates discovered a party of six Yankees in a hand car, necessitating an attack upon this group to prevent the bringing of reinforcements.  The resultant firing alarmed the main body of the enemy whom the Rangers immediately assaulted.  The Federals were forced from their positions and sought refuge among some buildings. As the Texans were preparing to envelop them, Woodward's Kentuckians rode up, surrounded the buildings and poured bullets into them, causing the Federals to surrender. 28  The enemy lost about fifteen dead,29 a dozen wounded,30 and forty-seven men and officers and eight Negroes captured. Five Confederates were killed,31 including Captain Harris and two other Rangers,32 and seven more Rebels were wounded. 33

On May 9 the Rangers (except for a force of between seventy and eighty men left with the baggage), the First Kentucky Cavalry, and some Tennessee cavalry set out on an expedition led by Colonel John Adams. 34  The Rangers were less than pleased with this service.  From Adams' report it appears that his idea of a raid was to capture enemy couriers  (which he succeeded in doing) and to force the enemy constantly to shift his forces to protect likely objectives. To do Adams justice, the Federals in this area were strong and energetic and many desirable targets were too dangerous to attack. 35 The Rangers, however, felt that Adams should have been more aggressive.  Particularly frustrating was his failure to assault a large wagon train guarded by only two men per wagon and his failure to make prisoners of the garrison at Fayetteville.  These men had sent a civilian to inform the Confederates of their desire to surrender so that they could be paroled and sent home until exchanged. 36  Perhaps the highlight of the expedition was the raid on Winchester conducted during Adams' absence.  Graber reported that while at Hawkins Cove on May 22 a Union foraging party was reported in the vicinity.  Company B of the Rangers and a company of the Kentucky regiment started off in pursuit. 37 Adams noted that the force was sent out by Wharton for reconnaissance, 38 while a Ranger wrote, "About a hundred of our regiment and Kentuckians got drunk one day and ran into the town ....” 39  Whatever the particulars, the force charged into the town, captured nine men of the picket, and reached the center of the town where the enemy, though caught by surprise, began returning fire from the brick courthouse.  The Confederates then beat a hasty retreat fearful of the enemy's artillery. 40 Adams reported two men dead and six wounded.  It was estimated, probably erroneously, that in addition to the nine prisoners an additional nine or ten Federals were killed.  The next day the Yankees evacuated the town. 41

Shortly before the Winchester raid, Wharton and Adams had a dispute.  Apparently the brigade was formed while Wharton was still absent and Adams was tendered command although Wharton was the senior officer.  Wharton wrote, "I had a conversation with Colonel Adams upon my arrival, in which I informed him I should assume command until I was ranked."42 Adams stated in his report that Wharton did not wish to serve under him and was also unwilling to assume command of the brigade, preferring the respective units only to cooperate. To settle matters, Adams went to Chattanooga to submit the problem to his superiors.  Beauregard ruled that the date of commission would determine the commander. 43  Graber recalled that on the day after the Winchester raid there was a meeting between the two commanders.  Adams announced his decision to start for Chattanooga to secure new forces.

Colonel Wharton had become exasperated at General  [sic] Adams' conduct the entire trip and told him to take his Kentucky regiment and go to Halifax with it, if he wanted to--that he intended remaining in Middle Tennessee and doing what he could to carry out the original order of General Beauregard. 44

This was basically how the problem was solved.  However, it was the Rangers who went back to Chattanooga, apparently at Beauregard's orders, while Adams stayed in Middle Tennessee until he was driven out. 45

In spite of some accomplishments, this operation was neither a success, nor a failure.  The command stayed intact and inflicted more casualties than it took, but a good deal of time and effort was spent in self-preservation.  The Federals were energetic in their efforts to trap the Confederates.  To escape, a part of the Eighth Texas and the Kentuckians with them had to ride for eighteen days to Chattanooga. 46 The rivalry of the commanders was also probably deleterious to morale.  William Nicholson summed up the situation and his feelings when he recorded:

. . . the enemy got in between us and the river and chased us all over Tenn. and Ga. and Ala.  I think we could have whipped them if we had the right sort of commanding officer, most of the men are getting tired of their Regimental officers and of the Regiment.  I am tired of it myself, and must either have a transfer or a substitute if the war is going to last much longer which I think it will from all appearances. 47

Nicholson, despite his discouragement, obtained neither a transfer nor a substitute, but remained with the command until his death in battle in October 1864.  Another letter concerning the same incident stated:

. . . a portion of our regiment were cut off on the north side of Tennessee river and had to make there [sic] way through 20,000 Yankees around Huntsvill [sic], and other places but they all got through safe & sound and we are all together at this place.  They had to travel most of the time at night and had to eat just anywhere they could get.  I think Cousin Nish was the worst shipped man I ever saw near 6 weeks without any clothing except what he had on. 48

The detachment left to protect the wagons was in for more than its share of the action.  One man reported that after the departure of the expedition the troopers proceeded to an unnamed town to shoe horses.  While there, the picket was driven in and an enemy force he estimated as 4,000 strong  (probably an exaggeration) effected their prompt evacuation. He gave the impression that all escaped and made no mention of losses of stores. 49 Graber, however, stated that all materiel was left behind, including cooking utensils and tents. 50

While at Chattanooga the regiment engaged a Federal gunboat on the Tennessee which threatened the city.  Except for its novelty, this action was unremarkable.  Major General Ormsby M. Mitchell, the commander of the Federal forces, extemporized a gunboat which he announced ready for service on May 15. 51  Its armament was not particularly impressive, consisting of a twelve-pound howitzer, two six-pound rifled cannon and armor of cotton bales. 52  It was, however, enough to worry the inhabitants of Chattanooga.  The Rangers fought two apparently ludicrous engagements with this vessel.  On the first occasion three Rangers attacked it and "drove" it ten miles downstream.  On the second, thirteen Rangers unsuccessfully attempted to board it. 53  It is doubtful that the Rangers' shotguns did much structural damage, but the Federals decided to use the vessel as a bridge across Battle Creek rather than for its original purpose. 54

A more significant incident of this period was an effort on the part of the Regiment to get itself transferred, preferably back to Texas or to General Hindman who had recently assumed command of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Two sentences in two different letters are all that has been found concerning this attempt.  The first, James Love, a correspondent of the Teleqraph, writing as "Galveston" stated, "An agent of the regiment is now in Richmond to get it transferred, if possible, to Hindman or to Texas."55 The next day another soldier wrote to his parents, "Col. Wharton has sent to Richmon[sic] to try and get the regiment transfered [sic] to Texas (and) we are looking for the gentleman to get back every hour."56  The absence of further material on the episode and the fact that the Rangers were not transferred adequately testify to its failure.

On June 9 Beauregard ordered Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest to assume command of the cavalry in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee. 57  When Forrest arrived at Chattanooga ten days later he found the Eighth Texas, William J. Lawton's Second Regiment Georgia Cavalry, James J. Morrison's First Regiment Georgia Cavalry, and a hundred Kentuckians under Lieutenant Colonel Woodward.  He spent half a month organizing this force and gathering information about Federal deployment before making his move. 58

By early July, Forrest was ready to begin offensive operations, choosing as his first objective Murfreesboro where there was a large Federal garrison.  The town also was an important supply depot vital to Buell's offensive operations against Chattanooga. 59 Forrest crossed the Tennessee River with the Second Georgia and Eighth Texas on July 9, 1862, and rode the forty miles to McMinnville in two days. Here he was joined by Morrison with part of the First Georgia, two companies of C. C. Spiller's Tennessee Battalion, two independent companies, and a few private volunteers, making a total he estimated as 1,400 men.  He rested a day to prepare his forces for the dash upon Murfreesboro.  At 1:00 p.m. the brigade departed McMinnville and marched the fifty miles to Murfreesboro, stopping only briefly for food, and arrived undetected at about 4:30 a.m. on the thirteenth. 60 A company of the Eighth Texas was detailed to capture the picket silently.  The men accomplished this by first identifying themselves as Federals and divulging their true identity only after they were holding guns on the enemy. 61 Forrest learned that the Ninth Regiment Michigan Infantry and the Seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Cavalry (consisting of five and two companies respectively)62 were camped near the edge of town and the Third Regiment Minnesota Infantry and Hewett's Kentucky Battery were posted over a mile away on the other side of the community.  There was also a small force at the courthouse for provost duty to protect the headquarters of the new commander, Brigadier General Thomas T. Crittenden63 and to guard some 150 political prisoners. 64  This division of troops was a fatal error.

