Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment, CSA
By Paul Robert Scott

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Arlington in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts in History

The University of Texas at Arlington
July 1977

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Table of Contents

Preface
Abstract
List of Illustrations
Chapter I. Raising the Regiment
Chapter II. Winter 1861
Chapter III. To Shiloh
Chapter IV. Return to Kentucky
Chapter V. Fighting in Tennessee
Chapter VI. The Chattanooga and KnoxvilleCampaigns
Chapter VII. The Long Retreat
Endnotes
Appendix. Roster of the Rangers
Bibliography

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Preface

I wish to take this opportunity to thank the many individuals who aided me in the preparation of this paper. First, I acknowledge my indebtedness to the three members of my committee, Dr. Martin H. Hall, Dr. C. George Wolfskill, and Dr. Homer L. Kerr who performed yeoman service throughout the development of this paper. Their patience and perseverance account for whatever scholarly merit it may have.

Two other persons deserving special mention are Judge Lester N. Fitzhugh and Mrs. Benjamin McPherson Hines. Judge Fitzhugh, a distinguished jurist, soldier, and historian, greatly facilitated my early research through suggesting an initial line of study, sharing the result of his own work, and by loaning me a rare and valuable book. Mrs. Hines, at great inconvenience to herself, made available family materials relating to the Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment.

I also wish to acknowledge, collectively, the many others who rendered aid. Numerous historians, librarians, archivists, and researchers went to great pains to see that I received the materials necessary for this project. My failure to cite them individually is not due to a lack of appreciation but to the dictates of time and space.

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Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment, CSA

Paul Robert Scott, M.A.
The University of Texas at Arlington, 1977

Supervising Professor: Martin H. Hall

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In 1861 the Confederate States of America was faced with the problem of raising an army to protect its newly declared independence. It resorted to the time honored expediency of commissioning individuals to raise the necessary units. One of the most renowned organizations thus recruited was the Eighth Texas Cavalry Regiment, more familiarly called Terry's Texas Rangers.

While they were representatives to the Texas Secession Convention, Benjamin Franklin Terry, John Austin Wharton, and Thomas Saltus Lubbock conceived the idea of raising a regiment of Texas cavalry for service in Virginia. Terry and Lubbock personally petitioned the Confederate government for permission to do so but were initially refused. President Jefferson Davis relented, however, after Terry and Lubbock gained glory during the First Battle of Bull Run, July 1861. Terry obtained the colonel's commission and Lubbock the lieutenant colonel's.

Back in Texas, Terry and Lubbock authorized ten captains (including Wharton) to raise companies for their units. Throughout August and September the companies individually recruited troops, organized, and mustered in Houston. In the excitement of the first days of the war, the ranks were quickly filled by the most qualified men available.

Terry's Regiment was not destined for Virginia service. As the first companies passed through New Orleans, Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Army of Tennessee, secured their transfer to his command in Kentucky. The Regiment assembled at Bowling Green, Kentucky, completed its organization and began operations against the enemy. Patrolling and skirmishing during the first few months were more important as training than for the influence on the overall military situation. In contrast, disease was rampant, killing Lubbock and incapacitating three-quarters of the command.

On December 16, 1861, near Woodsonville, Kentucky, the Regiment engaged the Thirty-Second Indiana Infantry Regiment in its first pitched battle. The Texans charged, carried the field, and inflicted more casualties than they sustained, but unfortunately Terry was killed. Technology had made sweeping changes in warfare and nowhere was this more apparent than in the cavalry. Increased firepower made sabers and traditional cavalry charges virtually obsolete. Terry's Rangers were admirably suited for this new form of warfare as it was consistent with their experiences at home where revolvers were more effective against Indians and Mexicans than were swords. They also enjoyed an initial advantage over their blue-coated counterparts as they were experienced in horsemanship from childhood.

Under their new commander, Wharton, the Rangers shared the Army's reverses throughout the first part of 1862 and suffered a marked decline in morale. Nevertheless they performed well in numerous small unit actions as well as in the Battle of Shiloh. In the summer they joined Nathan Bedford Forrest to raid behind enemy lines in Tennessee. Under his successful and inspirational leadership morale soared and remained high for the rest of the war despite the worsening military situation and numerous changes in commanders. They fought with the Army of Tennessee in the battles of Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and Bentonville and participated in several hundred other engagements in ever decreasing numbers but with the same determination with which they left Texas.

While the Federal cavalry consistently improved its efficiency, it never surpassed that of the Texans. Even in the final campaigns, Sherman's marches through Georgia and the Carolinas, the Rangers repeatedly engaged the enemy with favorable results. The regiment, though numerically a shadow of its former self, continued the fight until it was surrendered by Joseph Johnston in April 1865.

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List of Illusrations

Undated Photograph of Benjamin Franklin Terry, co-organizer and first commander of Terry's Texas Rangers

Undated (probably 1862) Photograph of Private Achille Ferris, Company H .

Privates John Walker Foster Hill and Robert Edward Hill, Company D. Summer or Fall 1861

Captain Louis M. Strobel, Company F. Probably about August 1861

The Army of Tennessee's area of operations, Winter 1861

Undated Photograph of John A. Wharton, Organizer and First Captain of Company B and Regimental Commander December 1861-September 1862

Undated Photograph of five Rangers

Shiloh Battlefield, April 6 and 7, 1862

Stones River (or Murphreesboro) Battlefield

Wheeler's Raid on Rosecrans, September 29-October 9, 1863

The Eighth Texas' Area of Operations, November-December 1863

The approaches to Atlanta

Area of operations, July 1864

The Rangers' second battle flag

The Terry's Texas Ranger Association's statue

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Chapter I
Raising the Regiment

When, in 1860, the tension between the North and the South reached the point that many Southerners believed that their only recourses were secession or submission, Benjamin Franklin Terry, Thomas Saltus Lubbock, and John Austin Wharton were three of Texas' most ardent advocates of the former. These three men, in addition to campaigning for the dissolution of the Union in the political arena, were equally willing to campaign on the battlefield to maintain it. Together they raised one of the most famous Texas units, the Eighth Regiment Texas Cavalry, C. S. A., or Terry's Texas Rangers.

Each was a prominent figure, and each was from a distinguished family. Ben Terry was born in Kentucky, February 18, 1821, the eldest of the four sons of Joseph R. and Sarah Smith Terry. His brother, David, born in 1823, was to have a distinguished and tumultuous career as a lawyer and judge in California before and after the War Between the States. With the outbreak of the conflict he left California and raised the unnumbered D. S. Terry Texas Cavalry Regiment for the Confederacy. Aurelius had the distinction of being the only one of the four brothers to die a natural death, but he did enjoy a prosperous life. 1 Clinton, the youngest, was Wharton's law partner and was mortally wounded at Shiloh. 2

The family moved from Kentucky to Mississippi at an undetermined date where Joseph and Sarah separated. Sarah traveled on to Texas with her sons and joined her mother, Obedience Fort Smith, in 1833 or early 1834. 3

There is no record of Ben's serving in either the Texas Revolution or in the War with Mexico in 1846. 4 It is possible, however, that he was in one or both of these wars. In February 1858, he received 320 acres in Jack County by a special act of the legislature; the service entitling him to the grant was unspecified. 5 His brother, David, claimed to have participated in the Texas Revolution (although he would have been only thirteen at the time of the Battle of San Jacinto); in the War with Mexico he served in the First Regiment Texas Mounted Volunteer Rifles. 6

[PHOTO]
Undated Photograph of Benjamin Franklin Terry,
co-organizer and first commander of Terry's Texas Rangers.
Courtesy of Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin.

Ben Terry always enjoyed a prosperous position in life. In 1840, his property included eighteen slaves, twenty-six horses, thirty-five head of cattle, and 2,000 acres of land. 7 In 1850 he owned twenty-eight slaves, 8 and in 1860 he had $68,000 in real property, $105,000 in personal property, and 118 slaves. Of Terry's 118 slaves, 105 were held jointly with William J. Kyle, his partner, on a sugar plantation located in Fort Bend County. They had purchased the enterprise in 1853. 9

Terry was a natural leader. He was over six feet tall with broad shoulders and blonde whiskers. His photograph implies that he was a powerful man with a dignified bearing. He is credited with being an aggressive individual, a "tireless rider," and a good shot. 10 As the eldest son of a fatherless family he had a chance to develop his leadership from an early age. His mother also died about 1836. More than likely the boys were reared by their grandmother or their uncle, Ben Fort Smith, a planter. There is, however, an indication in A. Russell Buchanan's David S. Terry of California that Ben was in fact the head of the family of boys in that it was he who allowed David to terminate his formal education. 11 Even though he allowed David to quit school he evidently had a great deal of respect for education because he maintained a school on his plantation, Oakland, for his own children and those of the neighborhood. 12

Thomas Saltus Lubbock was born in Charlotte, South Carolina, in 1817, to Henry T. and Susan Ann Saltus Lubbock. 13 In 1835 he moved to New Orleans to be with his brother, Francis R. Lubbock, and to work as a cotton factor. After staying a short period of time he joined the New Orleans Greys, a unit being raised to aid Texas in her revolt against Mexico, and arrived in Texas in time to participate in the Siege of Bexar, December, 1835. In January, 1836 he was employed on the Yellowstone, a Brazos River steamboat. Sam Houston, during his retreat, pressed the Yellowstone to ferry his army across the river. Later the ship had a brush with the Mexican army; but otherwise it played a relatively minor part in the campaign. In 1841, Lubbock was a member of the Texan-Santa Fe expedition as a lieutenant and was captured with it and sent to Mexico City as a prisoner. 14 He managed to escape by leaping from a balcony and was able to return to Texas in time to join the Somervell Expedition. 15

Lubbock was a staunch supporter of the South and its institutions. In November, 1860, David C. Jones, an organizer living in Owensville, Robertson County, Texas, named him a member of the Knights of the Golden Circle, a militant group founded on the dream of establishing a slave-holding empire in the southern section of the United States, Mexico, and Central America; the inclusion of the northern United States was optional. With the imminent threat of an abolitionist government in Washington, the organization changed its program to that of advocating secession. 16 In the meantime, Tom's brother, Francis, had been active in Texas politics. He was lieutenant governor from 1857 to 1859 in the Hardin R. Runnels administration and later served as governor from November 1861 to November 1863. At the beginning of the war Tom Lubbock was a Houston businessman. 17

John Austin Wharton was the youngest of the three, and he was the only one who lived long enough to establish a name for himself as a result of his Civil War service. He was born near Nashville, Tennessee, July 3, 1828, to William Harris Wharton and Sarah Ann Groce Wharton. As a child he was brought to Galveston but returned east to attend South Carolina College (present-day University of South Carolina). In 1848, he married Penelope Johnson, the daughter of South Carolina's governor, David Johnson. Electing to enter the legal profession, Wharton studied under Elisha Marshall Pease, who was elected governor of Texas in 1853 and 1855. In 1859, Wharton became district attorney of the First Judicial District, and in 1860 he was a presidential elector. 18 At the outbreak of the war he was practicing law in Brazoria with Ben Terry's brother, Clinton. 19

Each of these three men were members of the delegations their districts sent to the Secession Convention held in Austin in January 1861. Terry represented the district which included Matagorda, Wharton, and Fort Bend Counties; Lubbock represented Harris County; and Wharton, Galveston and Brazoria Counties. During the convention they did little to distinguish themselves from other members who were as ardently prosecession and perhaps even more vocal than they. The convention adjourned on February 5, and on February 23, the people of Texas voted for secession with the exception of E1 Paso County (which had cast its votes a week earlier). 20

While returning home together by stagecoach, Terry, Lubbock, and Wharton determined to raise a regiment of cavalry for the Confederate service to protect the new nation they were helping to establish. 21 Lubbock immediately left with George Goldthwaite for the Confederate capital in Montgomery to obtain permission to raise the proposed unit. Secretary of War Leroy P. Walker, however, refused their request on the grounds that it would be inefficient to raise forces in Texas when troops were available nearer to the scene of action in the east. It was expected that the war would be of brief duration; therefore, the government did not want to go to the expense of transporting troops from Texas. Lubbock returned to Texas "chagrined and indignant." Shortly after arriving home he determined to return East to personally participate, at least, in the struggle for Southern independence. 22

While Lubbock was in Alabama, Terry was dealing with problems closer to home. At this time there were some 2,800 United States troops stationed in the State of Texas, and Texans were determined to effect their removal and to appropriate their stores. At some points the transfer was carried out with almost ludicrous ease. At Brazos Santiago the material was receipted from Ordnance Sergeant John L. Greer, United States Army, and then turned over to Ordnance Sergeant John L. Greer, Texas Army. Captain Bennett H. Hill of Fort Brown (near Brownsville) was not so tractable. He not only refused to accede to the demands of Ebenezar B. Nichols, the commissioner of the state, but refused to acknowledge Nichol's authority. Nichols thereupon went to Galveston for reinforcements. He left Colonel John Salmon "Rip" Ford in charge of negotiations and Lieutenant Colonel Hugh McLeod with the forces at Brazos Santiago.

Arriving at Galveston on February 26, Nichols wired Colonel Terry, who had been selected by the Convention to command the battalion of reinforcements consisting of three companies of seventy-five men each from Brazoria, Liberty and Houston and the Galveston Rifles. At 6:00 p.m. on the twenty-eighth, Terry arrived at Houston with the Brazoria Company, consolidated two understrengthed companies found in Houston, took passage on a special train, disembarked at Galveston, and boarded the General Rusk where he found the Galveston Rifles waiting.

On March 2, he joined forces with Lieutenant Colonel McLeod at Brazos Santiago to form a regiment. Terry yielded his colonelcy, but became the unit's major. The two opposing forces faced one another for some two weeks, the Texans at Brazos Santiago and the Federals at Fort Brown. During this time Terry was active in communicating between Colonel Ford in Brownsville and the command at Brazos Santiago. On or about March 7, Captain Hill called on Nichols in Brownsville to announce that he had received marching orders and would evacuate the Rio Grande Valley without bloodshed. The Texans returned to Galveston on the fifteenth and Terry accompanied the companies from Harris and Fort Bend Counties to Houston. 23

In early June, Lubbock again left Texas for the East. This time it appears that he was accompanied by perhaps as many as fifty others, including Terry and Thomas J. Goree. 24 Wharton planned to join them but rather than traveling overland he sailed to New Orleans. Along the way he was allegedly temporarily detained by the Federals. 25 After his release he returned home to raise a company. 26 Oran M. Roberts, however, stated that it was illness that prevented him from being with his companions when on July 21, 1861, they participated in the First Battle of Manassas. 27

Upon arriving in Virginia in July, Goree was appointed an aide to General James Longstreet while Lubbock and Terry were attached to his staff as volunteer aides. 28 Early on the morning of the battle they made their most significant contribution to the Confederate victory when, as Longstreet wrote:

About an hour after my position was taken it was discovered by a reconnaissance made by Colonels Terry and Lubbock that the enemy was moving in heavy columns towards our left, the position that the general [Beauregard] had always supposed he would take. This information was at once sent to headquarters, and I soon received orders to fall back upon my original position, the right bank of the run. Colonels Terry and Lubbock then volunteered to make a reconnaissance of the position of the enemy's batteries. They made a very gallant and complete one, and a hasty sketch of his entire left. 29

By their early detection of the enemy's movements they allowed Longstreet and Beauregard to frustrate the Federal scheme of maneuver. As is so often the case, it was not these significant accomplishments which captured the imagination of both the public and of the leaders alike, but a more spectacular, less telling exploit the next day which General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the southern commander, recorded in his report:

[they] accompanied Captain Whitehead's troop to take possession of Fairfax Court-House. Colonel Terry, with his unerring rifle, severed the halliard, and thus lowered the Federal flag found still floating from the cupola of the Court-House there. 30

Terry's exploit in shooting down the flag has been recorded by almost everyone who has written about the Eighth Texas Cavalry, and even General Beauregard mentioned it in an article he wrote on Manassas after the war. 31 Even though shooting down a flag flying over a captured courthouse may seem redundant, it is of such things that legends are made.

Shortly after Manassas, Terry and Lubbock received commissions to raise a cavalry regiment for service in Virginia, reportedly in recognition of their battlefield exploits. 32 While sources dealing with circumstances surrounding their negotiations with officials in Richmond are sketchy, it is evident that there was a misunderstanding in the very basic matter as to who would mount the regiment. Terry and Lubbock apparently believed that the Confederate government would provide the necessary horses. While they required prospective recruits to bring their own weapons and equestrian equipment, they did not require them to have horses. 33 On the other hand, three months later, Acting Secretary of War Judah Philip Benjamin wrote that, "When Terry went to Texas to collect his regiment he was informed by the President in the most explicit manner that no cavalry could be accepted without their furnishing their own horses." 34 This misunderstanding would have serious, but not fatal, consequences later when the command reported for duty.

In early August Terry and Lubbock were back in Texas and on the twelfth they commissioned ten captains and directed each to raise a company consisting of:

. . . one captain, one first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, [four sergeants,] four corporals, one blacksmith, two musicians, and from sixty-four to one hundred privates, and to report the same to us on or before the ist day of September next. Each man will be required to furnish equipments for his horse and to arm himself. The company will be transported free. The term of service will be during the war unless sooner discharged. 35

The ten captains selected to raise the companies which were to comprise the regiment were: Thomas Harrison, John A. Wharton, Marcus L. Evans, Stephen C. Ferrill, L. M. Rayburn, Louis M. Strobel, William Y. Houston, Isham G. Jones, John Holt, and John G. Walkero Terry also offered a commission to John D. Rogers, but he declined because he was recruiting a company of infantry for service in Virginia. 36 While it is not known why these particular captains were selected to raise their respective companies, it is probable that each was personally known to either Terry or Lubbock. At least one company had been formed before its captain received Terry's commission. On August 14 the Weekly Telegraph reported that Terry had accepted Captain John G. Walker's company from Harris County. The same issue stated, however, that the company had not yet achieved full strength and that applications were still being accepted. 37 Three weeks later the newspaper announced that Walker's company had been enrolled with an election held the first of September. 38 This probably indicated that it had to be reorganized after receiving new recruits and perhaps losing some former members who had declined service in Virginia.

The call to arms stipulated that each man should furnish his own gear which was to include a rifle or shotgun, one or more revolvers, a saddle, bridle, etc. The regiment as a whole was very well equipped. When Captain Ferrill's company passed through New Orleans--a city which had become accustomed to seeing Texas troops en route to the war, as well as the many military organizations that flourished in and around the city--it evoked special comment from the Picayune. The newspaper calculated that the average cost of each man's saddle and rigging alone amounted to $100.00. 39 Confederate authorities, however, disagreed, for their evaluation was approximately a third that of the journalist's. 40

As might be expected, the soldiers brought a wide variety of ordnance. Terry, in reports to headquarters relating to the nature of the arms of his regiment, asserted that there were twenty-one different varieties. There were 597 double-barrel shotguns, ninety-one common rifles, twenty-nine Mississippi rifles, fourteen Sharps rifles, thirteen Sharps "6-shooting rifles," twelve Minié rifles, ten Sharps Carbines, six shotgun rifles, five Minié muskets, five Harper's Ferry rifles, five carbines, three Colt's "6-shooting rifles," three Morse rifles, three double rifles, three musketoons, two muskets, 584 Navy Colt revolvers, ninety-two Army Colt revolvers, sixty-four Colt "5-shooter" revolvers, twenty-two holster pistols, eleven Starr pistols. 41 Supplementing this motley assortment were numerous hunting knives. While the Weekly Telegraph's statement that each member of Strobel's company carried a two-foot, three-pound knife may have been an exaggeration, this is certainly an indication that there were a considerable number of large knives in this company. 42 Conspicuous for not being mentioned were swords, for with the exception of Terry's, there were none mentioned among the myriad weapons at the time of organization. 43

[PHOTO]
Undated (probably 1862) photograph of Private Achille Ferris, Company H.
Courtesy of Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin.

[PHOTO]
Privates John Walker Foster Hill and Robert Edward Hill, Company D. Summer or Fall 1861.
From Goldman, "Letters From Three Members of Terry's Texas Rangers."

[PHOTO]
Captain Louis M. Stroble, Company F. Probably about August, 1861.
Courtesy of the Confederate Museum, United Daughters of the Confederacy, Austin, Texas.

Some troopers brought their body servants to ease the straing of campaigning. It is not known how many slaves were with the regiment, but in December 1862, a Ranger wrote that there were sixty blacks who had been with the unit from the beginning. 44 This, of course, was only an estimate and Rangers were seldome guilty of underestimating the numbers of anything that they felt would reflect upon the honor of their regiment. This figure excluded, however, those slaves who had been with the regiment for only part of the time.

A recurring theme of those who were acquainted with the regiment during its recruitment was the high caliber and high spirits of those who were allowed to enlist. Leonidas B. Giles observed that:

The personnel was of the very highest. Sons of leading families, many of them college graduates, professional men, merchants, stockmen, and farmers, served in the ranks as privates, all young, in their teens and early twenties. Rank was scarcely considered. The supreme desire was to get into the war in a crack cavalry regiment. 45

Generally Giles was correct in his estimate of the personnel of the Regiment. As the appended roster shows they were not all in their "teens and early twenties," but the large majority were well within their prime years. The information available on the individuals confirms Giles' statement of their background. Not all were from prominent families, but many were. Their subsequent record indicates that they were well motivated and had faith in their cause. 46

The regiment's quality was high because each man was selected. At this point of the war the unit could pick and choose its members. If a man did not meet the expectations of the recruiter he was simply refused the privilege of enlistment. In late August it was already reported that hundreds had been turned down; 47 in late September the reported figure had risen to 3,000. 48 While these statistics were doubtlessly exaggerations, they do illustrate the attitude of the leaders towards recruitment. It was reported, albeit by a relatively unreliable source, that some individuals attempted to influence the decisions of the recruiters by offering $75 to $100 for being allowed to enlist. 49

There were several reasons for the capability to select recruits rather than simply accepting them. This was one of the earliest units to be raised in Texas for duty in Virginia and the first cavalry regiment for such service. Stephen B. Oates, a prominent Texas historian, in "Recruiting Confederate Cavalry in Texas," listed twenty-two cavalry units from company to regimental strength that were raised in Texas in 1861: five regiments were for service in New Mexico; five regiments and a battalion were for Texas; one regiment for Indian Territory; and four regiments, two battalions, and three companies were for Arkansas. The remaining unit, the Eighth Texas, alone was destined for service in the East. 50

Texans preferring to serve in the cavalry and who wanted to participate in the Eastern Theater, where it seemed that the outcome of the war would be decided, favored the unit Terry was raising. Texans, with a long tradition of mounted warfare including the Mexican-American War, Indian campaigns, and border skirmishes, always gravitated towards the cavalry. During the Civil War the state of Texas raised some ninety regiments, fifty-four battalions, and twenty-eight batteries for the Confederacy. Of this number there were sixty-one cavalry regiments and thirty-nine cavalry battalions. 51 This clearly indicates an overwhelming preference on the part of Texans to serve in the cavalry rather than in the infantry.