Forrest determined to divide his command into three assault forces each being assigned to destroy a portion of the Federals.  Failing in this they were to pin down their counterparts so that the entire force could be destroyed piecemeal.  Wharton was to attack the first encampment containing the cavalry and infantry.  Lawton's Georgians, the Tennesseans, and the Kentuckians were to attack the camp containing the artillery and the Third Minnesota while Morrison with Forrest would reduce those about the courthouse. 65

The command formed a column of fours and advanced down the pike.  With daybreak the Confederates sighted the Federal bivouac and charged. 66  The first camp hit was that of the Pennsylvania and Michigan contingents.  Just how effective was the surprise is debatable.  The Rebels reported that they caught the enemy completely unaware 67 while Colonel William W. Duffield commanding the Ninth Michigan wrote:

The noise of so many hoofs at full speed upon the macadamized roads was so great that the alarm was given before the head of the column reached our pickets, about 1 mile distant, so that our men were formed and ready to receive them, although they came in at full speed. 6

As the Confederates rode over the Pennsylvanians before coming to Duffield's command, both accounts were probably somewhat correct.  Unfortunately for Wharton, he hit this camp with too few men to destroy Duffield's force.  Approximately half his command was diverted to the attack upon the courthouse. Whether this was intentional, as Forrest's report indicates, or accidental because Forrest and his escort inserted themselves within the regiment's column resulting in the rearmost companies following Forrest to town, as another stated,70 is only speculative.  Wharton hit Duffield and managed to push him back to the center of his camp.  Duffield early in the attack was hit twice--once in the thigh and once in the right testicle,71 Wharton supposedly firing one of the shots himself. 72  Duffield remained with his men until the attack was repulsed and then fainted from loss of blood. 73 Wharton was also wounded. 74  When it was apparent that the assault would not succeed, and upon being counterattacked by the enemy, the Rangers fell back in less than perfect order until rallied by Lieutenant Colonel Walker. 75  These two forces were none too eager to renew the general engagement so the Federals took a strong position within an enclosure of cedar posts which the Texans surrounded. 76

Forrest, meanwhile, charged the town, followed by the Rangers and the Georgians.  The Georgians stormed the courthouse while the Texans cleared the surrounding buildings. At 8:00 this objective was secured77 and the Rangers and some Georgians under Ferrill rejoined their command.  In the process this force came within range of the enemy battery (the Rebels here had also failed in their primary mission) and suffered casualties.  They soon found the remainder of the command and joined them. 78

Though Crittenden had surrendered and his headquarters had been captured, his main fighting force was still intact. 79 Forrest determined to accomplish by bluff what he had failed to do by assault.  At 11:30 a.m. he sent a message to Lieutenant Colonel John G. Parkhurst, who had assumed command of the Michigan regiment after Duffield's wounds, stating:

Colonel:  I must demand an unconditional surrender of your force as prisoners of war or I will have every man put to the sword.  You are aware of the overpowering force I have at my command, and this demand is made to prevent the effusion of blood. 80

The Rangers, in the meantime, had retired about four miles down the pike and Forrest ordered their return.  Just as Duffield received Forrest's demand, the Rangers rode into view. 81 Parkhurst, being convinced that he was indeed facing the bulk of Forrest's force, determined by noon to surrender. He reported that amongst the forces opposing him, "There were also quite a number of negroes attached to the Texas and Georgia troops, who were armed and equipped, and took part in the several engagements with my forces during the day."82

This is the only indication that the slaves the men had with them may have borne arms. Forrest left a detail to guard this force and brought the rest to bear on the remaining Federals commanded by Colonel Henry C. Lester.  He made the same demand to that officer that he had to Parkhurst.  Lester requested to speak to Duffield to ascertain the surrender of the others.  He was thereupon led to the wounded prisoner and subsequently decided to surrender. 83

Forrest was able to report that the raid had cost him about twenty-five dead and forty to sixty wounded (probably an underestimate).  He reported about seventy-five enemy killed and 125 wounded.  Around 1,100 to 1,200 enlisted men were prisoners.  He made no mention of officers, but considering that at least one brigadier and two colonels were amongst them it was undoubtedly a sizable number. 84  The Federal court of inquiry opined that there were 1,040 troops at the post, excluding teamsters, clerks, stragglers, and other miscellaneous detachments. 85  In addition to the troops, Forrest captured a battery of four guns, fifty or sixty wagons, 300 mules, 150-200 horses, and deprived the United States of an estimated $500,000 worth of supplies.  What was not appropriated for the Confederacy was burned.  By night the Confederates were well on their way to McMinnville with their booty. 86  Wharton and Company B were directed to accompany the captured officers to Knoxville while the enlisted men were paroled at McMinnville. 87

Forrest remained at McMinnville until the afternoon of the eighteenth when he led his brigade northward toward Nashville.  He had heard of a detachment of Federal cavalry at Lebanon and decided to attack it.  The command rode all night of the nineteenth in order to achieve surprise,88 but the Federals, being apprised of the raid, left at midnight89 except for five soldiers on picket who were evidently forgotten and subsequently captured. 90 The Rebels stayed here until the twenty-first and then headed on to Nashville where they managed to capture five more pickets. 91 Forrest then attacked and destroyed three or four important bridges. 92 The Rangers, led by Walker, captured the Antioch Depot after a brisk engagement in which thirty-five of the enemy were taken. 93  Forrest reported that he had captured ninety-four enlisted men and three lieutenants and had destroyed a considerable amount of stores without suffering a single casualty.  He then withdrew southward while the Rangers returned to Chattanooga where they were by July 26. 94

The Federals, highly annoyed by Forrest, sought to run him to earth.  General William Nelson with his infantry took off in pursuit. 95  Needless to say, the Confederate cavalry had no difficulty avoiding the slow moving infantrymen.  On July 27 Forrest was at Manchester where he attacked a reconnaissance element in front of the Union force and captured fifteen and killed three. 96  On July 30, after spending a week in the hot July sun attempting to cut off Forrest and having nothing to show for their efforts except for the loss of three wagons and suffering about six casualties, the Federals gave up the chase. 97  The Rebels went on to Sparta. 98

This successful operation was what the Eighth Texas needed to restore its spirits after the depressing experience of previous months.  On July 26 Chaplain Bunting wrote from Chattanooga that there were about 700 effectives.  He also stated:

I can truthfully say that this regiment is now in better condition, both as to men and horses, than it has ever been during our campaign.  We have no sickness in camp.  The men are in good spirits and able for duty.  They are anxious for some onward movement.  The discipline is also better than at any former period.  Court Martials are of frequent occurrence, and their sentence seems to be willingly acquiesced in.  It is no unusual thing to see several Texas Rangers now digging holes in the ground, or marking time for several hours each day.  I believe this regiment will now compare with any other one (of cavalry) in the service, in good behaviour and the observance of law in the discharge of duty.  Col. Wharton is much gratified with his success in this respect.  Maj. Harrison is our best disciplinarian, and is a model soldier and officer.  The regiment now has a review every afternoon, and skirmish drill on foot in the morning.  The boys perform in a very scientific manner.  The horses are much improved from the recent scout across the river. 99

This image is in marked contrast with that projected shortly before of an unruly disgruntled band of men.  Part of the reason may be that Bunting was writing for the public, but the success of the Tennessee raid was undoubtedly partially responsible for the change.

For the better part of a month the Eighth Texas was engaged in no activities of note and its movements were not well recorded.  On July 26 Bunting reported the command at Chattanooga, Tennessee. 100 An order dated August 5 directed Wharton to take his command to Kingston, Tennessee. 101 Evidently this was the regiment's base of operation for most of the period of July and August, as the muster rolls for this period list Kingston as the station. 102 An order dated August 9 directed John S. Scott, commanding the Second Cavalry Brigade, to detach the Texans and order them to report to Forrest at Roddy, Tennessee, immediately. 103 Three days later a Ranger sent home a letter from Kingston indicating that the unit had not yet moved. 104  On the sixteenth another letter was posted in Roane County in which Kingston is located. 105

On August 15 Forrest left Sparta to conduct another raid in the direction of Murfreesboro. 106  The Rangers comprised part of his force although it is unknown when they physically joined him.  Again he paid particular attention to the railroad and followed the line running to McMinnville tearing up track and burning bridges. 107  This time the Federals reacted promptly, determined to trap him.  A brigade was sent in pursuit by the twenty-seventh. 108  Forrest planned to reach Altamont to meet the advance of General Braxton Bragg's army. 109  Bragg had replaced Beauregard, whipped his army into shape, and in a masterful move, had left his antagonist, Buell, behind and had begun a campaign which would take him into Kentucky.  A Federal force under Major General Alexander McCook, however, got to Altamont before the Confederates. With Union troops ahead and behind him, Forrest avoided contact by moving into the woods as the enemy approached on the road.  After the Federals had passed without discovering him, Forrest took to the road and went in the opposite direction. 110  Later the same day (August 30) General George H. Thomas managed to make contact near McMinnville.  Through good fortune he managed to cut Forrest's force in half but was unable to hold onto either portion.  All the Federals had to show for their efforts was the capture of one wagon and a few animals. 111

During this raid, on August 29 at Short Mountain Cross-Roads, some nine miles west of McMinnville,112 the Eighth Texas--under Forrest's personal leadership--had an unexpected setback at the hands of 100 troops of the Eighteenth Ohio and Ninth Michigan Infantry.  The Federals had just completed work on a stockade guarding the line from raiders. 113

Forrest determined to assault this position with half the command, leaving the others to hold the horses. 114  The Federals believed that in addition to the Texans there were three battalions of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Alabama cavalry. The assault was launched at 1:00 p.m. while the Federals were eating their meal about 100 yards from the stockade.  Forrest attacked and attempted to cut these forces off, but he failed and the enemy got into the fortification.  The Rebels assaulted the position from three sides and got to within fifty feet.  After ten minutes the Confederates, being unable to carry the position, retreated leaving their dead and wounded on the field. 115  Among those killed was Captain Houston of Company G.  Captain Henry R. Miller, the Federal commander, reported that he had suffered but nine men wounded while he buried twelve Confederates and held another forty-one wounded.  In addition, he had eight horses and thirty guns. 116  The next day a servant belonging to one of the slain Rangers was also taken. 117

On September 3 Forrest and his command reached Bragg's advance at Sparta.  Forrest's brigade joined the cavalry covering the invasion of Kentucky.  Bragg's arrival in Tennessee and advance towards Kentucky had left the Federals in this area outnumbered so they began a general evacuation. Buell had also been outflanked by this move and the Confederates were threatening his supply line. 118  As the Federals were in full retreat, it was the cavalry's job to impede their movement.  One veteran described their tactics:

We would dash into their rear, forcing them to stop and draw up in line of battle, when they would commence shelling us and we would move out of the range of their artillery . . . striking another column perhaps in flank, leaving the first mentioned column shelling the woods .... 11

Bragg reached Glasgow, Kentucky practically unopposed on September 12.  On the fifteenth he moved to Munfordville and on the sixteenth secured the surrender of the fort there and its 4,000 defenders.  This placed him between Buell and Louisville in a strong defensive posture, though not necessarily blocking Buell.  Even though Buell outnumbered him, he was in a strong position and could either stand fast, join with Kirby Smith's force and engage Buell, or march on to Louisville.  Instead, fearing a possible defeat, on September 20 he turned aside and allowed Buell to reach Louisville unopposed.  Despite his failure to crush Buell or to take Louisville, Bragg had managed to reoccupy basically the same line the Confederates held in December, 1861. 120

During part of this movement, the Eighth Texas formed the advance guard of its brigade and therefore of the army. The Rangers participated in several skirmishes, but had lost only one man by the time they reached Glasgow on September 13. 121 From there the Texans rode on to Munfordville where they cut off the retreat of the garrison. 122 Then they advanced north to Elizabethtown and on to Bardstown where they stayed several days. 12

On September 25 Forrest received orders to assume charge of military operations in Middle Tennessee. 124  Wharton took command of the brigade, which consisted of the Eighth Texas, Fourth Tennessee, Second Georgia, and three companies of Kentuckians. 125  Major Harrison commanded the Rangers as senior officer after Wharton's advancement and Walker's resignation.  Walker had never fully recovered from the wound he had received at Woodsonville. 126 On the twenty-seventh Wharton reported that he had 160-200 Rangers at Taylorsville and the remnant at his headquarters near High Grove, Kentucky. 127

One of Wharton's first actions as brigade commander was to attract recruits into the Eighth Texas.  On September 26 he wrote a Texas newspaper:

I will mount all good men who will come from Texas armed with a good shot gun to join Terry's Texas Rangers.  Each man should have a Navy Repeater, if possible, if not to be had in Texas, they can be procured here in the course of time. . . . The men should bring two suits of good clothing, (not more), and two good blankets.128

It is interesting to note that he offered to mount recruits even though the regiment was already short of horses.  On August 18 the Tri-Weekly Telegraph stated that the regiment needed about seventy-five mounts and proposed that they be obtained from the counties where the command was raised. 129 The suggestion may have fallen upon fertile ground because a few days later the Telegraph published a letter from Thomas Affleck, a wealthy planter with a son in the regiment, endorsing the idea and furthermore suggesting that persons take this opportunity to send packages of clothing to the Rangers. 130  It appears that the undertaking was at least partially successful.  In early October a soldier on detail in Texas wrote that they had procured seventeen horses131 and in January, Dunbar Affleck, Thomas' son, acknowledged that he had received the animal his father sent. 132  Wharton may also have been successful in his recruiting efforts.  The Compiled Service Records show that several men did enlist in late 1862 and early 1863, but it cannot be ascertained whether or not the colonel's efforts were responsible. 133

When Bragg began withdrawing about the twentieth, Buell sent his forces out to exploit the situation.  The Eighth Texas, in conjunction with the other cavalry, fought several engagements to frustrate the Federals.  This culminated in a highly successful skirmish at Bardstown on October 4.  The brigade was on the Louisville pike some four miles west of Bardstown guarding it from the enemy.  A large force of Federal cavalry, infantry, and artillery managed to get between the Confederates and Bardstown about half a mile from town.  Wharton immediately headed for this force at a rapid pace.  He found the Union cavalry drawn up on line of battle while the infantry and artillery were in the rear too far back to support their horsemen. 134  Wharton, with the Rangers, charged the Federals who broke and ran. 135  The Texans pursued the enemy shooting some and capturing thirty-six men and four officers. 136  General Thomas reported that he had about twenty dead and wounded and a large number missing. 137 Bunting listed only one man killed and three others wounded. 138 After the Rangers had cleared the cavalry from the path, the remnant of the brigade dashed past the infantry and artillery without trouble. 139

Four days later the campaign climaxed in the Battle of Perryville when a portion of Bragg's army engaged three Union Corps to the west of the town.  Wharton's brigade was at the extreme right of the line protecting that flank140 with the exception of a detail of eight men from each company detached to screen the left. 141 The battle began in the morning with an artillery duel while the other elements remained behind slopes out of harm's way. 142 About 2:00 p.m. the battle began in earnest on the Confederate right in a move to drive the Federals from Doctor's Creek, the only available water.  Wharton's cavalry led the attack.  The cavalrymen charged down the slope, across the bridge, and up a hill amongst the Federals in the woods. 143 The cavalry was finally stopped at a stone fence where Benjamin F. Cheatham's infantrymen came up and took over the assault.  The cavalry, now out of its element, began flanking the enemy.  An ordnance train was discovered, but artillery prevented its capture and did some damage to the regiment.  The rest of the day was spent following the infantry. 144  Four Rangers were injured in this fight including the mortally wounded Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Evans. 145  The Texans spent the night picketing on the battlefield.  Some men took this opportunity to take needed materiel from the dead. 146

Bragg succeeded in driving the Federals from their positions and inflicted more casualties than they, but it was at best a marginal victory.  The Federals were still present in superior force.  The next morning it was the Confederates who were withdrawing towards Harrodsburg.  The cavalry covered the retreat.  From Harrodsburg Bragg went on to Bryantsville where it became apparent that Kentucky was untenable.  Buell was in the vicinity with a superior force and Bragg's reinforcements had been defeated at Corinth on the fourth.  Supplies were insufficient, and the Kentuckians were not rallying to the cause.  Consequently, Bragg ordered the evacuation of Kentucky.  The Confederates started for Cumberland Gap on October 13 and all forces were out by the twenty-second. 147  The cavalry engaged in daily skirmishes with the enemy to help safeguard the main army. 148  The withdrawal took Wharton's brigade to Stanford about the fifteenth and to London on the seventeenth.  From London the cavalry withdrew to Wild Cat. 149  On October 25, the Rangers arrived at Knoxville, Tennessee where they rested a few days. 150 During the period in Kentucky the Rangers had been continuously employed in support of the army.  They had fulfilled their mission and had been successful in their fights.  One man recalled:

. . . from the day we entered Kentucky until the day we passed out of the state, thirty-eight days, our regiment in part or as a whole had been under the fire of the enemy's guns forty-two times, including Perryville Battle as one of the times. 151

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Chapter V
Fighting in Tennessee

The Eighth Texas engaged in no important undertakings for a month following the Kentucky campaign. The command reached Kingston, Tennessee on November 1, 1862, and departed for Sparta on November 8.1 Arriving on the tenth, it remained until the eighteenth and moved on, passing through Murfreesboro and reaching Nolensville in late November.2 Bunting reported 560 men fit for duty on November 25,3 but December's official report listed an aggregate strength of 531 with only 396 effectives.4 The most significant event during November was the selection of commissioned and non-commissioned officers to fill the vacancies created by promotions, resignations, and deaths. Harrison was confirmed as colonel; Stephen Ferrill was elected lieutenant colonel vice. Walker who had resigned; and L. M. Rayburn was promoted major. In addition, other subordinate regimental and company level positions were filled. Promotion by this time was by seniority and only second lieutenants were elected. 5

Though Harrison was now the commander, most of the men had little or no affection for him. One trooper wrote:

Tell Cousin Nish that Harrison as Col. steps as short as ever and holds his head so straight that it leans over behind[.] I believe that he is more unpopular than ever.6

Harrison was a disciplinarian who had a high regard for military proprieties, whereas the other officers were apparently indifferent. As a result, a great many men looked upon him with resentment.7 It may be significant, however, that after Shiloh only one source has been found that indicates that he was considered incompetent. The exception was a man who may have been smarting over Harrison's appointment of a nephew to a position he coveted:

I have no fault to find with Col[.] H except that he is addicted to getting drunk & does it when a battle is pending & has thus lost the confidence of his men . . . .8

While in the vicinity of Nolensville in conjunction with Bragg's operations against Nashville, the Rangers remained in contact with the enemy stationed nearby. Clashes were frequent but not severe.9 On December 3 they encountered a Union foraging party and captured a regimental and a brigade foraging officer as well as a lieutenant.10 On the twenty-fourth Wharton reported that a detachment of Texans and Georgians had captured a picket, took fourteen prisoners, and left others dead and wounded on the field while suffering no losses themselves. He also noted that because of these harrassments, enemy foraging parties no longer were sent out unless accompanied by large supporting forces.11