The spectacular victory at First Manassas less than a month previously also doubtlessly did much to bolster the spirit of Texans and whetted their desire to participate in such a "glorious" war. There was also a certain amount of snob appeal to be found in the recruiting methods. An announcement in a Houston newspaper for Walker's company stated that "None but men fitted for such service will be received. It is designed to make this the best regiment of the army, and every man will be picked with that view." 52 Terry's regiment had a multiplicity of attractions: a monopoly, status, popular support, and already a great deal of self-confidence. With these advantages it was relatively easy to recruit the most capable men into its ranks.

By the end of August, the enrolling being nearly completed, the respective men and companies began marching to Houston. On August 31, Terry took leave of his plantation in a manner befitting an aristocrat. He was on a fine horse, wearing a new uniform and an old sword, one that his uncle, Ben Fort Smith, had carried in the War of 1812 and at San Jacinto. He made the rounds of his property and visited some of his slaves who were too feeble to come to him. He then bade his farewells to the remaining servants and instructed them to render obedience to their overseers and to take care of his family. He also informed them that he would be home by Christmas. He then said goodbyes to his family and rode off with his son, David, who had joined John Holt's company. 53

The men of Stephen C. Ferrill's command, later designated as Company "D," met in Bastrop on a sunny morning in August, bade their friends goodbye, and rode sixty miles to Alleyton where they boarded the train for Houston and sent their horses back. Instead of being carried directly to Houston they were left at Pierce Junction to await another train. That night they were plagued by swarms of mosquitoes. The next day, the train not having arrived, they pushed by hand the freight car with their equipment and walked some nine miles to Houston where they bivouaced in a warehouse. 54 Company "G" left San Antonio on September seventh and marched 235 miles to Houston arriving on the thirteenth. 55 The others reported in at varying intervals throughout late August and September. 56

The main item of business once each company reached Houston was to be mustered into the Confederate service. Second Lieutenant Jesse W. Sparks, an officer on Henry E. McCulloch's staff, commander of the Department of Texas, administered the oath. Sparks was formerly of the United States Infantry. The event made an impression on at least one man, for long after the war he recalled:

A little incident happened at the time which showed the feelings and determination of the men. They were lined up on three sides of hollow square (as I now remember). The enrolling officer in the center asked this question, "Do you men wish to be sworn into service for twelve months or for three years or for during the war?" With a unanimity never surpassed, a shout unheard of before, that whole body of men shouted, "For the war," "For the war!" not one expecting or caring to return until the war was over, long or short, and the invaders had been driven from our borders. 57

It is not surprising that the response was "for the war," because that was the period for which the regiment was recruited. Doubtlessly the recruits did have a great deal of enthusiasm, but at the time no one thought that three and a half years of war lay before him. One trooper believed that it would be over in three months, while another expected to be home within twelve months. 58

The companies also had to complete their organization. All had probably chosen their officers and noncommissioned officers by the time they had arrived at Houston. There was, however, some last minute recruiting to fill out the ranks of units which did not yet have their full complement and to replace those who for some reason had enrolled but failed to muster with their unit. Even though the newspapers reported that the first companies numbered 116 men each, Harrison's company, the last to be enrolled, numbered only four officers and eighty-seven enlisted men. On September Ii, Rayburn and Jones each called for more volunteers to fill out their ranks, and on September 18 a local newspaper ran an announcement that there was room for 100 more recruits in the established companies. 59

Though there were last minute details for some individuals to attend to, the majority had very little to do except to visit town and to have a good time. At this early stage of their development the Rangers began demonstrating the flair that was to make them famous. As might be expected it was their horsemanship that attracted the greatest amount of attention. Individuals used the streets of Houston to practice such skills as dismounting and remounting at full gallop and to pick up objects on the run. Walker, acknowledged as perhaps the best horseman of the Regiment, at one point on Main Street jumped his horse over a brace of oxen. From their subsequent behavior in Nashville it would appear that their stunts were inspired as much by a love of public attention as a love for equestrianship. 60

The regiment itself was not organized at this time. While no reason was given for postponing formal organization, there are several possible explanations. The most obvious one was that at no time were all companies simultaneously present in Houston. Terry probably believed that it would be bad for the morale of the troops to retain them at Houston any longer than necessary; therefore after each company was ready it was sent towards its destination. The men were also newcomers to military life, and their understanding of martial matters was restricted solely to preconceptions and first impressions in an abnormal environment. They knew little more of their leaders. The regiment at this time could hardly be considered a unit; it was more like ten separate entities under a common leader. The men, being from scattered points, knew very little of the men and officers of other companies. They would, therefore, tend to be relatively provincial in their attitudes. Later common experiences would cause them to consider themselves as Rangers first and as members of their individual companies second. Since Terry planned to have all regimental officers, not just company grade officers, stand for election, he may have wished to give the men more experience with which to make an intelligent decision. As the time was not yet propitious, organization was postponed.

At this time the companies were known by the names of their captains and by self-assumed designations, such as "Prarie Rovers" or "The Bastrop Rangers." As each company arrived during the month of September, it conducted its business, and then left Houston for New Orleans on its way to Virginia. While it appears that each was largely on its own in making the journey, Francis Lubbock reported that the regiment was divided into two divisions. The first was led by Terry and had the honor of escorting the newly-elected governor of Texas, Francis R. Lubbock, on the first part of has journey to Richmond. The second division left a few days later and was led by Tom Lubbock. 61 The first companies departed Houston about September 18 and arrived at the Crescent City around the twenty-fifth. Companies were to straggle into New Orleans for over a month. 62

Strobel's company was the first to leave Houston just as it had been the first to arrive. The men boarded a train and rode to New Iberia where there was a gap in the line of some 100 miles which they were to march across. Wagons were hired to carry the baggage and eight to ten men were able to engage horses for the trip. The remainder had to travel on foot. By that afternoon the troops were suffering from blisters and sore feet due to the numerous puddles in the road. Seeing large herds of horses running loose, the commanding officer decided to press some for his men to ride. The mounted men succeeded in penning a herd of over a hundred head in various stages of training--some had never been handled, others were broken. The remainder of the afternoon was spent breaking horses. The next morning the company rode on towards Brashear City (now Morgan City). There they left their steeds and boarded trains. There apparently is no record as to what was done with the horses. The day after it reached New Orleans, Strobel's command again boarded a train and continued on its journey towards Virginia. At Grand Junction, Tennessee the captain received a telegram from Terry instructing him to halt and await further orders. 63

Ferrill's company left Houston by rail to Beaumont about the same time as Strobel's. Here it boarded a steamboat and sailed down the Neches and up the to Niblett's Bluff. The men then walked about a hundred miles and subsequently rode forty miles in ox-carts to New Iberia. Here they boarded boats which took them to Brashear City where they apparently caught the train for New Orleans. 64

A simple recitation of the route does very little to describe the journey. One man reported that the roads were muddy and from time to time they were rained upon. The baggage wagons often became mired and had to be dragged or pried free. 65 This naturally inspired a certain amount of grumbling among the troops, but generally they seemed to have accepted their situation as part of the profession. There was some sickness on the trip but it was not severe and appears to have been at least partially attributable to the men's tendency to overindulge in the sugar cane which grew abundantly along the route. 66

Wharton's company left Houston with Ferrill's and rode on horseback as far as Beaumont where it dismounted and returned its horses. From Beaumont the men sailed to Lake Charles, Louisiana, and then walked to New Iberia where other boats took them to New Orleans. 67 Wharton's company does not appear to have been particularly restrained in its actions. A private in Ferrill's unit reported that when a poor civilian, owning only about four head of cattle, refused to part with one, a member of Wharton's command killed the beef anyway. On the whole, however, it appears that the regiment got along reasonably well with the citizens of the area who presented them with. food and bouquets. 68

The Texans made a favorable impression upon the people of New Orleans, especially by their unusual dress. Throughout their history the Rangers were never particularly concerned about uniformity, and for the most part they wore what they deemed appropriate. New Orleans was the home of numerous volunteer organizations which quite often wore their uniforms. Several other Texas companies had passed through before the Rangers, all of which caused comparably little comment from the press. The arrival of Wharton's company only evoked an acknowledgement and the comment that "They . . . are a most formidable looking body of men." 69 Walker's company, however, attracted a great deal of attention. The Picayune observed that they were:

. . . dressed fantastically in hunting shirts of different material, with large boots worn outside and coming over the knees, with Mexican spurs attached. Some wore fancy Mexican pants trimmed down the sides with little round buttons, and silk sashes around their waists. Others had the Confederate flag, worked in different colored feathers to represent it, on the legs of their boots.

Their commander was the subject of especial comment:

Capt. Walker, who is about six feet four inches in height, and who has served nearly his whole life on the frontier as a Ranger, was dressed in a buckskin hunting shirt and pants, which latter fitted close to his well rounded form, with an immense pair of boots, large Mexican spurs, a real Mexican sombrero, or hat, and wore across his shoulders a beautifully worked Mexican blanket. 70

Though they were not yet fully organized, had seen only a month of Confederate service, and had yet to see combat, Terry's Rangers had already acquired a reputation. The people at home had sent them off with enthusiasm and at New Orleans they had been received with admiration. They were armed to the teeth and were commanded by men who were already veterans of campaigns and pitched battles. They were picked men who were expected to accomplish great things.

Company Organization and Activities 71
Houston to New Orleans

[TABLE]

Company Organization and Activities; Houston to New Orleans (continued)

*Although Bunting consistently spelled the name "Javellins" it appears from the
fact that they originally carried the skin of a javelina as a standard that
"Javelinas" is the correct spelling

---

Chapter II
Winter 1861

While Terry's regiment was being recruited, organized, and transported, events were in progress which redirected its destination from Virginia to Tennessee and Kentucky.  In mid-September, Albert Sidney Johnston had assumed command of the Western Department and found his situation to be serious.  He had an insufficient force to hold this important and highly vulnerable area which included a substantial portion of southern industry and mining.  The troops which he did have were poorly deployed and ill-equipped. 1  In order to bolster his force, on September 17 he telegraphed Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper:

I can mount and use Terry's regiment of Texas Rangers immediately if put under my orders. Please not to order any more armed companies from this department at present and order any such organized within the department to me here.

The next day the Adjutant and Inspector General replied:

Terry's regiment is understood to have been raised with special view to service on the Potomac.  If they prefer to remain in your department, stop and employ them as you propose.3

There is some contradiction as to how Johnston induced Terry's regiment to come to the Western Department.  Strong evidence indicates that Johnston and authorities in Richmond simply ordered the unit to Kentucky.  Francis Lubbock stated that while at Chattanooga, Terry received a dispatch from Johnston "ordering" him to Kentucky.  Some credibility is added to his version by the statement that he (Lubbock) said farewell to the regiment there.4  Others, however, maintained that Johnston requested the Texans to join his command and that they did so at their own volition, as the Adjutant and Inspector General's message indicated would be the proper procedure.  Writing after the war, Henry W. Graber, of Wharton's Company, reported that Johnston contacted Terry and requested that he persuade the troops to accede to join his command.  As inducements he authorized Terry to say that he would provide them with the best horses in Kentucky and that they would never be brigaded while he lived.5  (This last promise is probably erroneous, for in January, 1862, the command was part of William J. Hardee's division.6 The Eighth Texas, however, was not joined with another cavalry command until after the Battle of Shiloh where Johnston was killed.)  Upon obtaining the men's acquiescence, Terry supposedly agreed to service in Kentucky.7

Contemporary evidence, however, indicates that the rank and file were not consulted and, perhaps, even that Terry was not certain as to their status.  On September 28, William Nicholson of Ferrill's company wrote home that “Colonel Terry is in this place [New Orleans]--he is not certain where we will go but believes he will receive orders to go to Kentucky.”8  On September 29 the uncertainty was alleviated when a message was received from Richmond ordering them to report to Johnston.9  The unit received the change of destination with mixed, but predominantly negative, emotions.

Some were pleased (at least after the war) at the opportunity to serve under a fellow Texan who was personally known to Terry and other men of the command. 10 At the time, however, most of the soldiers were displeased with the change of destination and several voiced their displeasure in their letters home. ll

Shortly after the determination was made to deploy Terry's Regiment in the west, the companies began assembling at Nashville to drill and await further orders.  Terry reached the Nashville fairgrounds on October 3 with four companies, one had preceded him by two days.  Immediately upon arriving, the unit drew supplies.  The troopers also encountered a problem that would plague them throughout the war, a shortage of horses.  Terry soon learned that only 100 mounts had been gathered, and he expressed to Johnston his well-founded fear that horses in the vicinity were scarce and had been picked over. 12

The time spent at Nashville appears to have been a period of relative idleness.  The principal item of business was that of securing horses.  Five days after his arrival, Terry again reported to Johnston that procurement of mounts was going slowly. 13  With what animals they did have, however, the Rangers put on a spectacle for the citizens, just as they had in Houston.  The Gazette reported that the Rangers' repertoire of stunts included picking up objects while in a gallop, dismounting and remounting at full speed, riding horses on their flank, thus using them as portable bulwarks, and, perhaps most impressive of all, breaking horses heretofore considered unbreakable.14  J. K. Polk Blackburn noted that the Tennesseans scattered silver dollars to be picked up by mounted Rangers riding at full speed. Eventually half-dollars and quarters replaced dollars and were in turn succeeded by bouquets.  Notwithstanding the absence of financial remuneration, the Rangers avidly competed solely for the laurels.15

While at Nashville the Rangers suffered their first fatality, not from a bullet but from a hazard more dangerous in 19th century warfare, disease.  The first man to die was Thomas Hart of Ferrill's company who succumbed in early October.  His sickness and death spanned less than a day, and William Nicholson attributed it to an overdose of opium administered by physicians.16 During ensuing bivouacs more men sickened.  General Johnston had unfortunately occupied a portion of Kentucky unhealthful to his troops from the warmer climates of Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.  His entire command was plagued by measles, pneumonia, diarrhea, mumps, and other maladies.  In December, three-quarters of Terry's men were unable to stand roll call.17  These diseases permanently deprived the Confederacy of the services of large numbers of men.  Many Rangers died in the period from early winter 1861 to spring 1862; many others had their health shattered and were discharged.  A number of those medically discharged later reenlisted in either the Eighth Texas or in other units, but most had their taste for campaigning permanently satiated.18

The officers probably tried to keep a tight rein on their high spirited troopers to prevent trouble.  A private in Ferrill's company wrote that only six or eight of that company were allowed to go to town simultaneously and that they were only permitted to stay four hours.  He also stated that there was some circumvention of the rules. 19  Strobel's company, in particular, was in need of strict disciplining:

From the beginning, military discipline was a severe tax on the wild, independent youths of Strobel's Company.  They heaped censure on their officers and had fights among themselves in which several soldiers were wounded.  Another company was forced to assume the responsibility of restoring order in the turbulent Company F.20

Although Nashville was not mentioned as the scene of the disorder, this indicates the problems faced by those responsible for the unit's conduct.  Blackburn believed that it was a lack of discipline that led to the removal of the Rangers from Nashville.  He recorded that even though Terry posted guards about the camp at night, some individuals left undetected.  Many habitually overimbibed and vigorously took exception to being jailed by the city police.  One night three or four drunken Rangers attended a performance at the theater.  One scene depicted Pocahontas intervening to save the life of John Smith.  As Pocahontas placed herself in the path of the executioner's club, one of the Texans:

. . . whipped out a six-shooter and fired upon the supposed executioner with the remark that "his mother had taught him to always protect a lady when in danger."  This shot missed its mark, but created consternation and stopped the play.21

The local police foolishly attempted to thwart this trooper's

chivalrous attempt to "save the princess."  The Rangers escaped by killing two policemen and wounding a third.  Blackburn stated that the governor of Tennessee notified Johnston of the incident and that same night Terry's regiment was ordered to Bowling Green, Kentucky, on the first train. It was not reported what happened to the men responsible for this crime.22

While Blackburn tells a good tale that may have some factual basis (inasmuch as a contemporary newspaper advertised the play),23 more was involved in Johnston’s order of October 12 than he related.  The message reflected the urgency of the situation:

The enemy are advancing on Bowling Green.  Take all your men to that place by rail, if possible.  If there are no cars, march.  If Colonel [Lloyd] Tilghman’s armed Kentucky troops have not left Nashville, give them this as General Johnstons order to go at once, by rail or afoot.  Assume command of any other armed troops, except city guards, at Nashville, the commanders of which you may rank, and order them to follow you.  If you ranked by the commander, you exhibit this as General Johnston's order for their movement.24

The Confederates believed that 13,000-14,000 Federal troops

were advancing upon their force of 6,000 at Bowling Green.25 Terry received his movement orders around 2:00 a.m., October 13 and ordered the companies that were in Nashville to prepare rations for three days.26  Lubbock and his companies had not yet arrived.27  It was rumored that there might be an engagement the next morning, but upon arriving at Bowling Green it was discovered that the enemy was not as near as was thought.  The force of Rangers therefore settled into the routine business of soldiering, such as making bullets and caring for their weapons.28

A continuing problem during this period was supplying the regiment with the material it needed to insure the fulfillment of its mission.  The importance of securing horses for Terry's cavalry was so pressing that Johnston thought fit to mention it in his correspondence with Acting Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin.  In a situation report he wrote of his pressing need for money to purchase transportation:

I have been also particularly anxious to mount Terry's Texas regiment, the services of which are much needed, but for want of ready money cannot procure the horses.  On_ about 350 have been bought for this regiment.29

Benjamin, himself harassed by demands which he could not meet, replied:

I hope you have not bought the horses you speak of for Terry's regiment with the public money. There is no act of Congress allowing it, and the accounts cannot be passed without a special law for that purpose.  When Terry went to Texas to collect his regiment he was informed by the President in the most explicit manner that no cavalry could be accepted without their furnishing their own horses .... When Terry's regiment received leave to go to you instead of coming to Virginia, it was because we were led to believe that horses would be furnished them by subscriptions in Tennessee; but the expression of your letter makes me fear that you have ordered the purchase with public funds, and this would be very unfortunate.30

In addition to the problem of procuring horses was Terry's desire to improve further the quality of his regiment's weaponry.  In his initial report to Johnston, Terry requested that he be issued cartridge boxes for his shotguns. He also informed the general that he had been promised 250 Harpers Ferry rifles before he left Richmond.  He indicated that he could have these rifles modified to be loaded from the breech which would leave his entire regiment armed with shotguns and breech loaders, both of which were highly suited for cavalry.31 On November 2, in conjunction with reports Terry submitted enumerating by company the types and quantities of his regiment's firearms, he reported a deficiency of 214 guns (meaning shoulder weapons) and estimated that thirty-six others were inadequate, making a total of 250.  He also reported a deficiency of 186 pistols and wished to replace the eleven Starr pistols and sixty-four Colt 5-shooters (Pocket Pistols) to make a total of 261 revolvers he wished to acquire.  For some unexplained reason he made no mention of the twenty-two single-shot holster pistols.32

There is no indication that Terry’s requests were honored.  In view of the fact that the regiment was undoubtedly one of the best armed in Johnston’s army, and the problem Johnston was having procuring weapons for unites whose men were either unarmed or equipped only with flintlocks, it is unlikely that at this point the Rangers received any arms from the Confederacy, except for a few revolvers which were sold to individual officers.33 There are numerous receipts for supplies in the Compiled Military Service Records which enumerate all types of material received by the command throughout the war, but it was only in July, 1864 that weapons appeared on the lists.  Those in that issue were identified simply as Austrian rifles.34  Terry personally exemplified his philosophy of massive firepower.  One of his men recorded that he carried four Tranter pistols, an English double-action revolver.35  In addition, he also purchased a Navy revolver from the Confederate government.36

Though the Rangers failed to find a battle at Bowling Green, they were finally within striking distance of the enemy and were subsequently issued their horses.  The animals were assigned in a most cavalier, but equitable manner.  Each man drew a number by lot which indicated in which order he would choose his mount.  Those drawing low numbers had their pick of the herd; those with high numbers got what was left. 37

The regiment was soon ordered to Oakland, Kentucky, where it completed its organization at Camp Johnston.  In the Confederate service, company officers had to be elected by their men, but field grade officers were appointed.  Terry and Lubbock, however, set the precedent of standing for election in what amounted to a vote of confidence.38 This was largely perfunctory, although some changes were made at the company level.  The only important change was Thomas Harrison's election to the rank of major.  The companies also drew lots for their letter designations.  The regiment then reported its organization to the War Office in Richmond so that it could receive its official designation and commissions for its officers.  The War Department assigned it the official title of Eighth Regiment Texas Cavalry, signifying, of course, that this was the eighth regiment of cavalry from Texas that had been organized and mustered into the Confederate Army. Because of the month's delay in organization between Houston and Camp Johnston this number was somewhat higher than was expected.39

In spite of now having an official designation, the unit and its friends clung to the unofficial title of "Texas Rangers" which had been used in conjunction with the prefixes "Terry's" and the “First Regiment of.”40 It is not readily apparent when and how they acquired the title Texas Rangers. The title "Ranger" was popular with cavalry units in the Confederate service, especially those from Texas.  As early as August 7 journalists referred to the proposed regiment as a “Ranging Regiment.”41 Although never officially assigned, the title "Ranger" came naturally and passed into standard usage.

[Map]
The Army of Tennessee's area of operations, Winter, 1861.
From Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry, p. 65.