On Christmas Day William S. Rosecrans, who had replaced Buell, determined to attack. Although the enemy did not begin his general advance until the twenty-sixth,12 Wharton's brigade, consisting of seven regiments, two battalions, a detachment of the Third Georgia Cavalry, a battery, and two escort companies,13 was engaged all day Christmas skirmishing.14 More encounters ensued the next day as the Federals continued their advance past Nolensville thus forcing the Rangers to move their camp.15 Until the general engagement of the thirty-first, the Confederate cavalry, supported by other elements, fought to delay the Federal advance.16

The most significant engagement during these few days was on December 29 when Wharton had his brigade in line across the Wilkinson Pike. The enemy's cavalry was unusually aggressive and the Rangers believed that the excellently equipped Fourth Ohio was anxious for an engagement with them to prove its superiority. The Yankee regiment routed the Second Georgia which was armed mainly with single-shot rifles suitable primarily for infantry service.17 Harrison, upon seeing the Georgians in trouble, ordered an attack which soon reversed the situation. The Rangers brought in twenty prisoners, as well as horses, weapons, and equipment.18

The Federal offensive culminated in the Battle of Murfreesboro, or Stone's River, beginning December 31 and ending on January 3. Bragg's strategy was to assault and flank the enemy's right wing and roll up his line.19 Wharton's brigade, on the left, was instructed to get behind the enemy and to do all damage possible in conjunction with the general attack. To facilitate maneuvering, Harrison commanded the Eighth Texas, Second Georgia, and Third Confederate.20 Rayburn was in charge of the Rangers until illness forced him to relinquish command to Captain Gustave Cook.21 Wharton's attack was successful. The element commanded by Colonel Cox

[MAP/CHART]
STONES RIVER
30 DEC. 1862 - 3 JAN. 1863

Stones River (or Murphreesboro) Battlefield.
From Boatner, The Civil War Dictionary, p. 804.

captured a large portion of the Seventy-fifth Regiment Illinois Infantry,22 while four companies of Rangers under Captain S. P. Christian took a four gun battery. Wharton next attacked a column of wagons and artillery. The Second Georgia assaulted the saber-bearing cavalry escort and for the second time in three days was routed by an enemy with superior weaponry. The Rangers again intervened and turned the tables.23 The Confederates, having captured several hundred wagons, numerous pieces of artillery, and an estimated 1,500 prisoners, attempted to return to their lines with their prizes. They had, however, become badly scattered, with some pursuing the enemy, others guarding and directing the movements of the wagons, while still others were protecting their own battery.24 The previously routed Federal cavalry reformed and attacked simultaneously with another body of mounted troops that had recently arrived upon the scene. The assault forced the Confederates to abandon a large portion of their spoils.25 They did succeed, however, in bringing in five or six pieces of artillery, some 400 prisoners, about 300 beeves, and what mules and horses they had been able to cut loose from the wagons. Numerous enemy horsemen had been killed and wounded, including Colonel Minor Milliken of the First Ohio Cavalry who was killed by Private John Bowers of Company K, Eighth Texas Cavalry.26

The Rangers spent the rest of the day observing the enemy.27 On January 1, 1863 Bragg ordered Wharton's brigade to attack wherever possible on the Nashville and Murfreesboro Pike.28 About 4:00 p.m. the brigade observed a large wagon train with a cavalry escort at La Vergne which was headed towards Nashville. In concert with General Joseph Wheeler's cavalry, it launched an attack which netted 100 wagons, 150 prisoners, 300 mules, and a cannon. The animals, the gun, and about ten wagons were delivered to the commissary while the remaining stores were burned29 probably because a detachment could not be spared to take them to the rear. An attack upon an entrenched infantry regiment, however, was unsuccessful.30

Wharton reported that he then proceeded to Murfreesboro, arriving there at 1:00 a.m. He mentioned four hours of fighting on the route, but neglected to give any specifics. On January 2, Bragg ordered Wharton's brigade to the right flank. In the afternoon Breckinridge's division launched a determined but futile attack on the Federal left. Wharton, on his own initiative, directed artillery fire upon an enveloping column. When Breckinridge was thrown back, Wharton ordered his men to dismount to cover the retreat. The troops spent that night in the saddle screening the right flank.31 Bunting stated that there was some perfunctory skirmishing the next day,32 but Wharton evidently did not consider it worth reporting.

Bragg, having achieved a tactical victory, decided to withdraw when he learned that the Federals were being reinforced. The enemy had lost nearly 13,000 of a force exceeding 40,000 men, while the Confederates had suffered fewer than 12,000 casualties out of 35,000. The cavalrymen, believing that Bragg's position was stronger than it actually was, severely criticized him for not destroying Rosecrans.33 One of his apologists noted, however, that:

We are all at a loss to know why Bragg retreated on Sunday, but suppose he had good reasons-that he is a great General none can deny & history will no doubt clear up all mysteries. . . .34

On the final day of battle, Bragg lost much of the advantage he had gained the first. His decision was therefore probably correct, but it was hard for his men to accept the necessity of a retreat after winning a victory.

Sunday, January 4, found Wharton's brigade falling back slowly toward Shelbyville where it began picketing. The entire command had seen hard fighting and had shared remarkable successes. Losses, however, had been heavy. Wharton reported 108 dead and wounded and 107 captured out of a total of 2,000.35 The Rangers had suffered sixty-three casualties in the campaign.36 The damage that they had wrought upon the enemy, however, was even greater. Wharton stated that he had sent to the rear more prisoners than the total command numbered, a highly outstanding accomplishment.37 It appears from Union reports, however, that not all the captives got to Confederate prison depots and that many escaped and made their way back to their lines.38 This was probably the result of the fluid situation and an inability of the Confederates to detach escorts adequate to safeguard the prisoners.

Although the Eighth Texas had been conspicuous in all actions, Wharton took care not to praise his old command more highly than he did the others. He did, however, point out the strength of the Rangers and the weaknesses of his other regiments when he wrote:

The Rangers, being armed with revolvers, are better prepared to meet the enemy's cavalry than other regiments in the brigade. The battle of Wednesday was fought at great disadvantage on our part, the enemy's cavalry being much more efficiently armed and equipped. The proper weapon for cavalry has proven to be the revolver.39

Three weeks after the battle, a Ranger lieutenant with less charity stated: "The most of our Cavalry are Georgians, Tennesseans & Alabamians & as they are poorly armed & indifferent riders we do not estimate them highly. . . ."40

It is unclear whether the Rangers were armed with shotguns to the extent that they had been at the beginning of the war. A statement in Wharton's report makes it appear doubtful. "All soldiers in the command," he wrote, "who were armed with shot or other indifferent guns exchanged them for those of a more approved character."41 Blackburn, writing many years later, indicated that shotguns were still prevalent42 and contemporary letters show they were present.43 Possibly it was left up to each man's discretion whether he wished to retain a shotgun which was highly effective for close-in fighting but useless at longer ranges or to carry a rifle or carbine which threw out less lead but at greater distances. It was the revolver, however, which gave the unit much of its potency. A trooper informed a friend who was expected to rejoin the regiment shortly that:

It will not be necessary for you to get any pistols as I have enough for us both--I have had the opportunity of getting a dozzen [sic] for nothing in our fights and captures since you left and we will have plenty chances this winter--This Regt[.] has captured over 1000 breach-loading [sic] guns & six shooters since the battle of Shiloh & is finely armed.44

Many years later a veteran recalled:

One reason of our almost uniform success was the superiority of our arms. . . . If a man died or was killed his comrades kept his pistol. When a prisoner of the enemy's cavalry was taken this part of his outfit was added to the general stock, so that after a few months most, if not all, had two weapons of this kind, and some even tried to carry three or four.45

Swords appear to have been a rarity. Only one incident has been found when a Ranger, Colonel Cook, tried to use one. Bunting stated that in an ambush in October 1863, Cook discharged his pistol and then charged upon the enemy with his saber. Before he could close, however, the officer was wounded and the weapon was shot out of his hand.46 Blackburn wrote that saber charges by the enemy were greeted with amusement and were easily repulsed.47 The superiority of firearms over edged weapons was dramatically demonstrated in May 1863, when six saber-wielding Yankees charged Private Charles Howard and two other unidentified Rangers. The Texans held their fire until their assailants were within easy range and then killed five and captured the sixth.48

After picketing near Shelbyville for about three weeks, Wharton's and Forrest's brigades were united under Joseph Wheeler for a raid against Fort Donelson. The February weather was bitterly cold and exceedingly damp; Chaplain Bunting observed that there were only five days of sunshine that month.49 In addition to simple discomfort these conditions caused numerous cases of frostbite.50 The command left Shelbyville on January 28 or 29 (51) with all but the commanders in ignorance of the destination.52 Their route passed through Franklin and Charlottesville.53 Wheeler and Wharton met Forrest, who had been operating in the vicinity, and informed him of the plan to attack Fort Donelson. The latter opposed the scheme largely because his brigade was critically short of ammunition.54 Wharton's supply was also inadequate.55 Wheeler overruled Forrest and the combined force moved toward the Federal bastion. By February 3 the Confederates were in position for the attack.56 The Eighth Texas was not to take part in the assault. Nine companies were to be stationed on the road to Fort Henry to guard against Federal reinforcements57 and to cut the telegraph lines.58 Company B, serving as Wharton's body guard, supported the artillery.59 Although the Confederates pressed their assault energetically and managed to take some outlying positions, plus a cannon and eighty prisoners, their efforts were ultimately futile. As they neared the fort enemy artillery decimated their ranks. A second attempt also failed. With the arrival of five Federal gunboats and several transports, Wheeler decided to abandon the effort.60 The Rangers, however, did strike at the flotilla. One of the gunboats was towing a barge loaded with hay. Private Samuel Maverick of San Antonio leaped into the river, reached the barge, boarded it and set its cargo afire. He then escaped as the blaze destroyed both the craft and its load.61

That night the Confederates, hampered by the cold and the snow, began their long and arduous retreat. When they reached the Duck River they discovered that the ferry boat was on the opposite bank. Only two men--both Rangers-were willing to swim over to fetch it. They succeeded but had to be carried from the boat to the fire.62 The retreating Confederates reached Columbia about the ninth63 and rested there two or three days.64 The march ended on the thirteenth when they arrived in the vicinity of Lewisburg, Tennessee.65 Though a fiasco, the operation convinced many of the Eighth Texas that they were superior to their compatriots. One Ranger claimed that the Texans withstood the cold better than soldiers native to the vicinity. The other regiments apparently suffered more cases of frostbite than the Texans and it had been Rangers who secured the ferry boat on the Duck River. Finally, a Tennessean had to be left behind when he collapsed. Perhaps more significant than their alleged hardihood was another observation: the Eighth Texans were better clothed than their counterparts.66

An incident on the retreat provided an interesting and seemingly atypical insight in the relationship of the men with Harrison. On the fifth, in spite of the cold and fatigue of the march, the troopers engaged in a snowball fight. Some were bold enough to give their colonel "a taste."67 Unfortunately the witness did not state in what spirit the snowballs were thrown nor how Harrison reacted.

Following the Fort Donelson campaign, the Rangers engaged in routine picketing punctuated by occasional skirmishes. About the twenty-fourth68 the regiment moved its camp to Fairfield, Tennessee approximately three miles from Wartrace on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. The brigade was responsible for patrolling the area between Middleton and Woodbury. During part of this period (late February to early April) Captain Gustave Cook commanded the regiment since Colonel Harrison was in charge of a portion of the brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Ferrill was absent on sick furlough.69 Wharton organized a special unit-"Wharton's Scouts"--made up by drawing recruits from each of the brigade's companies (about fifty).70 Rangers dominated the command by providing the captain, the first and second lieutenants, and the orderly sergeant.71

Fighting was generally light and sporadic. Two men were captured on March 1 while away from camp on detail.72 On the twenty-first Company D supported a battery in a minor fight.73 Ten days later the Rebels attacked a Federal scouting party killing three Yankees74 and capturing six.75 The Rangers lost two men wounded.76 On April 1 there was more confused skirmishing with no damage to either side until evening when Private Robert B. Cotton of Company G and two infantrymen infiltrated enemy lines and each stole a mule from the wagons.77

Combat intensified during the second week of April when Wheeler and Wharton pulled the cavalry out of the line to conduct a raid against Federal controlled railroads. About the fifth the Confederates started around their left flank en route to Lebanon by way of Shelbyville. On the tenth they arrived at the Hermitage, Andrew Jackson's plantation, about twelve miles from Nashville.78 From there Wheeler and Wharton led one portion of the brigade to the Cumberland River where they ambushed a railroad train carrying horses.79 The river prevented them from close-assaulting the train,80 but the locomotive was severely damaged, if not destroyed, by artillery.81 Under Ferrill the remainder of the command--some 500 men of the Eighth and Eleventh Texas--marched to Antioch Station, about five and a half miles from La Vergne. Here, at a bend in the line, the Confederates displaced the rails slightly and then hid in ambush near the bed. About 4:30 p.m. a train appeared and ran off the track. The Federal guards resisted but were quickly overpowered.82 In less than twenty minutes the Confederates, having captured, plundered, and fired the train, withdrew.

It was a profitable exploit, and Ferrill reported that he had lost only one man wounded.83 The Federals, however, alleged that the Confederates lost six dead, six wounded, and three captured. The Rebels freed some forty-one prisoners84 (two others had been killed in the attack),85 killed nine Federals, and wounded ten others. Ferrill paroled about sixty captives, but carried off as prisoners twelve officers (including two colonels). The Confederates also discovered an estimated $30,000 in Union currency (greenbacks) on the train which they quickly looted.86 Wharton attempted to recover the money to buy horses, but his order was largely ignored.87 General Rosecrans also lost an engraved pistol which he had sent to Nashville for repairs.88 The Rebels also looted the mail in their search for valuables. The soldiers, however, seemed to find more in the letters from the enemies' wives and sweethearts of erotic than of financial interest.89

On April 13 Wheeler's command converged at Lebanon to begin its return. Surprisingly, for a week there was no enemy resistance even though the Yankee drums were constantly heard. Wheeler soon deduced that the Federals were seeking to cut him off. The situation rapidly deteriorated and he determined that a night march on a back road was necessary to extricate his raiders from a potentially disastrous position. A skirmish at McMinnville cost the Southerners a few prisoners, but apparently the Rangers were not involved. By May 1, the expedition succeeded in reaching friendly lines and the Eighth Texas encamped at Sparta, Tennessee.90

Another railroad raid in late April was not so successful. Marcus L. Gordon, captain of the scout company, led about twenty-five men of his unit and of the Eighth Texas into Kentucky.91 Near Franklin, Tennessee, he concealed his command near the tracks after separating the rails. Union sympathizers, however, had alerted the enemy who reinforced the guard. The train stopped ahead of the sabotaged track to allow the Union troops to attack the would-be ambushers. The Confederates managed to escape, but lost two dead and thirteen wounded.92 At least one of the wounded was subsequently captured.93 Gordon's command, after eluding three detachments of Union cavalry, managed to return without further loss.94

By late February 1863, Wharton was a division commander, and Harrison had become head of a brigade. As neither officer received promotion in rank, and as there was no apparent change in command structure, it appears that this was simply a redesignation of units to reflect their actual strengths.95 According to Harrison's adjutant, Benjamin Franklin Batchelor, the Eighth Texas did not comprise part of Harrison's brigade during May and June.96 He neglected to state to whom they were attached, but another man reported that during this period the Rangers did support a battery.97 It is therefore logical to assume that the Eighth Texas formed the division reserve and was under Wharton's direct command. In addition to supporting the artillery, the regiment also served on picket duty. By late May half the command operated out of Granville, Tennessee on the Cumberland River, while four companies were with B. F. White, Jr.'s battery.98 There was little fighting during this period. The regiment's only casualty for several weeks occurred on June 13 near Fairfield when a reportedly strong enemy force attacked the picket and one Ranger was slightly wounded.99

This period of relative inactivity allowed the Eighth Texas to recover much of the strength it had lost during eighteen months of war. One man observed that:

Our Regt[.] is stronger now and turns out more men for duty than any time since we arrived at bowling [sic] Gren [sic] [,] Ky. nearly two years ago[.] We have no sickness now scarcely and almost every man has a horse. . . .100

The source of this manpower is unclear. The Compiled Service Records reflect no dramatic increase in recruitment for this period, so the probable explanation is that soldiers absent because of illness and straggling rejoined their companies. There was, however, a great deal of homesickness and speculation as to a transfer to Texas. In May a soldier informed his aunt that:

There has been some talk of sending our Regiment to Texas and let some regiment which is there now take our place here. It is said that all the officers are willing to the exchange except Col. Harrison .... I think it would be very much desired by all the members of the
regiment. . . .101

Notwithstanding the general good health of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ferrill was forced to resign because of chronic diarrhea.102 He was the last of the ten original company commanders. Wharton and Harrison had been promoted out of the regiment, while the others had either resigned or had been killed. Gustave Cook, originally first sergeant of Company H, replaced Ferrill and S. P. Christian was promoted to major.103

Having remained static for five months, Rosecrans launched an offensive in late June to seize all of Tennessee. By skillful maneuvering he managed to dislodge and to force Bragg to retreat without a pitched battle. There were, however, numerous cavalry skirmishes. Fighting began for the Rangers on the twenty-fourth when enemy cavalry attacked two companies picketing at Fosterville on the Murfreesboro-Shelbyville Pike.104 The pickets, reinforced by the balance of the regiment, held the enemy in check until 4:00 p.m. when successes in other areas allowed the Federals to flank Harrison's brigade.105

For the next several days the Eighth Texas and other cavalry formations covered the withdrawal of Bragg's forces. After the fight of the twenty-fourth they fell back toward Bellbuckle travelling all night in the rain.106 During the succeeding days the Federals continued their advance probing weaknesses and seeking and gaining the Confederate flanks. The Rebel cavalry constantly marched and counter-marched, usually with little or no sleep and often in the rain, from one threatened area to another. The Southern horsemen engaged in numerous skirmishes in a futile attempt to check the enemy's progress. On the twenty-ninth, Harrison's brigade, consisting of the Eighth and Eleventh Texas, Fourth Tennessee, and White's battery, reached Tullahoma and assumed the responsibility of guarding the right. Two days later the Rebels abandoned the city when the Federals flanked that position.107