As soon as the Eighth Texas was deployed at its base at Oakland and was organized, Johnston utilized it in limited offensive operations.  These were primarily reconnaissance patrols and raids to ascertain the location and strength of enemy forces and, whenever possible, to inflict casualties upon the enemy.42  The principal reason for these activities was to conceal Johnston's weakness.  A modern historian has deduced that by December Johnston was facing a well-armed Union army of 57,000 with only 22,253 effectives who were poorly armed and generally unhealthy.43 By sheer aggressiveness he foiled the Federal attempts to ascertain his strength.  In fact, in mid-October, General William T. Sherman reported to Secretary of War Simon P. Cameron that Johnston could march into Louisville whenever he desired.44

The Rangers were active particularly in the area around their base at Oakland, and had several successful engagements in which they managed to kill and capture some enemy soldiers and civilian spies.45 While the main result of these pin-pricks was to reenforce the illusion Johnston was creating of a powerful and aggressive Confederate Army, it was also important in enhancing the confidence of the Rangers and giving them combat experience without taking any serious chances.

Houston's company was the first to draw blood.  On November 5, the advance guard of an eighty man scout from Houston's and Evans' companies encountered enemy pickets and managed to kill one or two, wound at least one other, and to capture two or three more.  One of the wounded prisoners was a terrified young boy.  With perhaps more magnanimity than good judgment, he was released upon the promise that he would return home, rather than being formally paroled. 46

Most patrols had no contact and brought back forage rather than prisoners.  In spite of some Union sentiment in the area, their contacts with the civilians were normally friendly, and in some regions they were freely provided with apples, buttermilk, potatoes, cider, etc.47 The opposition of the Union elements was passive.  Graber recalled that at Edmonton, Kentucky, the ladies at a hotel unsuccessfully attempted to conceal a spy during a raid.  On the same patrol civilians also reported large numbers of Federal cavalry threatening to cut the Rangers off from their base.  Because there was no contact, Graber believed that these accounts were to induce the Rangers to free their prisoners and flee the area.  The Rangers did leave, but not without their prisoners.48

One engagement caused the command to lose its respect for Major Harrison and to give him a nickname to commemorate the incident.  Johnston had ordered Brigadier General William J. Hardee to send a force of infantry and artillery, reenforced by a squadron of Terry's Regiment, to Jamestown and Tompkinsville, Kentucky, with the instructions that "if the enemy are there [Jamestown] and not in too great force, attack and destroy them.  Proceed to Tompkinsville and do the same thing."49 He also instructed Hardee to “create the impression that this force is only an advance guard.”50 Colonel Patrick Cleburne commanded and Harrison, with two companies of Rangers, formed the cavalry escort.  A popular myth perpetuated by writers who did not consult the official records, has it that Harrison, with his two companies, ran into a force of 5,000 Federal troops, causing him promptly to order a retreat.51 Cleburne's report mentions the same incident, except that Harrison is not mentioned specifically:

Two miles from town, my advanced guard jumped the enemy's pickets.  The Texas Rangers, 10 in front, gave chase, followed 4 miles, when they suddenly found themselves in presence of 40 U. S. Cavalry. Our men fell back and sent for reenforcements.52

Harrison's action in withdrawing in the presence of superior forces displeased many of the men who had more courage than good judgment, and they accorded him the nickname “Jimtown Major.”53 That evening they had a more successful engagement.  Cleburne wrote:

. . . our cavalry pressed the enemy in the direction of the Cross-Roads so closely that they got confused and dispersed in the woods at McRea's Cross-Roads.  Our cavalry fell on the main body of the enemy's cavalry, about 100 strong, and after a little skirmish, in which the enemy broke and left and got 2 of their men killed, other men and horses wounded, without damage to us, our cavalry fell back 5 miles to camp for the night.54

A number of fully accoutered horses, as well as muskets, pistols, and sabers were captured in this engagement.  The Federal cavalry was so shattered and dispersed that even the infantry managed to catch a number of their horses.  Harrison was specifically mentioned in the report:

. . . for the way they [Harrison and a volunteer identified as Captain Phillips] managed to disorganize and disperse this large body of the enemy's cavalry in an unknown country in the night, and without one friend among the country people. 55

The only Ranger casualty was J. T. Bankhead of Company I who was mortally wounded when he and an officer of Cleburne's command blundered into their own pickets at night after having delivered a message.56

Captain Walker, with a force of about twenty-five men, also scored a success on the night of December 15.  He led the contingent toward Columbia with the intention of breaking up a quartermaster depot there.  About eight miles from town he learned of a picket at the fork of the Glasgow and Edmonton roads.  Some eight Texans advanced upon the enemy from the direction of Columbia and identified themselves as Federals.  When they had come within ten feet, they opened fire. The Texans claimed that they killed and wounded eight Yankees and captured twelve horses, fourteen mules, and a quartermaster identified as Colonel Fraime.  The raiders then returned to their camp without loss.57 The Northerners acknowledged the death of one soldier and the capture of a Captain Frain, formerly connected with the Ninth Kentucky Infantry (Union) quartermaster department and a citizen of Monroe County.58

In mid-December, these raids and skirmishes culminated in a general engagement with the Thirty-Second Regiment Indiana Infantry near Woodsonville, Kentucky.  General Alexander M. McCooks's Division of Don Carlos Buell's army was slowly but steadily applying pressure along this section of the Green River, and was repairing a bridge near Woodsonville.59  Brigadier General Thomas C. Hindman was at Cave City, Kentucky, confronting the Federal force with a command of some 1,200 infantry and artillery and Terry's Regiment. His command was not sufficient to repel the Yankees, but it was strong enough to contest their advance.  On the morning of December 17, two days after the bridge was completed, Hindman moved towards Woodsonville to destroy the railroad. Terry led the vanguard, a force of some 250 Rangers drawn from eight companies.  Hindman managed to get his command to the railroad within a mile of the river undetected, except for a company of Rangers which established an observation post on Rowlett's Knob and had a minor skirmish with the enemy's pickets.60

Colonel August Willich's Thirty-Second Regiment Indiana    Infantry was a German-American unit.  It was noted as one of the best drilled outfits in the United States Army, as might be expected of a regiment whose commander was a veteran officer of the Prussian army.61

Federal Captain Jacob Glass advanced towards the Confederates until he ascertained the presence of infantry in force, and then retired.  Another company proceeded down the road until attacked by the Rangers some time later.62 Exactly how this combat came about is not clear.  Hindman reported that thirty minutes after the initial firing ceased he left Terry in command with instructions to decoy the Yankees up the hill so that he could employ his infantry and artillery while out of range of Federal cannon.63 The plan of action was sensible, but his statement that he left the field to find a suitable place to camp was illogical. There was a battle pending and it was still early afternoon. Graber's statement that Terry said, "General Hindman, this is no place for you; go back to your infantry,"64 may have some basis in fact.

In the meantime, three Union companies joined Captain Glass's unit on the right flank, two others went to the support of the company advancing down the road on the left, and three others formed a reserve.65 The enemy took advantage of trees, fences, and whatever cover the terrain afforded to strengthen their position.  Terry sent for the Confederate infantry, but before it arrived the enemy opened fire and he ordered the cavalry to attack.  The battle was divided into two distinct engagements because of a railroad cut.  Terry led the assault on Glass's company in a cornfield, and Ferrill attacked the force on the enemy's left.66 Willich described the charge:

With lightning speed, under infernal yelling, great numbers of Texas Rangers rushed upon our whole force.  They advanced as near as 15 or 20 yards to our lines, some of them even between them, and then opened fire with rifles and revolvers.  Our skirmishers took the thing very coolly and permitted them to approach very close, when they opened a destructive fire on them. They were repulsed under severe loss, but only after Lieutenants [Henry] Sachs, who left his covered position with one platoon, was surrounded by about 50 Rangers, several of them demanding of him three times to give up his sword and let his men lay down their arms.  He firmly refused, and defended himself till he fell, with 3 of his men, before the attack was repulsed.

Frank Batchelor described it in more personal terms:

. . . raising in his stirrups Terry shouted in a clear loud voice "Charge them boys! Charge!" then bending low with drawn revolver he dashed forward toward the enemy; his words were hardly uttered before a wild shout broke from our ranks & with spurs closely pressed the column made the charge.... Our charge was not made in front, but on a line; our column running closely outside the fence, which served the enemy as a sort of breastwork & rest for their guns--Nothing could exceed the brilliancy & daring of that impetuous charge.  Our Shot Guns threw up a blaze of fire & shot almost into their faces--the distance between our lines did not exceed ten or fifteen feet....68

It was a contest between steady infantry, armed with slow firing single-shot rifles and bayonets; taking advantage of cover and concealment and fast moving cavalry armed with shotguns and pistols delivering a heavy volume of fire. Early in the battle Colonel Terry was struck in the head by a bullet and instantly killed.  The forces soon became intermixed with the Germans withdrawing upon their supporting elements with the Rangers pursuing.69

The accounts of Terry's death appear to have been influenced by emotion.  He was credited with charging a group of infantrymen, killing two but being killed in turn by a third.  Terry, his horse, his two victims, and a third Federal, perhaps the one who shot him, all fell together.70 The Tri-Weekly Telegraph reported that the Federal trooper who shot Terry was killed by a volunteer named Anderson.71 Robert F. Bunting, writing to the San Antonio Herald, however, reported that it was uncertain who fired the fatal shot.72  Clarence R. Wharton stated that some years afterwards Clem Basset averred that the man who allegedly killed Terry was captured, and Terry's son, David, was allowed to murder him.73

Ferrill had less luck.  He succeeded in driving the skirmishers in, but the enemy was formed into a compact body and was able to repel his three charges.  The Federals withdrew upon the arrival of Hindman's infantry.  When Willich saw Confederate infantry being committed, he withdrew his forces a short distance and the battle ended.74

Hindman reported that his casualties (including two wounded infantrymen) totaled four dead and ten wounded.  He also stated that some fifteen to twenty horses were lost.  Hindman had seven prisoners, but three others were too badly wounded to be moved and were left with private citizens after being given medical treatment.  The day after the battle Willich reported that he had eleven dead, twenty-two wounded, and five missing.  Probably the two extra captives held by Hindman were assumed by Willich to be dead.76 While the Federals suffered more casualties than the Confederates, Terry's Rangers lost their commander, a man in whom they had the greatest confidence and would remember with profound respect.

Shortly after Terry's death, Thomas Lubbock died of typhoid fever in Nashville.  On January 8, 1862, the day before the latter's demise, he was officially promoted colonel although he never served in that capacity due to his eleven week illness.  Lubbock's body followed Terry's to Texas and both were buried with military honors in Houston.77

Following the battle of Woodsonville, Johnston ordered the Eighth Texas from the line to rest and reorganize at Camp Terry, near Woodburn, Kentucky.  He reported that sickness and death had reduced the unit's strength to half its original number, and that its horses were also jaded.78 An election was held at this time which advanced Lubbock to colonel and promoted Walker from captain to lieutenant colonel.  Several company officers and noncommissioned officers were also elected to replace those lost through death, discharge, and resignation.  Upon Lubbock's death, John Wharton was elected colonel.  It was technically illegal for officers to be promoted over the heads of their seniors, e.g., Walker over Harrison, and Wharton over Walker and Harrison.  The previous November Benjamin had written Johnston concerning a proposal to appoint a colonel to the Third Kentucky Infantry, "The lieutenant-colonel has a right to promotion under law, unless incompetent, and in that event the major must be promoted over him. . . ."79 Johnston favored the regular system of promotion (the automatic advancement of Harrison), but a delegation of captains persuaded him to honor the wishes of the Regiment, and by inference, the precedent set by Terry.80

The Rangers' actions at a dress parade at Camp Terry reflected their attitude toward military formalities.  Frank Batchelor wrote to his wife:

This morning we were called out for General Inspection & dress parade. . . & having no field officers a brass buttoned Colonel of the regular Army was sent to Superintend it; if there is anything that a Texian Ranger hates particularly it is a man in Uniform and the Colonel's appearance on the field was a signal for all sorts of squibs at his expense; he had not gone far with the inspection, when a man let his thumb slip from the hammer of his gun

[Photo]
Undated Photograph of John A. Wharton, Organizer and First Captain of Company B and Regimental Commander December 1861-September 1862.
Courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

and sent a bullet whizzing close to his ears, another spurred his horse who sprang forward and nearly unseated him, another wanted to bet a brass button, "as big as the Colonel's," that he could rope his Plume &c.  These pleasantries made the inspection quite brief and the officers disgust was profound when upon the announcement of "Dismissal" the battalion set up a hideous "Yell" and pell mell, helter skelter for Camps they charged leaping logs fences and ditches on the way; in less than three minutes "brass buttons" was the only horseman on the ground.81

As Batchelor's letter indicated, the Rangers held the external trappings of rank in disdain.  One officer wrote afterward that he was unaware of any of the command's officers applying for a commission from the Secretary of War and that insignias representing rank were seldom seen except on the parade ground.  There was actually little need for insignias for the men knew their officers and their obligations to them.82

Rangers also had a casual attitude toward uniforms in general, for photographs of members of the Regiment show little regularity.  Throughout the war they were compelled to wear whatever came to hand.  Whether the apparel was originally intended for use by civilians or by members of the Federal Army was immaterial.  There was, however, an insignia that was worn proudly by the Rangers--the Texas Star.  The first Eighth Texas reference to it came in February 1862 when correspondent Robert F. Bunting wrote of new recruits and noted that “. . . the 'star' indicates that they are Texas Rangers.”83  This star was probably no different from that worn by other Texans in the Confederate service.  A year later Bunting reported that a new device to be worn on the hat had been adopted to distinguish the members of the Eighth Texas from those of the Eleventh Texas with whom they had been brigaded.  This was a five-pointed star with the letters T-E-X-A-S between the points with the name TERRY over the star and the letter R in the center.84 In a contemporary (but undated) photograph of five Rangers the stars of four are visible.  While details are not discernible, it is apparent that there are no letters between the points and nothing over the star.

After a relatively short period of combat the Rangers had established a reputation.  One trooper wrote home from Camp Terry that General Hindman had twice requested that General Hardee (their mutual division commander) return the Rangers to his command.85 Bunting expressed the same thought more expansively:  “General Hindman himself acknowledged that he could not sleep soundly at night since the Rangers were gone.”86

[photo]
Undated photograph of five Rangers.  These six names Furnished with Photograph:  left to right, Peter Kenwell, Dick Oliver (unidentified individuals), Felix G. Kennedy, William A. Lynch, George W. Archer, and Thomas S. Burney of Company C and subsequently Shannon's Scouts.
Courtesy of Mrs. Benjamin McF. Hines.

Sometime during late 1861 or early 1862 the Rangers established a close relationship with another famous Confederate cavalry command, John Hunt Morgan's squadron. The Rangers appreciated Morgan for his personal courage, bold tactics, and excursions behind enemy lines.  From time to time individuals would accompany him on his raids and patrols, both from their own volition and upon orders from their commanders.  In addition, there was a mutual understanding among the men that, while standing camp guard, neither unit would interfere with the activities of the other.87

During the Winter of 1861-1862 the regiment suffered more from the elements than from the enemy.  The unit was subjected to rain, sleet, and snow.  As the Rangers had left home in late summer, it is doubtful if more than a handful had brought winter clothes.  The wholly inadequate Confederate commissary was unable to meet the needs of the army, and the suffering of the soldiers would have been greater had it not been for shipments of winter clothing from home.  These items were eagerly awaited, not only for the material goods they provided, but also because they were a link with home.88

After a short period of rest, the Rangers returned to the line to establish a base at Bell's Tavern, some twelve miles from the Federals.  Because of illness, however, many were missing from the ranks.  Among these were Lieutenant Colonel Walker, who was still recovering from wounds received at Woodsonville, and Major Harrison who was ill and who was expected by some to resign.  Despite the proximity of the enemy and constant patrolling, there was very little contact, and that which did occur was insignificant. 89

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Chapter III
To Shiloh

On January 19, 1862 Johnston's inadequate defenses began to disintegrate when General George S. Crittenden lost both a battle and the life of his second-in-command, Felix Zollicoffer, at Mill Springs, Kentucky. Zollicoffer's body was returned to the Confederates by the victorious Federals by the end of the month. The Confederate honor guard was composed of General Hindman, his staff and the officers and several privates of the Eighth Texas. The Texans were conspicuous in their buffalo robes and Mexican-style clothing. The transfer was amicable, perhaps because of the liquor the Federals distributed. There was a general exchange of witticisms during which Captain Marcus L. Evans expressed the desire that they might soon return the kindness which brought the two sides together. It may be assumed that the Federals were less than enthusiastic as to this wish.1

The next blow to Johnston's army fell on its left flank when Fort Henry fell on February 6 and Fort Donelson capitulated on the sixteenth. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson gave the Federals control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, smashed Johnston's left flank and necessitated his withdrawal to a more viable position.2 There is some indication in the Official Records that a contingent of the Eighth Texas made up part of the force at Fort Henry. Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, the commandant, mentioned a detachment of "Rangers" under an acting-Captain Milton, and the index indicates that this was the Eighth Texas.3 There is, however, no other supporting documentation for that conclusion, and there is no indication that P. Milton of Company K, the only Milton associated with the command, ever served in any position other than private.4

On February 9, a week before Fort Donelson fell, the Rangers were ordered to pull back from their station on the Green River towards Bowling Green in response to pressure upon the forts. Harrison and half the command remained in the vicinity of the Green River scouting, while Wharton and the remainder proceeded towards Bowling Green which was being evacuated. On the morning of the fourteenth Federal artillery took a position commanding the town and commenced shelling it.5 While largely ineffectual, it was annoying and did cause the last locomotive to uncouple and pull away from its cars leaving a number of convalescent soldiers.6

Late that afternoon the Rangers, forming the rear guard, withdrew from the town after firing the depot and abandoned stores.7 Bunting stated that they formed the vanguard of the retiring force as well as the rear guard. While he did not state which element they were the van of, he probably meant of the rear guard which consisted of Hindman's Division and the cavalry. The retreat towards Nashville was without incident and without interference from the Federals. Hardships along the route were in the nature of shortages of rations, inclement weather, and the natural congestion of a retreating army.

On the night of the sixteenth and seventeenth the column arrived at Nashville. While en route, Fort Donelson fell, forcing Johnston to continue his retreat southward. On the twentieth, Wharton received orders to take a force and retrace his steps through Nashville to Charlotte, Tennessee. His mission was to cover the retreat of those who had refused to be surrendered at Fort Donelson, and also to collect Confederate livestock in the vicinity. The next day the Rangers that could be spared left with rations for two days; six days later this force rejoined the main army at Murfreesboro. Again the Federals failed to exploit their advantage and press the Confederates. The Rangers were thus enabled to accomplish their mission hampered only by cold and rainy weather.8 The citizens in the area were generous in providing them with food and fodder.9

On February 28 the army withdrew from Murfreesboro to Corinth, Mississippi, where Johnston determined to concentrate his force.I0 Several days later the cavalry, which was covering Johnston's rear, also left Murfreesboro. About March 3 the command arrived at Shelbyville, Tennessee, where it spent approximately five days.11 Here Harrison attempted to instill some discipline, but failing to do so, he acquired another nickname. The Rangers were encamped within a mile and a half of the town, but the men were not allowed to enter without permission. Wharton, being absent ill, left Harrison in command. The major, however, discovered two men in town without permission. He ordered them to return to camp, but they refused.

When he returned to camp he ordered these men arrested by the camp guards and placed on the pike, marking time. A Mr. Sam Ash of Company B . . went to these men and led them back to camp, telling them that no such disgraceful punishment should be inaugurated in the regiment. The infantry were passing frequently and we considered it a disgrace to the Texas Rangers to submit to such punishment.12 Afterwards Harrison became known as the "Mark-time Major," as well as the "Jimtown Major. "13

By March 8 Terry's Rangers were near Wartrace, Tennessee, after serving as pickets. There had been some relatively unimportant skirmishing between the pickets of the opposing forces in which the Eighth Texas probably participated. 14 After leaving the Shelbyville-Wartrace area the regiment slowly moved to Huntsville, arriving on the sixteenth or seventeenth. After a two day stay it continued its march by way of Decatur and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and Iuka, Mississippi, arriving at Corinth at an undisclosed date. Along the route bridges were burned to delay the enemy's advance. Although there is no direct evidence that it was the Rangers who burned these bridges, Graber gives that impression.15

At Corinth, the end of the retreat, the regiment pitched camp within two miles of the city. Health and morale improved and many who had been absent sick returned.16 The Rangers were also transferred from General Hardee's command, by whom they felt slighted, to that of General Pierre G. T. Beauregard. Judge James Love of Galveston stated that he had requested Johnston to assign the Rangers to his command.17 Beauregard visited Wharton in camp and captivated the men by his charming manner.18 While there, the regiment sent out several scouting parties.19 The only one of note was led by Wharton and Harrison and consisted of some 200 picked men.20 A Federal force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was sent to capture them, but was foiled by Wharton's timely withdrawal. Although these forays fatigued both men and horses, they at least kept the regiment occupied.21 While Johnston was massing his forces of some 40,000 men at Corinth, General Ulysses S. Grant was concentrating his at Pittsburg Landing about twenty miles to the north on the Tennessee River in Tennessee. Grant had approximately 42,000 troops under his immediate command while another 20,000 of Don Carlos Buell's army would join him later. Johnston determined that his best course of action was to attack Grant at Pittsburg Landing, destroy that force, and then turn on Buell before their juncture left him hopelessly outnumbered. Accordingly, on April 3 the Confederates began their advance with the intention of attacking on the fifth.22 The march order of April 3 specifically mentioned Wharton's command.