With the evacuation of Tullahoma, Harrison ordered Cook to take his regiment to protect the brigade's wagons and an infantry division in jeopardy of attack. The Rangers brought the train out safely.108 The cavalry also sought to delay Rosecrans' progress by burning bridges and felling trees across the road.109 They spent that night picketing near Allisonia. On July 2 Wharton reunited his division and attempted to thwart the enemy's advance by engaging him in battle. The Eighth and Eleventh Texas were to charge as the Yankees approached. The Federals did not accept the challenge, so there was no combat until evening when there was some skirmishing. The next morning the Federals flanked the Confederates and forced them to run their horses for five miles to avoid being cut off from the mountain pass near Cowan Station.110

For the Rangers the campaign came to a climax on the morning of the fourth when the Fifth and Sixth Regiments Kentucky Cavalry North, attacked them on Cumberland Mountain near the Southern Episcopal University (now University of the South) at Sewanee.111 The Federals first assaulted the three companies on picket, cutting off one and driving another back onto the third. The enemy charged to within a few feet of this line, but was driven back by a well directed volley. The Federals, pursued by the Texans, reached their reserves, causing the Rangers to retreat to their original positions. The Texans repulsed a second Union attack in hand-to-hand combat. These two companies then fell back to join the main body of the regiment which had now formed in line of battle. The Confederates then took the offensive. Two companies attacked the dismounted men on the left while three others charged the mounted force. Both assaults succeeded in forcing the enemy back. Although the Yankee Kentuckians had been bested, they began maneuvering against the left with dismounted troops while their mounted men threatened the front and right flank. Cook slowly withdrew his command under the protection of the Fourth Tennessee. Bunting reported at the time that they considered this to be their most brilliant battle. The units maneuvered well despite the broken terrain and the men fought coolly and effectively.112 Casualties on both sides were lighter than might be expected from the intensity of the action. The enemy lost three dead, thirteen wounded, and one missing113 as opposed to one Rebel dead, six wounded, and two missing.114

The remainder of the campaign was anti-climactic. The Federals followed the Confederate cavalry the rest of the day but did not force combat. The Yankees did not appear the next day thus allowing the Southerners to cross over the Tennessee River unopposed into Georgia at Bridgeport.115

Upon entering Georgia, the Rangers established camp near Trenton on the seventh where they remained until the twelfth. On that day they moved to Rome, arriving on the nineteenth, to "recruit" or improve the condition of their exhausted horses.116 Chaplain Bunting, deeming that the souls of the soldiers were also in need of "recruiting," held a protracted camp meeting. Assisted by others he preached once or twice a day for nearly six weeks.117 He was rewarded for his efforts by a reawakening of faith amongst the members of the regiment. A "Christian Association" was organized with Colonel Cook as president;118 the precise nature of its activities is unclear. One man estimated that 100 Rangers were seeking the way to Salvation while fifty backsliders had been reclaimed. He also observed that:

You can scarecely now hear any oath when too [sic] months ago nothing else was heard very little card playing and although they are making
Peach Brandy all round us and the boys have free access to it you do not see any drinking nor no Rowdism any where[.]119

Most of the time, however, was spent in more military pursuits. Five roll calls were held each day, plus daily inspections, drill, and dress parades.120

The entire regiment was not present at Rome. One man reported that his cousin was with ". . . a party of our Regt[.] and a party of the llth Texas who are up in Tennessee watching the movement of the Enemy and bushwhacking them every chance they can get."121 Another detachment of twenty to thirty men led by Major S. P. Christian left some days
prior to August 21 to procure horses in Kentucky.122

While camp duties occupied much of their time, the Rangers still had ample opportunity for social activities. The soldiers made acquaintances about the countryside, paying especial attention to the young ladies.123 Although they were on good terms with many of the citizens, and enjoyed the abundant fruits and vegetables of the area,124 in general they resented the treatment they received. Bunting wrote,

Since our entrance into Georgia it has seemed the people have made up their minds to fleece us. "The soldiers are coming, and now we must raise prices" seems to be the watchword.125

The Tennesseans, in contrast, had been generous to the Rangers and had often risked imprisonment to aid them. While at Nolensville, Tennessee a trooper recalled that:

The ladies here are our best friends, they slip into Nashville and bring us out boots, clothing, &c concealed about their persons. One of them smuggled out a pair of sixshooters hid in the collar of her buggy horse.126

Another wrote that:

. . . one Lady a few dayes [sic] sinse [sic] wore out [from Nashville] three over shirts sevral [sic] prs Boots Hats &c what a great thing Hoops are. Some of them have brought out sevral [sic] Blankets Six Shooters and sevral [sic] suits of Confederate Grey all under them Well I wont [sic] say what.127

These differences prompted Wharton to state that next to Texas he would most prefer to fight for Tennessee, a statement that offended some of the Georgians present.128

The troops took the opportunity of this relatively idle time to honor John A. Wharton, their division commander and former regimental commander. They decided to present him with a horse valued at $1,500. The owner, however, parted with the animal for $1,000 in consideration of his friendship for Wharton. The men raised the money, plus another $1,000 to pay for entertainment, out of their own pockets.129 On August 5 the charger was given to the general in ceremonies which included a review, a band, a barbecue, and the inevitable speeches.130 That night they held a dance for the visitors and soldiers who were willing to miss Bunting's evening sermon.131 This gift made Wharton one of the best mounted men in the Confederate army. In addition to an exceptional horse, he owned a saddle which had cost $1,000 specie in Mexico City.132

---

Chapter VI
The Chattanooga and KnoxvilleCampaigns

While the Eighth Texas was in Georgia, Bragg and the bulk of his army remained in Chattanooga awaiting developments. Rosecrans was not seeking combat at this time, but he was making preparations to move against Chattanooga by organizing his supply depots and lines of communications. On August 16, 1863, he inaugurated a masterful campaign by which on September 9 he secured Chattanooga without the loss of a single man. 1

Although Bragg had been outmaneuvered, he began preparations which would culminate in victory at the Battle of Chickamauga. He withdrew to La Fayette, Georgia where he gathered his forces while protected from observations by the
mountains. To further conceal his intentions he manufactured rumors that his force was demoralized and in retreat. He ensured that the enemy was "aware" of this by sending fake deserters into Union lines. 2 General Joseph Eggleston
Johnston, commander of the Western Department, reinforced Bragg with two divisions and Davis ordered General James Longstreet and two divisions of his corps to be detached from the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet's transfer was successfully accomplished by rail within ten days. 3

Although Lincoln's military advisor, Henry W. Halleck, knew of Longstreet's departure by September 13,4 he failed to inform Rosecrans until the fifteenth, 5 perhaps because he believed the destination to be Charleston, South Carolina. 6 Meanwhile Rosecrans had scattered his advancing forces in the belief that Bragg's army was unable to resist and could possibly be destroyed if attacked from a flank or cut off from Atlanta. 7

On August 28 the Rangers left Rome and moved toward Alpine by easy marches. 8 About the fifth they were assigned the missions of observing an enemy column advancing upon Alpine and of picketing and patrolling the passes in the vicinity. 9 There were skirmishes, but none of consequence. 10 Finally on September 19 the two opposing armies came together in a broken, wooded region to engage in the Battle of Chickamauga. The nature of the terrain precluded the effective use of cavalry, so the Eighth Texas did relatively little fighting as compared to the infantry formations. On the first day the Eighth and Eleventh Texas were caught in a vulnerable position and forced to retire with at least six Rangers dead or wounded. The next morning there was a minor company-size picket fight. 11 Later in the day Wheeler, whose command was on the left flank, launched a diversionary attack 12 on George Crook's division of cavalry consisting of the First, Third, and Fourth Ohio and Second Kentucky. 13 The main body of Rebels dismounted and launched a frontal assault while the Eighth Texas rode over the enemy camp and fell upon the flank. The Rebels won after hard fighting. Bunting reported that the enemy lost three colonels: one dead, one mortally wounded, and one captured. 14 Actually only Lieutenant Colonel Valentine Cupp commanding the First Ohio was killed. Nearly six months previously he had been captured in Ferrill's ambush of the train at Antioch Station and had been subsequently exchanged. 15 There are two versions of how this dying officer was treated. Blackburn, who seems almost to have taken a ghoulish delight in relating the grisly side of battle, wrote that he was found sitting against a tree:

Some of our boys approached him and said to him, "Well Colonel, as you will not need your hat or boots any longer we beg the privilege of exchanging with you," and as the Colonel could not reply, the boys concluded that silence gives consent, and proceeded to make the exchange.