Wharton's regiment of Texas cavalry will be ordered forward at once to scout on the road from Monterey to Savannah between Mickey's and its intersection with the Pittsburg-Purdy road. It will annoy and harass any force of the enemy moving by the latter way to assail Cheatham's division at Purdy.23

The Rangers claimed that they were the first to leave Corinth and this order indicates that they were correct. The regiment of some 450 men guarded the left front and flank of Johnston's army. During the night of the fourth and fifth 100 were placed on picket and the remnant were within supporting distance.24 The weather was miserable. The men who were required to remain mounted were subjected to a heavy rain which drenched them and their equipment.25 The next morning Wharton committed a tactical error which endangered the entire operation. When day broke and the command was reassembled, the men requested permission to fire their arms, rather than risk battle with damp charges which could misfire. The Colonel consented and the weapons were discharged. The firing would have disclosed the presence of the Confederates if the Union army had been vigilant. Wharton was immediately summoned by his superiors and was undoubtedly reprimanded. Upon returning to his command he made a speech in which he acknowledged his error and exalted his men to atone for it in battle.26

The rain had more serious consequences for the Confederate army than causing the Eighth Texas a night's discomfort and the near disclosure of their positions. It hampered the march of Johnston's army and resulted in the attack being postponed twenty-four hours. Thus Saturday, the day the attack was originally scheduled, was spent reconnoitering the enemy's position.27

At sunrise April 6, 1862 the Confederates attacked and caught the Federal army by surprise, despite the day's delay, Wharton's blunder, and a brigade-sized engagement the previous day. The battlefield was roughly in the form of a box. Owl Creek on the Confederate left and Lick Creek on the right formed the sides and the Tennessee River the bottom. The creeks and river simultaneously contained the Federals and secured their flanks, but as Johnston was depending upon surprise and momentum to drive Grant's army into the Tennessee, it favored the Confederates more than the Federals. The terrain within the box, consisting of dense underbrush, ravines, and woods, made the cavalry practically useless.28 As a result, the Rangers were ineffectual the first day. They entered the battle on the extreme left flank at about 11:00 a.m.29 Shortly after their arrival ten men were detached to capture a cannon which they found abandoned with its horses disabled. The remainder of the regiment spent the morning following the infantry.30 About noon General Hardee directed the Texans to dismount and support a battery firing upon the enemy. The Federals soon retired and the General ordered Wharton to press them, apparently in conjunction with Morgan's squadron.31 In pursuing the enemy, the regiment was forced to cross a boggy ravine single-file which resulted in its becoming extended. Wharton, at the head of the column, crossed the ravine and

[Map of Shiloh]
Shiloh battlefield, April 6 and 7, 1862.
From Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, p. 757.

crested a summit some 300 yards from the starting point. The enemy, approximately forty yards away, then opened fire from their position in the woods behind a fence.32 Wharton was hit in the leg; Clinton Terry, Frank's brother who was serving as a volunteer aide, was mortally wounded; and thirty-one other men were killed or wounded.33 Wharton reported that he ordered the command to retreat 200 yards, to dismount, and fight on foot.34 Giles, however, stated that although some men had started throwing down the fence, most of the Regiment broke and fell back while Wharton and others attempted to prevent their flight.35 Before the cavalrymen could return to the engagement, infantry units came up and dislodged the enemy.36

The Rangers pressed forward and discovered an unsupported battery being harassed by enemy fire. Wharton dismounted five companies, threw them forward as skirmishers, and drove off the Federal troops.37 This ended the first day's fighting, although more casualties were suffered because of enemy artillery.38 Their performance was perhaps adequate, but certainly not spectacular. Bunting listed forty-one killed, wounded, or missing. Their only concrete accomplishment was the maintenance of pressure upon the already hard-pressed Yankees.

The Confederate army as a whole had more success. It forced Grant's forces steadily back from one line to another, almost driving them into the river. Some Federals, in fact, attempted to escape across the river and many more believed their situation to be hopeless. By afternoon, however, two events occurred which deprived the Confederates of their victory. General Johnston was shot in the leg and bled to death and, more important, the vanguard of Buell's column arrived.39 The Confederates in the meantime had become disorganized with many men absenting themselves from the battle to loot the Federal camps.40 When the last maximum effort was required to clear the enemy from the battleground, the Federals were too numerous and the available Confederates were too few.41

There was no combat during the night, although Federal gunboats shelled Confederate positions. Wharton posted a heavy picket 42 and the command slept on the field in the rain.43 With the arrival of part of Buell's forces and the break of day, Grant took the offensive. For the Rangers Monday was largely a repeat of Sunday. At about 10:00 a.m. Beauregard, now in command, ordered the Texans to counter-attack on the left. Wharton determined to charge the enemy from the rear. Again woods and a ravine forced the men into a column. When Wharton reached the site where he planned to form for the charge, his command was strung out some 400 yards. He found the field to be occupied by the enemy's reserve, thought to consist of two infantry regiments. The Federals opened fire and, though the Rangers at the head of the column tried to resist, they were forced back. The command fought the enemy on foot and notified Beauregard of the development.44 While thus engaged, Beauregard fell back, with the Rangers retiring with the infantry. Beauregard then ordered Wharton to move to the right to protect the retreat. The Colonel did as directed after detaching a company for scouting and two more to protect William H. Ketchum's Alabama battery.45 Ketchum had remained behind to cover his brigade's retreat when the withdrawal exposed it to a potentially fatal Union attack. With the support of the Rangers, however, it was able to keep the enemy at bay until Colonel Preston Pond, Jr.'s brigade was safe and then retire itself.46

The Texans camped that night in the rear of their retreating comrades and threw out pickets in cooperation with the other cavalry. Again it rained throughout the night. The next morning, Wharton, thinking that the fight had ended and suffering from his wound, turned the command over to Major Harrison.47

On Tuesday the cavalry, consisting of Nathan Bedford Forrest's and Wirt Adams' regiments and Morgan's squadron, as well as the Eighth Texas, covered Beauregard's retreat from the victorious but sluggish Federals. The operations during the morning and early afternoon were routine, restricted largely to the destruction of abandoned stores and equipment. During the late afternoon or early evening, however, Harrison learned that the Yankees were developing their position.48 General Sherman commanded this force consisting of his Third Brigade and the Fourth Illinois Cavalry.49 Major Harrison reported this to General Breckinridge, commander of the rear, who ordered the Texan to hold off the enemy as he was not yet ready to move. A company of some forty men, of Forrest's command, joined the 200-220 Rangers. The Major estimated that the enemy's cavalry numbered 300 men, and seeing that it was supported by infantry, fell back. The Federals attempted to outflank him, so Harrison withdrew again. He was then joined by a company of forty men from Colonel Adams' Regiment and learned that the remnant of Adams' command was prepared to block the enemy's flanking maneuver. Harrison thereupon returned to his original position to find that Forrest had joined his company. Together they decided to assault.50 Harrison rode up and down the line to instruct and to encourage his men. They were to ride to within twenty steps of the Yankee line, stop, and cut loose with their shotguns. Part of the encouragement consisted of urging the Rangers to follow their "Jimtown--Marktime Major.''51 Forrest, as senior officer, ordered the charge when the enemy infantry ineffectually discharged its pieces. The Confederates rushed forward at full speed and brushed the skirmishers aside. They halted just short of the Seventy-seventh Regiment Ohio Infantry which was waiting to receive the horsemen with bayonets. The Rebels thereupon fired their shotguns which, loaded with buckshot, proved effective at close range. Under this galling fire the Yankee infantry broke and ran, disrupting the Fourth Regiment Illinois Cavalry in their rear. The Confederates pursued with revolvers until stopped by the brigade's reserve formed in line of battle. The Federals, however, were firing too high, evidently to avoid hitting their own men who were intermixed with the Rebels. The Confederates, having expended their ammunition and seeing that this second line could not be broken, withdrew while still relatively unscathed.52 The intrepid Forrest, however, rode into the enemy line and although both he and his horse were wounded managed to escape.53 Harrison reported that this charge had cost his command two dead, seven wounded, and one missing. He was unaware of the losses of the other elements.54 Sherman reported that when the area was reoccupied he found that fifteen of his men had been killed and about twenty-five wounded.55 In addition the Texans had taken forty-three of his troops prisoner.56 More important than attrition, perhaps, were the tactical benefits of this charge. Sherman stated:

The check sustained by us at the fallen timbers delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were provided for and dead buried, and our troops being fagged out by three days' hard fighting, exposure and privation, I ordered them back to camp, where all now are.57

The Confederate army was thus able to retire to Corinth unmolested.

This engagement also resulted in most of the regiment's members revising their opinion of Major Harrison. Whereas the incident at Jamestown reportedly caused them to question his courage and the episode near Shelbyville represented him as a martinet, the charge on Tuesday showed him to be a capable and resourceful combat officer. As one man wrote, ". . . one 'gritty' little Major, Tom Harrison of Waco[,] showed himself to be a soldier from his 'boot soles up.'''58

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Chapter IV
Return to Kentucky

After the Battle of Shiloh the Eighth Texas helped cover the withdrawal of Beauregard's Army to Corinth.  Failing in an attempt to draw Sherman's force into an ambush following the charge on April 8, 1862, General John C. Breckinridge ordered the regiment to defend the Hamburg road where it was expected that the enemy would attack.  There was no attack, but there was rain. 1  Also on April 8 the regiment drove forty mules from the battle area. 2  The next morning the unit rode to Monterey and from there to Beauregard's headquarters where it stood picket that evening.  On Thursday the Rangers were ordered to escort invalids, both Northerners and Southerners, from the hospital to a more secure location. The cavalrymen walked while the casualties rode.  The date of the regiment's return to Corinth went unrecorded, but it was probably around the twelfth. 3

The exposure and hardship of the Shiloh campaign took a higher toll on the Texans than simply the sixty-six men Wharton reported as battle casualties. 4  Numerous soldiers were furloughed or discharged during the succeeding weeks because of poor health. 5  The officers, in particular, were not loathe to absent themselves.  A second lieutenant wrote in disgust:

Our Regiment has suffered sadly for want of field officers ever since the fall of Terry & this is the reason we have made so little progress-- Wharton is not strong enough to endure the exposure & has been a good deal absent on account of sickness--Lt. Col. Walker it seems is never going to return; he has been absent over 4 months & many in the Regt are so disgusted by his conduct in absenting himself that they call him a humbug; our Major has been sick & absent three fourths of this time; our Adjutant ditto--out of ten captains we have only 4 present and ready for the field--I would to God we had Col. J. H. Morgan to fill the place of Terry. 6

This officer was not alone in his opinions.  Nicholson, even before the battle, stated that since Terry's death he would have preferred to be in Morgan's squadron. 7  In June a "veteran" of nearly three months stated that the command was disgusted with its “commanding officers.” 8

A relatively large number of recruits arrived at this time, helping to replace some of the losses.  One group came organized as a company, apparently led by a Captain Johnson (given name not ascertained), 9 while others reported individually.  Some joined the existing companies for the war, whereas others formed a new company sworn in for three months duty and lettered "L." 10  A substantial number of the new recruits had arrived before Shiloh and had fought with the established companies and had suffered some casualties. 11 One youth, at least, was not particularly well equipped.  He arrived with neither horse nor pistol, but he did have the forethought to bring a servant. 12  On April 28 the regiment numbered 813, of which 485 were effectives. 13

The absence of details concerning the activities of the command during this period suggests that it was relatively idle and engaged more in "licking its wounds" than in conducting operations.  There were persistent rumors of orders to return to Tennessee which were based upon actual intentions of the commanders. 14 At least partially because of the poor condition of the horses, the command remained stationary until the twenty-third when it marched some fifteen miles to Rienzi in hopes of finding more plentiful forage. 15  Horses, besides being difficult to maintain, were also in short supply.  In mid-May the Tri-Weekly Telegraph reported that at least 125 men were without mounts. 16

On the night of the twenty-fourth a report that Federals had launched an attack caused the command to prepare to march.  It began to rain, but the regiment was held in readiness from midnight until nightfall of the next day when word came that there would be no movement.  By the twenty-seventh the unit was ordered to Russellville, Alabama to procure fodder and to protect the area from Federal raiders. 17 It was reported at the time that this was the beginning of the long awaited return to Tennessee.  It does not appear, however, that this march was conducted with any great urgency as the men found plenty of time to write letters and at least one found time to go fishing. 18

The movement to Tennessee seems to have been more or less coordinated with the actions of other cavalry units, notably Morgan's, and intended as a diversion. 19 One trooper wrote home that on May 6 the force consisted of some 3,500 men and three pieces of artillery and that they were to cross the Tennessee River the next day. 20  Bunting reported that General William N. R. Beall was in charge of the combined regiments of Scott, Morgan, and Wharton. 21 Probably at this time Captain William Y. Houston commanded the Rangers.  On April 22 he was mentioned as the ranking officer because of the absence of the field officers. 22  On May 11 Bunting reported that Wharton had returned and was on his way to join the regiment which was either in Tennessee or en route. Harrison had recovered but was in Corinth to participate in the expected battle between Beauregard and Halleck.  There was no mention of Walker. 23

In early May the regiment entered Tennessee after crossing the Tennessee River at Lambs Ferry near Courtland, Alabama. 24  On the eighth a detachment of about eighty men under Captain Houston joined Lieutenant Colonel T. G. Woodward and a force of 350-400 men of the First Regiment Kentucky Cavalry South for a raid against the enemy at the town of Bethel on the Elm River, some thirty-two miles from Lambs Ferry. 25  It was discovered, upon arrival, that the Federals were not at Bethel but there was a small detachment guarding a trestle nearby. 26 Woodward's force was to attack while Houston was to cut off retreat. 27 The plans were disrupted when the Confederates discovered a party of six Yankees in a hand car, necessitating an attack upon this group to prevent the bringing of reinforcements.  The resultant firing alarmed the main body of the enemy whom the Rangers immediately assaulted.  The Federals were forced from their positions and sought refuge among some buildings. As the Texans were preparing to envelop them, Woodward's Kentuckians rode up, surrounded the buildings and poured bullets into them, causing the Federals to surrender. 28  The enemy lost about fifteen dead,29 a dozen wounded,30 and forty-seven men and officers and eight Negroes captured. Five Confederates were killed,31 including Captain Harris and two other Rangers,32 and seven more Rebels were wounded. 33

On May 9 the Rangers (except for a force of between seventy and eighty men left with the baggage), the First Kentucky Cavalry, and some Tennessee cavalry set out on an expedition led by Colonel John Adams. 34  The Rangers were less than pleased with this service.  From Adams' report it appears that his idea of a raid was to capture enemy couriers  (which he succeeded in doing) and to force the enemy constantly to shift his forces to protect likely objectives. To do Adams justice, the Federals in this area were strong and energetic and many desirable targets were too dangerous to attack. 35 The Rangers, however, felt that Adams should have been more aggressive.  Particularly frustrating was his failure to assault a large wagon train guarded by only two men per wagon and his failure to make prisoners of the garrison at Fayetteville.  These men had sent a civilian to inform the Confederates of their desire to surrender so that they could be paroled and sent home until exchanged. 36  Perhaps the highlight of the expedition was the raid on Winchester conducted during Adams' absence.  Graber reported that while at Hawkins Cove on May 22 a Union foraging party was reported in the vicinity.  Company B of the Rangers and a company of the Kentucky regiment started off in pursuit. 37 Adams noted that the force was sent out by Wharton for reconnaissance, 38 while a Ranger wrote, "About a hundred of our regiment and Kentuckians got drunk one day and ran into the town ....” 39  Whatever the particulars, the force charged into the town, captured nine men of the picket, and reached the center of the town where the enemy, though caught by surprise, began returning fire from the brick courthouse.  The Confederates then beat a hasty retreat fearful of the enemy's artillery. 40 Adams reported two men dead and six wounded.  It was estimated, probably erroneously, that in addition to the nine prisoners an additional nine or ten Federals were killed.  The next day the Yankees evacuated the town. 41

Shortly before the Winchester raid, Wharton and Adams had a dispute.  Apparently the brigade was formed while Wharton was still absent and Adams was tendered command although Wharton was the senior officer.  Wharton wrote, "I had a conversation with Colonel Adams upon my arrival, in which I informed him I should assume command until I was ranked."42 Adams stated in his report that Wharton did not wish to serve under him and was also unwilling to assume command of the brigade, preferring the respective units only to cooperate. To settle matters, Adams went to Chattanooga to submit the problem to his superiors.  Beauregard ruled that the date of commission would determine the commander. 43  Graber recalled that on the day after the Winchester raid there was a meeting between the two commanders.  Adams announced his decision to start for Chattanooga to secure new forces.

Colonel Wharton had become exasperated at General  [sic] Adams' conduct the entire trip and told him to take his Kentucky regiment and go to Halifax with it, if he wanted to--that he intended remaining in Middle Tennessee and doing what he could to carry out the original order of General Beauregard. 44

This was basically how the problem was solved.  However, it was the Rangers who went back to Chattanooga, apparently at Beauregard's orders, while Adams stayed in Middle Tennessee until he was driven out. 45

In spite of some accomplishments, this operation was neither a success, nor a failure.  The command stayed intact and inflicted more casualties than it took, but a good deal of time and effort was spent in self-preservation.  The Federals were energetic in their efforts to trap the Confederates.  To escape, a part of the Eighth Texas and the Kentuckians with them had to ride for eighteen days to Chattanooga. 46 The rivalry of the commanders was also probably deleterious to morale.  William Nicholson summed up the situation and his feelings when he recorded:

. . . the enemy got in between us and the river and chased us all over Tenn. and Ga. and Ala.  I think we could have whipped them if we had the right sort of commanding officer, most of the men are getting tired of their Regimental officers and of the Regiment.  I am tired of it myself, and must either have a transfer or a substitute if the war is going to last much longer which I think it will from all appearances. 47

Nicholson, despite his discouragement, obtained neither a transfer nor a substitute, but remained with the command until his death in battle in October 1864.  Another letter concerning the same incident stated:

. . . a portion of our regiment were cut off on the north side of Tennessee river and had to make there [sic] way through 20,000 Yankees around Huntsvill [sic], and other places but they all got through safe & sound and we are all together at this place.  They had to travel most of the time at night and had to eat just anywhere they could get.  I think Cousin Nish was the worst shipped man I ever saw near 6 weeks without any clothing except what he had on. 48

The detachment left to protect the wagons was in for more than its share of the action.  One man reported that after the departure of the expedition the troopers proceeded to an unnamed town to shoe horses.  While there, the picket was driven in and an enemy force he estimated as 4,000 strong  (probably an exaggeration) effected their prompt evacuation. He gave the impression that all escaped and made no mention of losses of stores. 49 Graber, however, stated that all materiel was left behind, including cooking utensils and tents. 50

While at Chattanooga the regiment engaged a Federal gunboat on the Tennessee which threatened the city.  Except for its novelty, this action was unremarkable.  Major General Ormsby M. Mitchell, the commander of the Federal forces, extemporized a gunboat which he announced ready for service on May 15. 51  Its armament was not particularly impressive, consisting of a twelve-pound howitzer, two six-pound rifled cannon and armor of cotton bales. 52  It was, however, enough to worry the inhabitants of Chattanooga.  The Rangers fought two apparently ludicrous engagements with this vessel.  On the first occasion three Rangers attacked it and "drove" it ten miles downstream.  On the second, thirteen Rangers unsuccessfully attempted to board it. 53  It is doubtful that the Rangers' shotguns did much structural damage, but the Federals decided to use the vessel as a bridge across Battle Creek rather than for its original purpose. 54

A more significant incident of this period was an effort on the part of the Regiment to get itself transferred, preferably back to Texas or to General Hindman who had recently assumed command of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Two sentences in two different letters are all that has been found concerning this attempt.  The first, James Love, a correspondent of the Teleqraph, writing as "Galveston" stated, "An agent of the regiment is now in Richmond to get it transferred, if possible, to Hindman or to Texas."55 The next day another soldier wrote to his parents, "Col. Wharton has sent to Richmon[sic] to try and get the regiment transfered [sic] to Texas (and) we are looking for the gentleman to get back every hour."56  The absence of further material on the episode and the fact that the Rangers were not transferred adequately testify to its failure.

On June 9 Beauregard ordered Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest to assume command of the cavalry in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee. 57  When Forrest arrived at Chattanooga ten days later he found the Eighth Texas, William J. Lawton's Second Regiment Georgia Cavalry, James J. Morrison's First Regiment Georgia Cavalry, and a hundred Kentuckians under Lieutenant Colonel Woodward.  He spent half a month organizing this force and gathering information about Federal deployment before making his move. 58

By early July, Forrest was ready to begin offensive operations, choosing as his first objective Murfreesboro where there was a large Federal garrison.  The town also was an important supply depot vital to Buell's offensive operations against Chattanooga. 59 Forrest crossed the Tennessee River with the Second Georgia and Eighth Texas on July 9, 1862, and rode the forty miles to McMinnville in two days. Here he was joined by Morrison with part of the First Georgia, two companies of C. C. Spiller's Tennessee Battalion, two independent companies, and a few private volunteers, making a total he estimated as 1,400 men.  He rested a day to prepare his forces for the dash upon Murfreesboro.  At 1:00 p.m. the brigade departed McMinnville and marched the fifty miles to Murfreesboro, stopping only briefly for food, and arrived undetected at about 4:30 a.m. on the thirteenth. 60 A company of the Eighth Texas was detailed to capture the picket silently.  The men accomplished this by first identifying themselves as Federals and divulging their true identity only after they were holding guns on the enemy. 61 Forrest learned that the Ninth Regiment Michigan Infantry and the Seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Cavalry (consisting of five and two companies respectively)62 were camped near the edge of town and the Third Regiment Minnesota Infantry and Hewett's Kentucky Battery were posted over a mile away on the other side of the community.  There was also a small force at the courthouse for provost duty to protect the headquarters of the new commander, Brigadier General Thomas T. Crittenden63 and to guard some 150 political prisoners. 64  This division of troops was a fatal error.

Forrest determined to divide his command into three assault forces each being assigned to destroy a portion of the Federals.  Failing in this they were to pin down their counterparts so that the entire force could be destroyed piecemeal.  Wharton was to attack the first encampment containing the cavalry and infantry.  Lawton's Georgians, the Tennesseans, and the Kentuckians were to attack the camp containing the artillery and the Third Minnesota while Morrison with Forrest would reduce those about the courthouse. 65

The command formed a column of fours and advanced down the pike.  With daybreak the Confederates sighted the Federal bivouac and charged. 66  The first camp hit was that of the Pennsylvania and Michigan contingents.  Just how effective was the surprise is debatable.  The Rebels reported that they caught the enemy completely unaware 67 while Colonel William W. Duffield commanding the Ninth Michigan wrote:

The noise of so many hoofs at full speed upon the macadamized roads was so great that the alarm was given before the head of the column reached our pickets, about 1 mile distant, so that our men were formed and ready to receive them, although they came in at full speed. 6

As the Confederates rode over the Pennsylvanians before coming to Duffield's command, bot