Giles, whose account is generally more sober and calculated to present the regiment favorably, reported, however, that the colonel requested to see an acquaintance, Ranger Lieutenant George M. Decherd. He entrusted his belongings to Decherd to be sent home. 17

Also on the twentieth, Rosecrans, acting upon a report that there was a gap in his line, ordered Thomas J. Wood to remove his division to that position. In actuality, there was no void, but the woods hid an entire division from the sight of Captain Sanford C. Kellogg of George H. Thomas's staff who originated the erroneous information. Before the Federals could close the breach left by Wood, Longstreet launched an attack that tore through the weakened line and ensured a Confederate victory. Although a large portion of the Federal army was routed with Rosecrans himself fleeing to Chattanooga, some elements which remained intact made a stand at Horseshoe Ridge and prevented the annihilation of the entire command. Had Bragg followed up his advantage by rapidly committing troops in other sectors of his line he might still have destroyed his adversary. Though Bragg was lethargic, his cavalry promptly exploited the situation. 18

That evening General Wheeler ordered six companies of Wharton's division under Ranger Captain George W. Littlefield to take possession of a ford on West Chickamauga Creek to cut off the retreat of a Federal wagon train and its cavalry escort. The next morning Littlefield engaged the enemy until
Wharton attacked and captured the train and took about 300 prisoners. 19 For the rest of the day the Eighth Texas blocked the Chattanooga road and engaged in only light skirmishing. Other elements of Wheeler's Corps, however, were more actively involved. On the twenty-third the command pushed through Rossville, with Company B of the Eighth Texas advancing to within a mile of Chattanooga. 20

Bragg, after several days hesitation, determined to retake Chattanooga. He ordered Wheeler, bolstered by Forrest's command, to disrupt Rosecrans' communications. Forrest's brigades were neither physically nor emotionally fit for this service, for units were understrength and the men and horses were exhausted. 21 Furthermore, the troops lacked faith in Wheeler probably because of the fiasco at Fort Donelson. 22 On the thirtieth, Wheeler, after selecting only the most fit of Forrest's command, began preparing for the raid. 23 Meanwhile, Wharton's and William Thompson Martin's divisions seized fords across the Tennessee River. During the night of the twenty-ninth, Company D of the Rangers cut a road down the bank at an unguarded shoal, enabling the division to pass over unmolested just before daybreak. During the morning the Rangers attacked an enemy picket, capturing and killing

[map diagram]

Wheeler's Raid on Rosecrans, September 29-October 9, 1863.

From, Official Records Vol. XXX Part 2, p. 674.

several. 24 The next day Wheeler launched his raid with some 4,000 men and six guns. 25 Although hindered by muddy roads and rain, he spent October 2 climbing Walden's Ridge. At the top Wheeler announced his plan to take some 1,500 men with him while the balance moved on the Federal depot at McMinnville. 26 Five companies of the Eighth Texas, led by Cook, were taken by Wheeler, while the others accompanied Wharton and the force commanded by Henry B. Davidson. 27

At 3:00 a.m. the next day, Wheeler and his command set out toward Chattanooga. Ten miles along the way they captured a train of thirty-two wagons. 28 An hour later another train, variously estimated as 500-960 wagons, was attacked and its escort of infantry and cavalry driven away. For eight hours the Confederates pillaged the convoy burning the wagons and killing the mules. 29 They spared a few animals to replace their jaded horses, as needed, or to have as remounts. 30 This action complicated Rosecrans' predicament, for the Confederates had already cut the railroad to Chattanooga and he was forced to rely solely on wagons hauling supplies over a sixty mile trek. Wheeler now interdicted the route and had destroyed an important convoy. Food for Rosecrans' soldiers became scarce and there were inadequate stocks of clothing suitable for the autumn weather. 31

When he had finished with the wagons, Wheeler rejoined the main force near McMinnville. On October 3, Davidson sent Harrison's brigade around McMinnville to capture a stockade and to cut the telegraph while the rest of his command
invested the town. Upon the garrison's surrender, the Rebels helped themselves both to the government stores and to the goods of eight allegedly pro-Union merchants. The town's other inhabitants welcomed the cavalrymen. 32 On October 4 Wheeler marched on Murfreesboro with his reunited command with Union Generals Crook and Robert B. Mitchell in pursuit. 33 The Eighth Texas protected the rear with Major Christian and three companies forming the guard. The Federals pressed Christian and succeeded in getting between him and the main body. There ensued a mile-long running battle in which several Rangers were captured. After the party had rejoined the main body, the Federals aggressively shelled the brigade which had now formed in line of battle.
Harrison's brigade checked the thrust and then fell back slowly until dark. 34

The next morning at 2:00 the Confederates moved out with the Third Regiment Arkansas Cavalry in the rear. By daylight the Rangers were at Woodbury. 35 George Littlefield reported that a colored brigade was at Murfreesboro and that the Texans were determined to massacre any prisoners that might be taken. 36 Wheeler, however, did not attack the town, but turned towards Shelbyville destroying railroad tracks, trestles, and bridges. 37 At Murfreesboro, Companies D and F of the Rangers circled the town in hope of capturing a railroad train. Although disappointed, they did secure an ox-drawn train hauling wood to Nashville. Although the cargo was of no use to the raiders, the oxen were butchered for beef. 38 On the sixth, the Eighth Texas occupied Shelbyville without loss. The Rangers, seizing the opportunity to lay in a wardrobe of winter clothing, appropriated the goods of Yankee store owners. As other commands entered the town all semblance of order vanished and the occupation deteriorated into a pillage with civilians being relieved of their
property at gun point. Bunting indicated that the Rangers did not take part in the disorders, but, since they had been the first into the town, they undoubtedly had had their pick of the loot. 39 One officer wrote to his wife that, "Our Cavalry looked more like a vast Caravan of Merchants, than soldiers, on returning from Tennessee. Every man had from one to three suits of Yankee clothes. . . ." 40

On the seventh, the pursuing Federals finally caught up with the raiders and bested them in a fight near Farmington. When Wheeler had moved out, Wharton's division was behind Davidson's. Davidson had been attacked and routed and the Rangers were ordered to charge down the road. A force of Yankee cavalry, dismounted and armed with the newly issued seven-shot Spencer rifle, ambushed them in a cedar brake. The Rangers were fortunate that drizzling rain and art£11ery smoke obscured the vision of their ambushers. 41 The head of the column was shattered, however, with Colonel Cook and at least two others wounded and most of the horses injured. Major Christian extricated the command--including the wounded--and immediately took a position which prevented the enemy from exploiting his advantage. The rest of the brigade did not support Christian, but passed around the action to avoid combat. When the engagement was broken off, Captain W. R. Jarmon was in command as Christian had been wounded. Only one man was dead, but at least fifteen were wounded, seven of whom were left at private houses. 42 At least one of the injured, First Lieutenant J. K. P. Blackburn of Company F, was subsequently captured. 43 Giles reported that that evening Wharton and Wheeler both stated that the Rangers had done all that could be expected of them. Harrison, however, exclaimed:

It was no fight at all! I'm ashamed of them! If they can not do better than that I'll disown them!

A staff officer put in: "I always thought that regiment somewhat overrated anyhow."

This aroused "old Tom," who got up, shook his finger in the fellow's face and broke out furiously: "Who the _____ are you? There is not a man in that regiment who can not kick you all over this yard, sir!"

As he strode off to his horse, he was heard to say: "By ____ I'll curse them all I want to; but I'll be ______ if anybody else shall do it in my presence!" 44

Wheeler deemed it prudent to return to Confederate lines across the Tennessee River. On the ninth the raiders forded at Muscle Shoals five miles about Lamb's Ferry. On the eleventh the cavalry established camp near Decatur, Alabama, and rested for over a week. The men were displeased with their service in Tennessee even though they had wrought a great deal of damage upon the enemy. Apparently most felt that the campaign, especially the Battle of Farmington, proved that Wheeler was unfit to lead cavalry raids. 45

While the Rangers rested near Decatur, Wharton traveled to Richmond, Virginia, regarding his transfer to the Trans-Mississippi Department. He was also to attempt to get the Eighth Texas transferred with him. 46 Wharton was subsequently transferred, but the regiment remained east of the
Mississippi. 47

In late October Bragg ordered Longstreet and Wheeler to capture Knoxville with its garrison of 12,000 men under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside. The cavalry marched through northern Georgia into east Tennessee where it joined the infantry at Sweetwater on November 11. On the twelfth Longstreet ordered Wheeler to strike the enemy at Maryville and to create a diversion. Under the cover of darkness the next evening Wheeler crossed the Tennessee with four
brigades. Dibrell's brigade, in the advance, surprised and routed 48 two companies on picket, variously reported as from the Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry, North, and as the Fifth Indiana Cavalry. 49 Wheeler reported that 151 prisoners were taken. 50 While this figure is probably an exaggeration, the
Federal commander did report that most of his men were captured. As Dibrell was involved in this encounter, Brigadier General William P. Sanders attacked the Confederates with the First Kentucky Cavalry and the Forty-fifth Ohio Infantry (Mounted) Regiments. 51 Harrison's brigade repulsed this thrust and, assisted by John T. Morgan's brigade, drove

[map diagram]

The Eighth Texas' Area of Operations, November-December 1863.

From Collier, The War Child's Children, p. 91.

them back in confusion. 52 In this engagement Sanders acknowledged the loss of forty-nine officers and men. 53

The next day Wheeler forded the Little River in pursuit of Sanders' force which consisted of four brigades and a battery. The Confederates pushed the Yankees back to a strong defensive position where their left flank was protected by a
high ridge and the right by the Holston River. Stock Creek, a stream unfordable to horses, separated the forces, and open, rising ground provided the Union troops with excellent fields of fire. Wheeler dismounted about half his command and attacked the Federal left. This element drove the Yankees from their position and then pressed on, flanking the enemy line, forcing Sanders to withdraw. In the meantime, another detail repaired the partially destroyed bridge across the creek, enabling Armstrong's division to cross on horseback.
For over an hour the dismounted Rebels drove the Federals from position to position while their mounted compatriots overhauled them and prepared to charge. 54 The Rangers, led by Captains Jarmon and Littlefield, 55 formed the
van while the Eleventh Texas followed and the Third Arkansas protected the flanks. Dibrell's brigade followed in support of Harrison's. The Texans smashed through the enemy line and drove them three miles 56 to within a mile of Knoxville. There another force of infantry and artillery checked the onslaught and forced the Eighth Texas to break off contact. 57 As dusk was approaching, Wheeler withdrew to Stock Creek. The Rebels reported the capture of 140 Yankees and that others had been killed and wounded; 58 Bunting wrote that the Rangers themselves had taken seventy-five prisoners. 59 While no Federal sources have been found to confirm the completeness of the alleged rout, casualty reports do tend to support the Confederate version. Three of the Union regiments involved acknowledged losses totaling 101 officers and men (including eighty-two captured or missing) for that day's fighting and the light skirmishing of the next. 60 The Rangers had not escaped unscathed: one man was dead and six were wounded. 61

On the sixteenth, Wheeler determined that the continuation of operations in this area would do little to facilitate the capture of Knoxville, and, at Longstreet's request, broke off contact in order to rejoin him. 62 The Rangers reached the scene of the action in front of Knoxville on the nineteenth and took up a position on the left flank. Their participation in the siege was unremarkable until the twenty-second when they, with one of the Georgia regiments, built a raft to float downriver to destroy a pontoon bridge at
Knoxville. The logs, however, were green and sank. 63

During the entire campaign the Confederates had to contend with the elements as well as the enemy. The Eighth Texas, as well as the entire cavalry, suffered acutely from a lack of forage and food as well as from the cold, rainy, east
Tennessee climate. The commissary was incapable of meeting the demand placed upon it. Much of the wheat issued was spoiled, therefore the soldiers had to subsist largely on pork seized from the civilians. A great deal of time and
effort was consumed in the simple, but necessary task of procuring food for man and beast. 64

On the twenty-third Wheeler pulled two brigades out of the line in an effort to capture the Federal garrison at Kingston, about fifty miles to the Confederate rear. He thought the enemy force consisted of two cavalry regiments and a section of artillery. 65 Along the route Major Christian, absent since the battle at Farmington, rejoined the regiment as its commander. 66 A hard march over poor roads brought the exhausted Confederate cavalry to their destination about 3:00 a.m. on the twenty-fourth. They discovered that the enemy had been reinforced with infantry. The Rebels sparred with the Yankees for about seven hours before Wheeler determined that his force was inadequate to carry the position and withdrew. Also on that day Wheeler received orders to return to Bragg's headquarters. 67 Major General William T. Martin assumed command of the cavalry in East Tennessee. He immediately returned to Knoxville to engage in routine picketing and skirmishing. 68

On November 25, Bragg's command occupying Missionary Ridge, perhaps unnerved by the spectacle of a seemingly irrestible tide of blue-clad infantry, broke and ran during a Federal attack, allowing the enemy to occupy the commanding
terrain. This reverse forced Bragg to move his army to Dalton, Georgia, 69 and Grant, who had replaced Rosecrans, was free to send Sherman to Knoxville. Longstreet also found his communications with Bragg cut. In an effort to destroy Burnside before he was reinforced, Lonqstreet attacked Fort
Sanders, the key to the Federal line on the twenty-ninth. The failure of this assault brought the siege to an end, but Longstreet determined to remain at Knoxville until forced to withdraw. 70

The cavalry, meanwhile, continued operations against the enemy. On the twenty-sixth Harrison's and Alfred A. Russell's brigades crossed the Holston River below Knoxville to demonstrate against the enemy there. Although Russell made contact, Harrison's command encountered no opposition. On the thirtieth, near Maynardville, Martin found General William E. Jones' brigade of Virginia Cavalry 71 being pushed back by a Federal column advancing from Cumberland Gap. 72 The next morning the Rebel cavalry joined in the action and the Yankees withdrew across the Clinch River with Martin in pursuit. 73

The Rangers, in addition to participating in these developments, enjoyed some successes on their own. Captain Alexander M. Shannon of Company C and a force of about a dozen men, returned from a scout behind enemy lines with fifteen prisoners and fifty-six horses and mules; they had also burned six wagons. About the first of December Company H encountered a Yankee picket, drove it in, and then enticed its reserve into charging by hastily withdrawing as though
fleeing. Company F, in line of battle, stopped the enemy, and as soldiers from the other companies came up, the Northerners broke. The Texans chased them for three to four miles and captured fourteen. 74

Martin returned to Knoxville on the second and remained until the fourth when Longstreet withdrew eastward upon the approach of Federal relief columns. 75 The cavalry covered the retreating infantry with the Rangers on the right. The
Rebel withdrawal was relatively uneventful until the fourteenth when Longstreet turned upon his pursuers at Bean's Station. The Eighth Texas did not get into the action until the sixteenth 76 when the Rebel cavalry ran into a division of
infantry and a cavalry force of unknown strength forming the advance of Major General John G. Parke's column. 77 Captain Jarmon, acting as lieutenant colonel, was wounded in the encounter. 78 On the twenty-fourth there was another skirmish between the cavalry and a strong enemy force at Mossy Creek. Martin broke off the engagement when it became apparent that he could not carry the position. 79 Christmas passed in peace, 80 but hostilities resumed the twenty-sixth. Four times during the day their superiors ordered the Rangers to draw the enemy's artillery fire. Although successful, they suffered casualties; the purpose of this assignment was never explained. Daily skirmishing continued through the twenty-ninth. Constant fighting during December had cost the regiment dearly, and five men had been killed and twelve (including the acting lieutenant colonel and acting Major George W. Littlefield) had been wounded. 81 The effective strength at this time was about 400 men. Longstreet granted furloughs to five percent of his command, the first furloughs granted on a regular basis; the Eighth Texas' quota was twenty. 82

An incident in December and early January, though not directly affecting operations, was nevertheless keenly felt by the entire regiment. In late November Private Ephraim Shelby Dodd of Company D became separated from his command. In order to secure food and shelter, he failed to correct a civilian's assumption that he was a Federal soldier. When not posing as a Federal he sought information about the enemy's positions which would help him rejoin his regiment. On December 17 the Union Home Guard (militia acting as police) captured him and sent him to Knoxville. Dodd had made the serious mistake of keeping a diary in which he had recorded his masquerade. 83 On the basis of his diary, and the fact that he was wearing blue trousers and a Federal
overcoat, he was charged with being a spy. It was normal procedure for Confederates to wear captured clothing, but it was supposed to be dyed. However, Dodd had at all times worn on his hat the regimental star which identified him as a member of the Eighth Texas. On January 5 a Union courtmartial found him guilty, and on the eighth he was hanged. The
Rangers considered this to be judicial murder. He was convicted for doing what many others had done. 84 More than a few had passed as Federals for the purpose of gathering intelligence for the army, but Dodd was simply trying to
return to his lines. The previous March Wharton had written to General Leonidas Polk that "Fifty men could have ridden . . . as Federal cavalry, into Murfreesborough, and I will have it done yet." 85 If Dodd could be hanged for his actions, so could many others.

The first three months of 1864 apparently differed little from the previous December. There was a great deal of skirmishing, but no substantial change in the overall situation. The only noteworthy engagement during January came on
the seventeenth when a Confederate force consisting of the Eighth and Eleventh Texas and an unspecified number of infantry clashed with Oscar H. La Grange's cavalry brigade near Dandridge. The Texans nearly succeeded in running off
the horses of a dismounted regiment, but reinforcements prevented them from doing so. In the end, however, the Federals were driven from the field. 86 Late February found Harrison in Dalton, Georgia attempting to have his brigade
transferred back to the Army of Tennessee. 87 Although he reported success at the time, 88 it was not until March 29 89 that the command left Tennessee to rejoin the western army. Their route took them through Asheville, North Carolina, Greenville, South Carolina, and Athens, Georgia, to Resaca where they arrived about April 22. Here the cavalry remained for over a week to rest before joining the main army. 90

On March 12 a detachment of about eight Rangers 91 were the victims of an atrocity far worse than Dodd's execution. This party was part of a force that had been cut off in middle Tennessee the previous October. They had continued
operations against the enemy there and in southern Kentucky by observing his movements and striking him whenever practical. 92 On March 1193 Lieutenant Robert S. Davis of Company E was wounded and taken to a private home. 94 The
next day two companies of the Fifth Tennessee Cavalry, North surrounded the residence. 95 Captain Joseph H. Blackburn promised the Rangers that if they surrendered they would be treated as prisoners of war. Davis agreed, but after they had turned over their arms, they were murdered, with Blackburn himself shooting Davis. 96 The only survivor was William Davis of Company D who killed his guard and escaped to report the incident. 97

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Chapter VII
The Long Retreat

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Endnotes

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Appendix
Roster of the Rangers

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Bibliography

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